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Abstract 
 
 
Anecdotal and subjective evidence suggests that the manual flying ability of pilots operating 
highly automated aircraft is declining owing to a lack of opportunity to exercise such skills in 
the modern air transport environment. However, there is a paucity of objective evidence to 
support this safety concern. Consequently, the work presented in this thesis aims to provide 
empirically derived data to evaluate the extent and causes of the speculated manual skills 
decline and guide possible intervention strategies.  
 
Initially a cognitive task analysis is undertaken to determine the cognitive demands of 
performing manual flight in a large jet transport aircraft. Expert pilots report employing highly 
refined mental models structures which enable them to predict the aircrafts performance 
whilst causing minimal burden to their mental capacity. The study concludes that when 
measuring manual flying performance careful consideration must be given to designing a task 
which challenges both the cognitive and physical aspects of manual flying skill.  
 
Secondly, relatively novel pilot performance measures based upon the frequency analysis of 
control input data are evaluated. An empirical study finds that these techniques are both 
reliable and sensitive to manual flying performance. Furthermore, when studying large 
transport aircraft, such measures of the pilots control strategy are found to contribute valuable 
information about performance which is missing when just traditional ‘outer-loop’ performance 
measures are applied. The study concludes that these measures of control strategy are 
valuable in evaluating manual flying performance.  
 
Finally, the manual flying skills of a sample of pilots of highly automated aircraft are evaluated 
on a challenging manual flying task. A significant proportion exhibit poor manual flying 
performance as judged by a type rating examiner. Further analysis reveals that the 
performance of the pilots is significantly influenced by the amount of recent manual handling 
experience they have accumulated, rather than their longer-term manual flying experience. 
Significantly, airspeed tracking ability is influenced which is cited elsewhere as a causal factor 
in many manual flying skill related accidents. The results support the previous anecdotal and 
subjective concerns relating to the loss of manual flying skills. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Given that weather conditions over the UK were relatively benign, the pilots of 
an Airbus A321 airliner returning to Nottingham East Midlands airport elected 
to perform a manual approach. This involved disengaging the auto-pilot and 
auto-thrust systems and ‘hand flying’ the aircraft via its side-stick controller, 
rudder pedals and thrust levers. The flight director system remained engaged, 
providing assistive flight guidance information to the crew. However, because 
they failed to select the approach mode on the Flight Management and 
Guidance System (FMGS) the flight director did not prompt the crew to 
descend towards the runway. Consequently, the aircraft was allowed to fly 
through the Instrument Landing System (ILS) glideslope and became slightly 
high on the approach. The crew, realising their error, elected to deselect the 
flight director and continue following the ILS using raw data alone. The slight 
perturbation in profile was relatively minor and should have been safely 
recoverable in the distance remaining. However, the handling pilot was unable 
to perform a stable approach in this manual condition.  The aircraft oscillated 
significantly on the ILS and the airspeed was allowed to bleed off excessively. 
The aircraft arrived over the runway threshold with low energy, requiring the 
pilot to command an unusually nose high attitude in order to arrest its rate of 
descent. The touch down was heavy and the high body angle caused the 
aircraft to strike its tail on the runway surface, resulting in substantial 
structural damage. The subsequent accident investigation found the aircraft to 
be fully serviceable prior to the event. It highlighted several issues with the 
flight but primarily noted that the pilot’s manual flying skill was inadequate and 
a significant contributory factor (AAIB, 2002). A review of the recent UK 
accident and incident reports (Ebbatson, 2006) revealed many similar events, 
all in which the manual flying ability of the handling pilot was considered to be 
lacking. This thesis will investigate how differences in exposure to manual 
flight operations influence the strength of a pilot’s manual flying skill.  
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1.1 Background 
 
The evolution of the airliner flight deck from primitive wheel-house to highly 
automated control room has been driven by the concurrent desires for 
increased efficiency and safety in flight operations. In the past, the approach 
to the integration of flight deck automation has been predominantly 
technology driven. Automatic functionality has often been incorporated into 
aircraft designs as and when it has become available, simply with the view 
that more is better (Billings, 1997; Hawkins, 1998). The support offered by 
automation on the flight deck has been touted as a means of freeing up crew 
capacity and suppressing human error at its source, by substitution of the 
human. However the validity of this approach has been strongly challenged 
on human factors principles (Wiener, 1988; Billings, 1997; Parasuraman, 
Sheridan and Wickens, 2000; Goteman and Dekker, 2003). It is apparent that 
automation sometimes fails to work as a co-operative crew member and, 
rather than aiding pilots in their work, it becomes a hindrance which must be 
‘worked around’.  
 
During initial training, all pilots are taught the complex psychomotor and 
cognitive skills required to control their aircraft by physical manipulation of the 
primary flying controls i.e. basic manual flying skills (see JAR-FCL). 
Conversely, during routine operation of a modern jet transport aircraft it is 
more common for the flight path and energy to be controlled by a combination 
of automated systems (i.e. the auto-pilot and auto-throttle). In this mode of 
operation the psycho-motor aspect of control is minimal and the cognitive 
aspect is modified (Damos, John and Lyall, 2005; Latorella, Pliske, Hutton 
and Chrenka, 2001), with the emphasis of the pilots work shifted towards 
higher order cognition (i.e. complex decision making & problem solving).  
 
The opportunity for airline pilots to practise basic manual flight is usually 
minimal, although this is somewhat modulated by the type of carrier, its fleet, 
operational philosophy and route network. For example, two of the most 
prominent European low cost carriers have quite distinct operational 
 12 
philosophies, one encouraging routine manual flight over use of the 
automatics wherever possible and the other vice versa. The only mandatory 
requirement for manual flying proficiency to be evaluated (outside of initial 
training and type rating) is during the biannual Operator Proficiency Check 
(OPC) and annual License Proficiency Check (LPC). Even on these 
occasions only a small set of manual handling tasks with limited scope are 
stipulated (see CAA Standards Document 24). 
 
However, the ability of the pilot to revert to basic manual control is essential, 
for example, in cases where the aircraft’s automatic capability is diminished or 
when reconfiguring the automatics is an ineffective use of the crew’s capacity 
(Amalberti, 1998).  It is conceivable that, due to the infrequent opportunity to 
exercise manual flying skill in modern flight operations, crew may experience 
“out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity” (Wickens, 2000) and their basic flying ability 
may diminish over time. The threat of this skill fade is a concern shared by 
pilots, operators, regulators, manufacturers and researchers alike (Baron, 
1988; Childs and Spears, 1986; Parasuraman, Molloy and Singh, 1993; 
Tenney, Rogers and Pew, 1998).  
 
There is much subjective affirmation of this concern in the manual flying skills 
literature (see following sections) but a paucity of objective data with which to 
support it, nor much suggestion as to a viable future strategy for monitoring 
manual flying ability on a day-to-day basis. In order for regulators and 
operators to address the safety concern higher quality, empirically derived 
data must be available which better defines the nature of the potential 
problem. This research programme aims to provide these data and develop 
methods to assist other research in the field.  
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1.2 Rationale for Research 
 
1.2.1 Automated Flight 
 
The late 1970s were a turning point in the evolution of flight deck design. 
Rising oil prices coupled with advances in microprocessor technology saw the 
emergence of ‘two crew’ operations which dispensed with the flight engineers 
position, their role being absorbed by sophisticated automated systems. This 
transition significantly shaped the modern flight deck environment. The 
literature divides flight deck automation into three principle types (Billings, 
1997), these being information automation, control automation and 
management automation. 
  
Information automation relates to the presentation of flight related information 
and is encapsulated by the Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) found 
in most modern aircraft. When operating aircraft equipped with these systems 
the crew view highly processed information via computer generated ‘glass’ 
displays rather than having to gather and mentally process large amounts of 
raw data from a disparate array of electro-mechanical gauges.  
 
Control automation governs the aircraft’s flight path and energy and when 
engaged has (limited) authority over the principle flying controls. Modern 
autopilots and auto throttles have advanced significantly since the early 
generation jets. They allow the pilot to delegate short term tactical flight goals 
and are capable of performing sophisticated vertical transitions and automatic 
landings with incredible reliability and precision.  
 
Management automation relates to the long term strategic planning of the 
aircraft’s operation and guidance. The Flight Management System (FMS) is 
perhaps the most significant piece of technology to be incorporated into the 
modern flight deck. These systems integrate navigational and environmental 
data and use complex algorithms to continually compute highly optimised 
flight paths which satisfy a series of strategic goals stipulated by the crew (i.e. 
fly from waypoint A to waypoint B, cross waypoint C above a certain altitude, 
 14 
climb to an altitude using the most fuel efficient profile etc.). Furthermore the 
pilots can choose for the FMS to deliver its guidance information directly to 
the autopilot and auto throttle systems where it can be executed, thereby 
integrating the automated control and management of the aircraft. 
 
The result of automation has been vast increases in the precision of 
navigation and the efficiency of aircraft operations. However, it has also 
brought about a fundamental shift in the way pilots operate their aircraft, 
redistributing workload and creating fresh opportunity for human error to occur 
(Sarter, Woods and Billings, 1997; Harris, Hancock, Arthur and Caird, 1995). 
Pilots have predominantly become aircraft managers rather than direct 
controllers, spending the majority of their time planning the flight, 
programming the automation and monitoring its operation rather than actively 
handling the flying controls (Wood, 2004). 
 
1.2.2 Manual Flying Skill 
 
At a very basic level, manual flying skills may be defined as those which are 
displaced by the presence of automation on the flight deck. As previously 
noted automation is responsible for both the processing of flight information 
and the physical manipulation of the aircraft and therefore it seems logical that 
in the absence of these automated systems the pilot must employ both 
cognitive and psychomotor skills to compensate. Certainly the psychomotor 
aspect is observable in that the pilot must physically actuate the aircrafts 
primary flying controls to govern its orientation and trajectory in the absence 
of the autopilot and autothrottle. However, the previous examination of 
automation functionality shows us that in the absence of information and 
management automation systems, such as the FMS and electronic flight 
displays, the pilot must also employ significant cognitive skills. These skills 
are required in order to assess the aircrafts current condition, predict its future 
state and plan flight paths which satisfy navigational requirements.  
 
Naturally the demand placed on these manual flying skills is not uniform 
across the flight profile but is dependent upon the transient nature of the 
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aircraft. For instance during cruising, straight and level, flight the aircrafts 
state tends to be relatively steady and when properly trimmed few physical 
inputs are required and little cognitive effort is required to monitor the 
situation. Contrastingly, during the departure and climb and the approach to 
landing phases the aircraft’s state tends to be highly transitory both in the 
horizontal and vertical planes. It takes far more physical input to guide the 
aircraft during this phase and much more cognitive involvement to monitor 
and predict its path and energy. A more detailed definition of the differences 
between manual and automated flying skills will be developed throughout the 
course of the thesis. 
 
1.2.3 Evidence for the Loss of Manual Flying Skills from Pilot Attitude 
Surveys 
 
As highly automated airliners began to enter operation a great deal of new 
human factors research also began, much of it focusing on the skills required 
to operate the novel technology and potential errors which may occur (Curry, 
1985; Wiener, Chute and Moses, 1999; Tenney, Rogers and Pew, 1998). 
Researchers also showed interest in the attitudes of the pilots who were the 
first to transition to these new types. The earliest signs that pilots were 
concerned about the potential loss of their manual flying skills owing to the 
operation of highly automated airliners emerged through this work. Although 
these surveys of opinion extended for more than a decade few empirical 
measurements of flying proficiency were collected during this time to 
substantiate or refute the concerns they presented.    
 
Curry (1985) distributed a cockpit automation attitude measurement scale to 
recently appointed Boeing 767 pilots who had transitioned from older 
generation aircraft. Over 80% of the sample ‘strongly agreed’ that the new 
generation of flight deck technology could lead to a degradation of manual 
flying skill, however only 63% of respondents believed their own skills had 
suffered. This disparity was either an artefact of the pilots’ self rating biases, 
or may indicate that crew of the time were still working around the automatics 
and operating their aircraft like they had the previous generation of ‘manual’ 
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airliners. The latter suggestion was supported by a second statistic from the 
research which reported that 87% of the sampled pilots were seeking to hand 
fly the aircraft as much as possible on every sector. Similar results were 
obtained in a study of crew transitioning from the early generation DC-9-10/30 
to its highly automated variant, the DC-9-80 (MD-80) (Curry, 1985) and also 
between electro-mechanical and highly automated variants of the Boeing 737 
(Wiener, Chute and Moses, 1999). 
 
Flight crews of this generation were evidently sufficiently confident in their 
manual flying ability to disengage the automatics from time to time and 
exercise their skills. It is likely that this is because those crews had a 
considerable foundation of manual operating experience to fall back on.  
However the modern pilot demographic is considerably different to that which 
existed at the time of the aforementioned research. Highly automated airliners 
are now prolific amongst the airline fleets of developed nations and have been 
for some time. Even many highly experienced pilots have likely spent the 
majority of their career operating highly automated types. With smaller 
turboprops and regional jets (the starting point for many flying careers) now 
also incorporating highly automated flight decks many of the younger 
generation of pilots may not have been exposed to ‘manual’ types outside of 
their ab-initio training.  
 
The current generation of pilots may therefore conceivably lack the same 
foundation of manual handling experience which gave earlier generations the 
confidence to routinely revert to manual control and maintain proficiency 
(Curry, 1985). With a lack of experience feeding a lack of confidence to build 
experience the problem could likely worsen. The phenomenon is exacerbated 
by other developments in the air transport environment. As highly automated 
aircraft have demonstrated increasingly reliable and precise navigation, 
operational procedures have evolved to exploit this capability, allowing higher 
traffic flows through airspace whilst improving environmental and economic 
performance. Many airport departure and arrival navigational procedures are 
now highly complex and principally designed to be flown via the automatics. 
They can be difficult to fly manually in large high performance aircraft. 
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Furthermore airlines have introduced Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) 
programmes to feedback operational performance data into their Safety 
Management Systems (SMS). Whilst these programmes have been hugely 
beneficial to flight safety, if they are improperly implemented they could 
potentially further deter crews from disengaging the automatics since poor 
manual performance is likely to be detected and questioned. 
 
Owen and Funk (2007) summarised the concern more recently when they 
undertook an online meta-review of perceived flight deck automation 
problems, citing evidence from research literature to either support or refute a 
collated set of issues. Part of this review detailed manual flying skills issues 
caused by the operation of highly automated aircraft. A total of 31 pieces of 
evidence were found to support the statement “Pilots may lose psychomotor 
and cognitive skills required for flying manually or for flying non-automated 
aircraft, due to extensive use of automation”.  Although this is a reasonably 
large body of evidence, the nature of the data sources limits its objectivity. 
The data were almost exclusively derived from the compilation of subjective 
pilot opinion (bar a single incident survey and two citations from accident 
reports), the majority of which is sourced from just two principle research 
studies (Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1989). Whilst this evidence provides compelling 
support for the existence of a safety concern, it does not offer an objective 
grounds to measure the extent of the problem.  Furthermore, it is evident that 
the assumed definition of ‘manual flying skill’ varies considerably between 
sources. In some cases just the physical components of skill are considered, 
relating primarily to the impact of control automation (see Billings, 1997). In 
other cases the cognitive aspects of manual flying skill are considered, 
relating to the impact of information and management automation (Billings, 
1997).  
 
 
1.2.4 Evidence for the Loss of Manual Flying Skills from Accident Data 
 
The analysis of past accidents and incidents is an important means of 
assessing where operational risks exist and guiding intervention strategies. 
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Previous studies have reported that between 70% and 80% of aviation 
accidents result from some form of human error (O’Hare, Wiggens, Batt and 
Morrison, 1994). However, establishing accident causality is notoriously 
difficult since there are typically multiple convening factors which make up an 
accident sequence. Consequently, it may be complex to isolate the 
contributory factors, such as manual handling deficiency, and to distinguish 
cause from effect. However, frameworks and taxonomies have been created 
which aim to make the analysis of these events more systematic.  
 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is one such 
taxonomy which extracts the human factors which contribute to an accident or 
incident sequence. HFACS has been widely applied and well validated 
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  It is based upon Reasons ‘Swiss cheese’ 
accident model (1990) and structured around four hierarchical levels 1) 
Organisational influences 2) Unsafe supervision 3) Preconditions for unsafe 
acts, and finally 4) Unsafe acts of the operator (see figure 1). Each level is 
sub-divided into more specific elements.  
 
When examining the contributory actions of the flight crew to accidents, as is 
the case when looking for evidence of manual flying deficiencies, the focus 
falls on the ‘unsafe acts’ level of HFACS. Unsafe acts are broken down into 
three types of error 1) Decision errors 2) Skill-based errors, and 3) Perceptual 
errors.  Manual flying deficiencies are encompassed principally by the ‘skill-
based error’ category which is defined by Weigmann & Shappell (2003) as 
“stick-and-rudder and other basic flight skills that occur without significant 
conscious thought”. The authors of the methodology cite ‘breakdown in visual 
scanning’, ‘poor technique’ and ‘over-controlled the aircraft’ as typical aviation 
skill based errors. 
 
There are distinct performance phases which define the process of skill 
acquisition. Rasmussen’s skill-rule-knowledge framework (Reason, 1990) is a 
commonly adopted model which defines a tripartite of performance levels. At 
the lowest level “knowledge-based” performance is applied in novel situations 
where the performer must used detailed on-line analytical processes to 
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understand a situation and formulate an effective course of action.  Errors at 
this level typically occur because the performer has an incomplete or 
erroneous knowledge base or insufficient processing resources. Pilots who 
have had little opportunity to build manual flying knowledge may exhibit this 
form of erroneous behaviour, becoming overwhelmed by the task demands. 
 
With increasing expertise the performer may then exhibit “rule-based” 
behaviour, where familiar problems can be diagnosed and solved using stored 
rules of the form if (state) then (action). The level of conscious activity is 
somewhat reduced. Errors at this level typically occur because a situation is 
misdiagnosed and the wrong rule is applied. Finally, at the highest level, 
expert performers apply skill based behaviour whereby upon diagnosis 
complex sequences of pre-programmed instructions are executed, largely 
without any dedicated conscious monitoring. These action structures allow for 
cognitive efficiency since they place little demand on the information 
processing channels.  The manual flying inputs of a highly skilled pilot will 
therefore be made largely with little conscious effort and in response to very 
sophisticated situational assessments. However, the manual control inputs of 
less skilled pilots will be made very consciously and demand far greater 
information processing bandwidth. 
 
Meta-cognition is an awareness of ones own cognitive performance, 
particularly relating to the acquisition of skill. An individual with heightened 
meta-cognitive ability understands the process of skill acquisition as well as 
their own position in that process, thus allowing them to enhance their 
learning performance.  Very skilled pilots who are reflective with good meta-
cognitive ability may thus be able to recognise inefficiency in their cognitive 
performance during manual flight and adapt their information gathering and 
assessment processes to suit.  
 
Using HFACS, a review of the US National Transport Safety Bureau’s (NTSB) 
commercial aviation accident records for the years 1990 through 1996 
(Weigmann and Shappell, 2001) revealed that 63.6% of accidents occurring 
to FAR part 121 operations (scheduled passenger or cargo airlines operating 
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large transport category aircraft) involved at least one skill-based error. Errors 
of this category were by far the most prominent in the data set and remained 
at a fairly consistent level throughout the seven year sample period.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - The HFACS model (reproduced from Weigmann and Shappell, 2003) 
 
 
A more recent report published by the Australian Air Transport Safety Bureau 
(2004) analysed accidents occurring to Australian registered aircraft operating 
over their national territory during the period 1993 to 2002 using HFACS. The 
use of a common taxonomy allowed the analysis to be compared alongside 
equivalent data from the US. The analysis showed that 84% of Australian 
accidents and 77% of US accidents involved at least one skill based error. 
However it should be noted that the data set was not restricted to FAR part 
121 type operations and in fact approximately 80% of the accidents related to 
general aviation operations. No specific break down is given for the 
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percentage of skill-based accidents occurring to air carrier operations and so 
it is difficult to make direct comparisons with the earlier NTSB analysis.  
 
The aforementioned HFACS analyses do not explicitly define the number of 
accidents in which poor manual flying skills were directly attributed as a 
casual factor. However they do suggest that a significant proportion of 
accidents occurring to large air transport aircraft involve a skill-based error, 
giving scope to the proposition that manual flying skill deterioration represents 
a significant threat to flight safety. 
 
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Accident Analysis Group published a 
review of global fatal accidents occurring over the period 1997 through 2006 
to large public transport aircraft (CAP 776).  The group use a bespoke 
taxonomy rather than the HFACS system, allocating primary causal factors, 
causal factors, causal groups and circumstantial factors. In a similar result to 
previous studies flight crew related causal factors were listed for 78% of the 
fatal accidents. More specifically ‘flight handling’ was listed as a primary 
causal factor in 14% and a causal factor in 29% of all fatal accidents. The 
group reports that flight handling ‘tended to be associated with inadequate 
speed, pitch attitude and/or directional control, often following an engine 
failure, resulting in the aircraft stalling’. When sorted by consequence, 17% of 
the events involved a loss of control in flight, following non-technical failure 
(the report cites the example ‘flight crews inadequate speed control’) and 63% 
of these events involved a flight handling causal factor. Therefore flight crew’s 
handling of the aircraft was often cited as a contributory factor to fatal 
accidents in cases where no aircraft malfunction existed.  
 
The CAA report appears to give more direct evidence about the significant 
role of flight crews’ manual flying skill in large transport aircraft accidents. 
However the definition of ‘flight handling’ assumed by the report is not 
explicitly detailed and it is not clear if it also includes flight control actions 
performed through the auto flight systems. Some caution must therefore be 
given in the interpretation of these results. 
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Figure 2 –Distribution of fatal accidents by flight phase for the period  
1998 to 2007 (adapted from Boeing 2008) 
 
Boeing (2008) recently conducted an analysis of accident data pertaining to 
the worldwide commercial jet fleet, including the distribution of fatal accidents 
by flight phase for the period 1998 to 2007 (see figure 2).  Notable is the 
dominance of the approach and landing phase, which is where 43% of fatal 
accidents occur despite this only representing approximately 16% of the 
typical flight period. Contrastingly, the takeoff and climb phase, which also 
accounts for 16% of the flight period, was associated with 31% of fatal 
accidents and the cruise phase, which represents a sizable 57% of the total 
flight period, was associated with just 9% of fatal events. The approach and 
landing phase thus seems to be a particularly high risk and perhaps 
demanding flight phase, and when combined with the previously mentioned 
CAA data, likely to involve loss of control issues. This view is shared by the 
Flight Safety Foundation (2000) who has long labelled approach and landing 
accidents as “the biggest killers in aviation” and has consequentially designed 
the Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) toolkit. It seems 
prudent that in order to tackle the most critical manual flying skills issues we 
should first look to this phase of flight. 
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Ebbatson (2006) noted a trend amongst highly automated aircraft types in a 
review of the recent UK incident and accident data (2000 to 2006) published 
by the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB). This includes the accident 
case study reproduced in the introduction to this thesis. Many reports centred 
on pilots who had deliberately disengaged their aircraft’s automatics at an 
early stage of the approach and had subsequently demonstrated poor manual 
handling ability. In the bulletins issued by the AAIB there are accounts of at 
least two very similar incidents occurring relatively recently. On both 
occasions the autopilot, auto thrust and flight director systems were 
disengaged at an early stage of the approach, as in the East Midlands 
incident. Also on both occasions there were significant deviations on the 
localiser and glideslope, followed by poor airspeed management in the latter 
stages of the approach resulting in high flare angles and tail strike damage.  
 
Significantly these, and many similar events, often involved highly 
experienced crew and occurred shortly before the handling pilot was 
scheduled to undertake a licence or operational proficiency check in the 
simulator. This gives support to earlier evidence that flight crews confidence in 
their manual flying ability is diminishing and that some feel they need to 
practise manual flight, even in sub-optimal conditions (i.e. following an un-
briefed reversion to raw data), in order to perform successfully during their 
proficiency check. Ironically, in these cases the roles of the aircraft and 
simulator appear to have been reversed, with crews practising in the aircraft in 
order to perform well in the simulator.   The problem seems to be exacerbated 
by a general decline in the number of simulated training hours made available 
to crews as airlines are pressured to reduce costs, and face the need to focus 
the remaining hours on more dominant automation related issues. 
 
The UK CAA recently issued a Flight Operations Department Communication 
to Aircrew (FODCOM 24/2004) which highlights their concern over this 
practise, encouraging crews to participate in manual flying but urging that it is 
conducted in appropriate circumstances and is properly planned and briefed 
for.  
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These individual accident reports support the broader anecdotal accounts and 
subjective evidence (e.g. Curry, 1985; Wiener et al., 1999; Wiener, 1988) of 
manual flying skill deterioration. It must also be considered that all of the 
statistical data and evidence evaluated in this section were the subject of 
aircraft accident reports. Accidents are the most severe consequences of 
errors, where significant damage to the aircraft, its occupants or other 
property occurs, and fortunately they are relatively low in frequency. They are 
the result of the perfect alignment of many latent and active failures. The 
Heinrich ratio (1959) suggests that for every fatal accident there are 29 less 
severe accidents and as many as 300 near misses, many of which may go 
unreported. In summary, the relatively severe manual handling events 
highlighted in these studies may only represent the tip of a much greater 
issue.      
 
1.2.5 Evidence of Manual Flying Skill Loss from Experimental Work 
 
Surprisingly, given the amount of the aforementioned subjective data and 
anecdotal evidence (Wood, 2004), very little objective experimental work has 
been conducted to evaluate the loss of manual flying skills concern. Arthur, 
Bennet, Stanush and McNelly (1998) compiled a meta review of generic skill 
decay research finding that, whilst in general all skills will fade without 
sufficient frequency or quality of practice, complex, open-loop, predominantly 
cognitive based skills are likely to decay more rapidly than simple, closed-
loop, predominantly psychomotor based skills. However, only two studies 
have been conducted in the aviation domain and they did not form part of this 
meta review. It has already been noted that many pilots report a loss of 
confidence in their manual flying ability and it is possible that this in itself may 
affect meta-cognitive processes, such as the focusing of attention or 
management of capacity. There is insufficient evidence in the literature to 
confidently predict how the effect of deteriorated confidence or other 
emotional factors brought about through inexperience may impact the 
performance of manual flying skill. However, a study of young pilots (Terelak, 
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1993) found that increased levels of anxiety generally had a negative impact 
on the learning of psychomotor flying skills.      
 
In contrast to the findings of Arthur et al. (1998), Viellette (1995) compared the 
manual handling performance of pilots operating electromechanical (with little 
automation) and EFIS equipped (with sophisticated automation) variants of 
the same basic jet transport aircraft. The study evaluated performance on a 
course tracking and instrument approach task in a full flight simulator.  It was 
found that the group operating the EFIS equipped variant demonstrated 
significantly lower tracking performance in a number of dimensions compared 
to the group operating the traditional electromechanical variant.  
 
Whilst the results of this trial make a valuable contribution there are a number 
of limitations in its method acknowledged by the researchers. Primarily, the 
RMSE performance metric employed is relatively insensitive (see Hubbard, 
1987) and much progress has been made in the development of performance 
metrics and multivariate statistical techniques since this study was performed. 
Also no detailed data of the individual pilot’s operating experience was 
collected and the unlikely assumption is made that all pilots in the EFIS group 
have the same level of recent manual handling experiences and that other 
differences in the pilot’s career background did not significantly influence their 
performance. However, the researchers noted that they found considerable 
variation in performance in the EFIS group suggesting that individual 
differences in career background and automation exposure may have 
influenced performance. It was suggested that future studies explore the 
contribution of these factors. Furthermore, given the shift in pilot demographic 
since the research was performed, the utility of the results in the modern 
environment are questionable.  
 
More recently Young, Fanjoy and Suckow (2006) evaluated the manual 
handling performance of a cross section of pilots undertaking airline interview 
simulator checks. Detailed information about the participating pilot’s career 
background and automation exposure was collected allowing for it to be 
correlated with performance, along with a survey of the pilot’s instrument 
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procedures knowledge and self-reported scan proficiency. There was some 
evidence from the study that those pilots who placed greater faith in the 
automatics had weaker manual flying skills. However performance was 
evaluated using a subjective observer rating system for which no validation of 
reliability was provided. Consequently few statistically significant results were 
presented. 
 
1.2.6 Adapting Training 
 
Recent changes in regulations allow airlines to be more flexible with their 
training, modifying their programmes to be relevant to their particular 
operation, rather than to meet generalised criteria. This scheme is know as 
the Alternative Training & Qualification Programme (ATQP). However, in 
order to justify such modifications the airline must put forward a robust safety 
case based on strong objective evidence. The training and assessment of 
manual flying skills may be an area that could benefit from modification under 
ATQP in future training programmes for highly automated airliners. 
Unfortunately, as noted in a CAA review of Flight Crew Reliance on 
Automation (Wood, 2004) and affirmed in this review, there is currently a lack 
of objective data to demonstrate the postulated decline in manual flying ability, 
nor a definitive method with which to provide these data.   
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1.3 Scope of Research 
 
The research focussed exclusively on commercially operated jet transport 
aircraft equipped with highly automated flight decks. For the purpose of this 
research the term ‘highly automated’ is considered to indicate a flight deck 
equipped with auto-pilot, auto-throttle, flight-director, flight management 
system and electronic flight information system (including, as a minimum, an 
electronic attitude directional indicator (EADI) and electronic horizontal 
situation indicator (EHSI) or equivalent). The research focused on the primary 
flight control and management tasks and did not consider secondary manual 
tasks, such as aircraft’s system control. The research is orientated towards air 
transport operations in developed nations. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
 
In light of the literature discussed in this chapter the following research 
objectives were defined. 
 
1. Clarify the definition of manual flying skills and evaluate the 
cognitive mechanisms of manual flight. 
 
2. Determine the most appropriate means of objectively measuring 
manual flying skill proficiency. 
 
3. Assess the manual flying performance of a broad sample of pilots 
operating highly automated aircraft on a valid and relevant manual 
handling task. 
 
4. Evaluate the effects of differences in the career background and 
recent manual handling exposure of the pilots on their manual flying 
performance. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
  
Figure 3 – Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
The diagram in Figure 2 is presented as an overview of the Thesis structure 
and to indicate where each research objective is fulfilled. The shaded element 
indicates the reader’s current position in the Thesis. The diagram is 
reproduced at the beginning of every major section. 
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Chapter 2 
2  
Study I: Cognitive Manual Flying Skills 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Manual flight is generally defined as a condition whereby the pilots operate 
the aircraft without the support of its primary automatic systems and exert 
control by manipulating the primary flying controls i.e. inceptor, rudder pedals 
and thrust levers (Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens, 2000). This leads to 
a distinctive and quantifiable difference in the physical skill requirements of 
manual versus automatic flight, with the former clearly requiring far more 
sophisticated psycho-motor ability. This overt characterisation of manual flight 
can lead to the assumption that the only skills threatened by ‘out of the loop 
unfamiliarity’ (Wickens, 2000) are motor skills.  
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However, automation is also designed to support the pilot’s cognitive 
functions (Sarter, Wickens, Mumaw, Kimball, Marsh, Nikolic and Xu 2003). 
Sophisticated instrument displays which present highly processed information 
via systems such as the flight director and flight management system all work 
to relieve the pilot’s information processing requirements and support decision 
making. Ideally the pilots should remain cognitively engaged in order to cross 
check the automation using raw data sources. However the exceptional 
reliability of modern automatics, the complexity of navigational procedures 
and other operational pressures may reduce the level of cognitive 
engagement (Parasuraman et. al., 1993; Wood, 2004). There is therefore 
potential that the cognitive skills required for manual flight may be redundant 
during automatic operation and that these skills may also be vulnerable to 
decay. The purpose of this chapter is to better understand the cognitive 
processes that underpin and shape manual handling proficiency. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Aircraft state transitions over a typical flight profile 
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Figure 4 presents an overview of the aircraft state transitions which occur 
during a typical flight. Whilst the aircraft is in a steady state the complexity of 
the cognitive problem is reduced and the pilot can employ a relatively simple 
mental model to determine how the aircraft will respond and what information 
should be monitored. Transitory states however are far more complex since 
the pilot’s mental model must incorporate two aircraft states and the risk of it 
failing is correspondingly increased (see later sections for a more detailed 
discussion of mental models and aircraft control). 
 
The diagram shows that during the initial climb the aircraft rapidly enters a 
relatively steady climbing state. There is typically no need to modify the 
aircrafts thrust or configuration during this phase. There may be an occasional 
requirement to stop the climb and adopt level flight due to airspace 
requirements but generally all climb segments will be flown with the same 
fixed thrust, with the pilot seeking to maintain steady climb airspeed. Without 
automatic assistance the cognitive burden of the pilot is focused on the lateral 
navigation of the aircraft. The pilot must scan and integrate the primary flight 
and navigational data  to build a horizontal mental model and determine the 
aircrafts current horizontal position, it’s future horizontal position, how that 
relates to the horizontal goals and restrictions, and what course adjustments 
may be required. The cruise phase is also highly steady with configuration 
and thrust essentially fixed, and with minimal requirement for changes in the 
aircrafts altitude or course. 
 
By contrast the descent, approach, landing and missed approach (if executed) 
phases are highly transient. Lateral manoeuvring increases significantly and 
the aircraft must make significant energy changes, adopting varying 
configurations and descent profiles, in order to conform to a variety of 
airspace and traffic constraints. The pilot’s mental model must therefore 
incorporate a multitude of aircraft states and be highly dynamic, increasing the 
chances of cognitive failures occurring. This latter phase of flight therefore 
appears, from a high level, to be the more cognitively challenging and prone 
to error, supporting the data which show it to generate a greater number of 
accidents (see section 1.2.4). 
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2.1.1 Models of Human-Aircraft Control 
 
Manual aircraft control requires the pilot to employ both open-loop and closed-
loop control behaviour (Baron, 1988).  Open-loop behaviour is independent of 
feedback (i.e. a golfer driving a ball) and involves the execution of pre-
programmed motor schema to effect large changes in the aircrafts orientation, 
path or location. Closed-loop control is used to track and maintain a target 
state by monitoring feedback channels. In this control mode the pilot monitors 
and adjusts their performance in order to reduce any discrepancy between the 
desired aircraft state and the observed aircraft state. This is often termed 
‘pursuit tracking’. Feedback is delivered primarily via the flight instrumentation 
and outside field of view although vestibular, somatic, proprioceptive and 
auditory cues are also utilised. The continuous closed-loop control 
requirement of manual flight is therefore highly demanding of the pilot’s 
physical and cognitive capacity.   
 
Human factors research has developed process control models to describe in 
more detail how pilots achieve manual aircraft control. The series model 
(McRuer, 1982) presented in figure 3 is widely cited and demonstrates the 
hierarchical nature of the control process. For example, whilst the pilot 
ultimately wishes to satisfy high level flight goals, such as flying level at 
6,000ft, the control system only allows for direct manipulation of the aircraft’s 
basic six degrees of freedom i.e. body attitude and translational rates. 
Consequently the pilot must manipulate lower order parameters (e.g. attitude, 
airspeed etc.) in order to satisfy higher order goals (e.g. altitude, path etc.). 
The pilot must close several control loops concurrently. In the series model 
these control loops are shown nested within each other. The ‘inner’ attitude 
control loop is closed in order to satisfy the ‘outer’ flight path control loop. 
Owing to the control system design employed in large transport aircraft there 
are generally significant time lags between the pilot making a control input 
and the occurrence of an effect in an outer loop parameter i.e. a control wheel 
input causing a lateral displacement of the aircrafts position (this will be 
discussed further in chapter 3). Consequently such aircraft require the pilot to 
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anticipate the aircrafts likely and desired flight path in order to achieve 
effective control. The associated mental projection is highly demanding of 
cognitive resources (Moray, 1999).  
 
Unfortunately models such as the series model of control lack detail of the 
higher level cognitive processes which underpin them. For example, in the 
model there are two confluence points where feedback of the observed 
aircraft state is compared to the desired aircraft state in order to determine 
their relative error and to select a future course of action. However, the 
cognitive skills and strategies which are necessary to generate the requisite 
data and perform this ‘black box’ function are not detailed. Also, the desired 
flight path is specified as an input to the model. In automatic operation this 
information would usually be provided by the flight management system. 
However in manual flight there is a substantial degree of cognitive processing 
which must be undertaken to derive the required goals. Again the processes 
by which this is achieved are not detailed in these models yet form a crucial 
component of the ‘skill’ of manual flying. 
 
 
Figure 5 – The series model of pilot control showing the nested inner and outer control 
loops (adapted from McRuer, 1982) 
 
 
2.1.2 Mental Models 
 
It is theorised that for a human to have effective control over any process they 
must possess a mental model of that system (Moray, 1990; Sarter et al., 
2003). A mental model is a user’s memory of the structure of a system which 
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may be used to simulate how it will respond to a control input or 
environmental change (Delzell, Johnson and Liao 1998; Hegarty, 2004; Klein 
and Crandall, 1999). The quality of a pilot’s mental model is a key determinant 
of their flying performance since it guides their attention and allows them to 
prioritise tasks. The development of strength in the mental models structure is 
related to experience and any weaknesses in it may be directly related to 
failures in task performance. Strong mental models are critical under 
conditions of stress since performers will tend to revert to familiar routines and 
those most easily recovered from memory, which are generally one and the 
same.  
 
Humans generally find it simpler to control simple linear systems but higher 
order (2nd and 3rd) rates of change with significant time lags are characteristic 
of translational phases of flight. To accomplish control the pilot must be able 
to think ahead of the aircraft. Accordingly, the mental model acts as a 
mechanism of mental projection and enables anticipatory control of a system. 
This is congruent with Endsley’s (2006) definition which states that the highest 
levels of situational awareness are achieved when the controller can 
anticipate the future state of the system. Mental models therefore play an 
important role in problem solving, judgement, decision making and planning 
for the pilot. They are simplifications of the real system which rely on 
abstraction and mental rules of thumb (heuristics). Carley and Palmquist 
(1992) propose that expertise is signified by more efficient mental model 
structures which are simplified in some areas, where unnecessary system 
complexities are removed in favour of generalised rules, and expanded in 
others, where more detailed system knowledge is beneficial. Flach and 
Jaques (2003) published work which showed how a pilot’s mental model of 
the inner control loop problem was refined with expertise. It was shown that 
on a precision approach pursuit tracking task experienced pilots effectively 
‘lock out’ several of the aircrafts degrees of freedom in order to simplify the 
control problem. For example, controlling the descent profile by ‘fixing and 
forgetting’ the aircrafts thrust setting and manipulating just the pitch attitude.   
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There is large body of research which has examined the cognitive demands of 
using automation on the flight deck (Harris, Hancock, Arthur and Caird 1995; 
Holder and Hutchins, 2001; Sarter, Woods and Billings, 1997; Sarter et al., 
2003). However very little objective research has been undertaken to 
establish the basic cognitive mechanisms and mental models which pilots use 
to operate large transport aircraft manually, and how these mechanisms and 
models may be subject to decay (Childs and Spears, 1986). Accordingly a 
study was undertaken using objective cognitive task analysis techniques to 
audit the cognitive processes employed by pilots in a challenging manual 
flight scenario. The results of this study were intended to inform further stages 
of the research programme and to ensure that the scenarios used to elicit and 
measure manual handling ability were valid from a cognitive perspective. 
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2.2 Methodology 
 
2.2.1 Cognitive Task Analysis 
 
It is often desirable to fragment a task into a structure of smaller subtasks so 
that a better understanding of the underlying processes can be formed. The 
decomposition can be performed to guide training and workspace design, to 
identify potential errors in task execution or simply understand how experts 
perform the task (Kirwan, 1992).  Such techniques are given the general label 
of task analysis. Traditionally task analysis has been conducted in the 
behavioural domain, whereby analysts explore the observable actions which 
are performed by the operator and describe the rules that determine when 
those actions are performed.  An example of this technique is Hierarchical 
Task Analysis (HTA).  Using this technique actions are grouped in a very tight 
structure, each forming the goal for a subordinate network of actions.  
Traditional task analysis techniques build detailed pictures of the physical 
aspects of task performance but offer very little insight of the cognitive 
functions underpinning that performance.  
 
As many aspects of work, such as piloting modern aircraft, have become less 
physical and more information processing orientated there has been an 
increased emphasis in understanding the cognitive elements of task 
performance (Flach and Jaques, 2003). Correspondingly task analysis 
techniques have developed to encompass the cognitive domain.  The field of 
cognitive task analysis is still relatively immature and although a variety of 
methodologies are described in the literature, generally they offer more of a 
guiding philosophy than a prescriptive set of rules and procedures. 
 
However, the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) methodology (see 
Militello, Hutton, Pliske, Knight, Kline and Randel, 1997) offers a prescriptive 
and streamlined approach to the data collection and analysis procedure.  
Although originally conceived to guide industry practitioners with a limited 
research background it has found popularity in the applied research field in 
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diverse domains such as fire fighting, naval radar operation and aviation (see 
Latorella, Pliske, Hutton and Chrenka, 2001).  The ACTA technique was 
adopted for this study because it is was supported by detailed instructional 
material, yields quality information of cognitive demands with minimal 
resource requirements and has been well demonstrated in literature.  The 
methodology consists of three complementary data collection phases 1) Task 
diagram phase 2) Knowledge audit phase and 3) Simulation interview. These 
are structured around one on one interview sessions with subject matter 
experts (SME).  
 
The following sections describe how the ACTA methodology was applied to 
elicit the critical cognitive components of the manual flying task during the 
approach to landing phase. The approach phase was chosen as it involves 
some of the more complex flight path and energy management tasks and is 
the most likely phase for manual flight to be undertaken in an operational 
environment. Additionally the findings of this research are intended to 
compliment those of Flach et al (op cit.) who also studied the approach to 
landing phase.  
 
2.2.2 Participants 
 
The ACTA process requires highly skilled subject matter experts as its data 
source.  For this study expert flight crew were assumed to be, at a minimum, 
command qualified. Furthermore, senior captains who had been appointed to 
training duties or had a background in test flying were actively sought.  These 
experts were more likely to have developed the self analytical skills necessary 
to report their own behaviour and cognition to the analyst. Multiple SMEs were 
interviewed to provide reliability and validity, overcome individual biases, 
provide redundancy protection against poor quality interviews and ensure the 
full breadth of the task was examined.   
 
Interviews were conducted in quiet, private rooms either at the participant’s 
place of work or at Cranfield University.  Sessions were conducted with only 
the researcher and the SME present and, with permission, they were audio 
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recorded.  British Psychological Society ethical conduct standards were 
adhered to throughout the course of the research and all data was de-
identified.   
 
A total of nine participants contributed over 13 hours and 80,000 words of 
transcribed interview data.  All were senior captains, with four holding the 
chief pilot position and two having a training role.  Average flying experience 
was approximately 10,500 hours.  The aircraft types currently operated by the 
participants were the MD-11, B747-200, B747-400, B767, B757, B737 and 
A320.  The participants also had considerable experience on other 
commercial types including the B777, DC-10, B747-300, A310, RJ100, 
Gulfstream 100, Learjet 25/35, ATR42/72 and older generation types 
including the B707, HS Trident, HS 748, BAC 1-11, Bristol Britannia and 
Bristol Freighter.  
 
2.2.3 Phase One – Introductions and Task Diagram 
 
The opening phase of the interview involved the collection of biographical 
data using a pro-forma and a semi-structured discussion around the potential 
decay of manual flying skills and influencing factors (see interview protocol in 
appendix A). The interviewer presented working definitions of ‘automatic 
flight’, ‘manual flight’, ‘approach phase’ and ‘cognitive skill’ so that these 
would be consistent through the research sessions. 
 
In line with the ACTA methodology a ‘task diagram’ was elicited from the 
SME.  The task diagram is a simple representation of how the SME 
conceptually structures the task of interest.  The researcher asked the SME to 
think about how they manually control the aircraft during the approach to 
landing phase and to list between four and eight steps that fully described that 
process.  The researcher recorded the steps on a flip chart visible to both 
parties.  The SME was then asked to indicate which of the tasks steps 
involved challenging cognitive elements and these steps were highlighted 
accordingly.   
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Ultimately a simple conceptual map of the task was produced representing 
the structure adopted by the SME and indicating where all the cognitively 
demanding elements were concentrated.  This diagram served as a guiding 
framework for the remainder of the interview session. 
 
2.2.4 Phase Two – Knowledge Audit 
 
The knowledge audit phase of the interview identified the specific areas of 
cognitive expertise which enable experts to deliver superior performance on 
the manual approach to landing task. For each highlighted step in the task 
diagram the interviewer administered a series of scripted probe questions to 
elicit examples of cognition in areas such as situational assessment, 
diagnosis, prioritisation, self assessment etc. The full interview schedule 
including cognitive probe questions can be found at Appendix A. 
 
The ACTA process labels the elicited examples as cognitive demands. The 
cognitive demands were listed down the first column of a table printed on a 
flip chart. For each cognitive demand the analyst enquired as to why this 
cognitive demand was challenging, what cues and strategies may be 
employed to satisfy it and what errors a novice may make, recording this 
information in corresponding columns of the table structure. The resulting 
tabulated data sets are known as cognitive demand tables and are 
reproduced fully in Appendix B.   
 
2.2.5 Phase Three – Simulation Interview 
 
During the final research phase the SME performed a simulation of the 
manual approach and landing task and then in a subsequent interview was 
asked to describe how and why they did what they did. This technique is used 
to provide an understanding of the expert’s problem solving processes in 
context and can uncover details not revealed by the knowledge audit.  
Although high fidelity simulations clearly offer rich environments for analysis, 
past studies have shown that less resource intensive, low fidelity simulations 
are capable of yielding information of equal quality and validity in the cognitive 
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task analysis setting (Latorella et al., 2001).  The ACTA suggested format of a 
paper simulation exercise was adopted for this study since it required minimal 
resources to develop and deliver and was easily portable to the various 
interview locations. A paper simulation is a written walkthrough of a task 
scenario where several perturbing events are introduced. The participant is 
required to read through the simulation and think about how they may react to 
or resolve the presenting problems. 
 
The paper simulation described a reasonably challenging but nonetheless 
likely approach scenario to be conducted under manual control, divided into 
sequential segments (Appendix C). In each segment a problem was 
introduced, including ATC re-routes, energy management challenges and 
environmental condition changes. The scenario was developed with reference 
to the Flight Safety Foundations (FSF) Approach and Landing Accident 
Reduction (ALAR) toolkit (2000) which lists key factors which lead to 
approach and landing incidents. The SME was instructed to read through the 
scenario, pausing after each segment to consider what their thoughts, 
decisions, judgements or actions may be, if any, at that stage.  Printed 
approach charts and flight briefing material specific to the scenario were 
provided. 
 
The analyst asked the expert to verbally ‘walk through’ the scenario and to 
draw attention to any pertinent events, decision points or judgements that 
occurred.  The analyst then asked the expert to detail the actions, salient cues 
and potential errors associated with each critical point in turn. This information 
was added to the cognitive demand tables elicited during the knowledge audit. 
 
2.2.6 Treatment of Data 
 
The task diagram statements and cognitive demands tables from the interview 
sessions were transposed into Microsoft Excel worksheets. The interview 
audio recordings were transcribed to complement the written notes taken 
during the sessions, producing over 85,500 words of data.  Repeated passes 
of the audio recordings were made to check for transcription accuracy, and 
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identify intonation subtleties, inference, emphasis and possible misleading 
statements.  For each participant in turn the transcript and written notes were 
scanned to identify the individual cognitive demands brought to attention 
during the session and to uncover any which were passed over during the 
interviews. Any newly identified cognitive demands were added to the ACTA 
prescribed cognitive demands tables. 
 
Where there was uncertainty of meaning in the transcript or written notes the 
audio recording was consulted.  If the meaning was still questionable a 
second independent researcher experienced in cognitive task analysis and 
familiar with the aviation domain was consulted. If the meaning could not be 
agreed the statement was excluded from the analysis. 
 
 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
 
The results of this study demonstrate that manual flying proficiency is heavily 
dependent upon many cognitive processes which are potentially redundant 
during automated flight. In particular, cognitive resource intensive mental 
arithmetic operations are central to the execution of the aircraft/environment 
model which is used to anticipate control requirements and to manage the 
aircrafts energy efficiently. Expert pilots report employing heuristics to ease 
the cognitive burden of the manual flying task and identify typical 
shortcomings in the mental model structure of less able pilots. 
 
2.3.1 Task Diagram 
 
The task diagram phase identified how the individual SMEs conceptually 
structured the manual approach to landing task. To compare and contrast the 
representations of each SME the task diagram steps were assembled into a 
common figure (see figure 4).  
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A simple coding scheme was superimposed upon the task diagram data. Task 
steps were categorised as planning, execution, or monitoring & evaluation 
activities. Task steps which simultaneously described two different categories 
of activity were subdivided. Conversely, neighbouring steps which described 
the same category of task were ‘band-boxed’ together. Again, a second 
analyst experienced in CTA and the aviation domain was asked to perform 
the same coding process in parallel and independently. Where the assigned 
coding category differed between analysts a third, similarly experienced, 
analyst was asked to code the case. Ultimately if a consensus could not be 
reached the data was excluded from the analysis.   
 
It is notable that the SME’s were consistent in the way they conceptualised 
the manual approach to landing task and that in general they described the 
task using a simple closed-loop structure (i.e. plan  execute  monitor  
adjust  plan) as per the process control model presented in the introduction 
to this chapter. 
 
2.3.2 Cognitive Process 
 
A total of 63 unique cognitive demand descriptions were elicited across all 
participants for the manual approach to landing task. Full reproductions of the 
cognitive demands tables are given at Appendix B. The data were coded into 
ten emergent categories and as before this template was presented to two 
other analysts for comparative coding. Again, where a case could not be 
coded it was excluded from the analysis. These categories and the frequency 
of their occurrence in the data are presented in figure 5. The majority of the 
cognitive demands were associated with the vertical profile and energy 
management aspects of the approach task rather than the lateral aspect, 
suggesting that the former is a more cognitively complex activity. 
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Compare present s ituation 
against ideal s ituation
Manage descent and 
conf igure aircraf t
Check position against plan 
and project to determine 
future conformance
Monitor conformance
Adjust prof ile/path
Start descent
Monitor
Task steps in order of elicitation
Calculate w here to start an 
idle prof ile descent 
Plan later descent segments 
w here there are other 
restrictions
Reduce thrust and descend, 
change conf ig
Check vertical prof ile Check lateral path Adjust descent rate
Antic ipate the requirement 
for manual f light and brief  
prior to departure
Determine navigational 
references
Stipulate check gates
Call out if  gates aren't 
achieved
Make conf iguration changes
Plan descent, determine 
basic and likely constraints
Descend on plan
Determine total track length
Calculate vertical prof ile 
using geometry and 
know ledge of  aircraf t 
performance
Plan approach, identif y 
constraints, determine prof ile 
and track
A llocate check gates to 
monitor prof ile
Control aircraf t to plan
Get out option, excecute go 
around plan
Plan a desired path
Manipulate controls to 
achieve path and prof ile 
goals
Observe the ef fects of  
manipulation
Process and modify 
manipulation toachieve path 
goal
Determine most probable 
path
Calculate total track length
Designate intermediate 
check points
Plan an idle descent prof ile
Adjust descent rate as 
required
Produce a mental picture of  
the procedure
Designate check gates
Descend, s low  and 
reconf igure aircraf t
Monitor conformity and 
predict conformity to path
Pilot 7
Pilot 8
Pilot 9
Pilot 1
Pilot 2
Pilot 3
Pilot 4
Pilot 5
Pilot 6
 
Planning Execution Monitoring & Evaluation  
 
Figure 6 – A composition of each subject matter expert’s task diagram. indicating how 
they conceptually structured the manual approach to landing task at a high level. Task 
steps are coded into planning, execution or monitoring & evaluation activities.  
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The detailed cognitive demands, coupled to the structure of the task 
diagrams, gave a strong description of the cognitive process by which the 
pilots operate the aircraft, together with strategies and heuristics which are 
employed by experts to minimise the cognitive burden and achieve superior 
performance. The following account of the process is derived from that data. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Cognitive demands categories and their frequency of occurrence 
 
 
The bulk of the cognitive demands related to the initial approach planning 
phase, prior to the top of descent. However, the SME reported re-visiting parts 
of this planning activity during execution of the approach to accommodate 
changes or rectify errors. Initial activity focussed on identifying the applicable 
geometric and energy constraints such as crossing restrictions, minimum 
safety altitudes, airspeed restrictions etc. and selecting suitable navigation 
aids. This included consulting their operating experience to anticipate any 
likely ATC restrictions or routings that were idiosyncratic to that airfield or 
approach.  
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Primarily the SME would attempt to fit a clean idle descent profile (typically 
using a 3nm per 1,000ft of altitude model) anchored to the final approach fix 
back through the geometric and energy restriction (establishing the top of 
descent (TOD) point). However, where restrictions violated this profile the 
SME undertook a mental modelling and simulation process to determine the 
most efficient means of satisfying the constraints.  This involved computation 
of the speed, track length and altitude exchanges required to meet the gate 
and fitting this information against the SMEs mental model of the aircrafts 
performance in the current environment. The reported mental models were 
essentially a series of lookup values and simple algorithms which related track 
length, ground speed, altitude and time for various aircraft configurations and 
environmental conditions (wind speed was generally factored into the aircraft 
performance model via the groundspeed to airspeed relationship).  
 
The SME relied heavily on heuristics to simplify the execution of the model. 
For example “a typical descent at 210kts from 7,000ft requires 23 track miles”, 
“lead in distance for a standard rate 90 degree turn is groundspeed over 100”, 
“add 1 extra track mile per 3,000ft of descent when using engine ant-ice” etc.. 
The SME would also ‘lock out’ degrees of freedom in their calculation by 
making generalisations, i.e. average terminal manoeuvring speed will be 
180kts which equates to about 3 miles every minute, rather than making 
complex calculations for several segments at different speeds. This supports 
the work of Flach and Jaques (2003) discussed in the introduction to this 
section. 
 
The process of running the aircraft/environment model relies on the 
development of efficient estimation techniques and again draws on mental 
arithmetic operations which significantly burden both working and long term 
memory (Baddeley, 1986; Beilock, Kulp, Holt and Carr, 2004). However the 
mental rules of thumb and simplifications outlined here by the SME bypass 
most of the mental arithmetic, reducing processing requirements and freeing 
up capacity for other flying tasks. The expert pilots indicated that those 
inexperienced in manual flight would often exhibit poor performance because 
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they either became saturated by the modelling process, generated inaccurate 
information or would bypass the process entirely, using a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach and ‘relying on luck for it to work out’.  It was suggested by several 
SME that a lack of manual flying experience and reliance on highly processed 
information from the flight management system can prevent the formation of 
heuristics, efficient mental strategies and in general the optimisation of the 
mental model structure.  
 
“(Poorly performing manual pilots) haven’t got enough information 
yet hardwired into their brain to accurately predict what the aircraft’s 
going to do next” 
(Excerpt from SME interview) 
 
The SME also indicated that constructing a mental simulation of the approach 
helped to retain the specific details in memory and reduced the need to make 
notes or refer back to the approach charts. These observations are in line with 
the suggestions of mental model theory cited in the introduction (Hutchings, 
1995) and more general theory that information is held better in memory 
following some degree of processing.  
 
When a satisfactory approach had been constructed the SME again reported 
using mental lookup tables to execute the plan. Long term memory stored key 
attitude and thrust reference values that would cause the aircraft to achieve 
the planned translational rates in its current configuration. Again, SME 
comment suggested that dependence upon the flight director appears to 
reduce the formation of this ‘lookup data’ and many less manually 
experienced pilots ‘hunt around’ to find appropriate attitudes or thrust 
reference values. 
 
“It would seem that people just don’t know where to put the nose, 
(they) haven’t got a sort of safe number in their mind and don’t 
know what to do with the attitude of the aeroplane” 
(Excerpt from SME interview) 
 
The most significant cognitive demands (judged by the frequency of 
elicitation) related to the monitoring of the aircraft’s position and energy 
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against the planned approach.  Principally this involved establishing the 
aircrafts current position and energy state. The SME pilots reported the 
importance of considering the efficiency of the scan pattern and adapting it to 
the informational requirements of that stage of flight. They considered that 
novices would often attend to irrelevant information, using a fixed scan pattern 
which made inefficient use of their already limited capacity (Damos, John and 
Lyall, 1999). Determining the aircrafts position from raw data also required 
some mental arithmetic operations but was made less complex if thought was 
given to the selection of appropriate navigation aids.  
 
“You can make a mental calculation and say this is or this isn’t 
going to work, and you can say to the (ATC) ‘that’s not enough 
miles, can I have another 6 or 7’ “ 
(Excerpt from SME interview) 
 
Comparing the aircrafts current position against the planned approach was 
accomplished through two mechanisms, both of which demanded resources 
for mental arithmetic and drew upon the aircraft/environment mental model.  
In one mode the SME reported interpolating the planned flight path geometry 
to produced discreet spatial check gates which could be compared against 
the computed aircraft position i.e. “the profile puts us at 3,000ft 3 miles from 
the fix, so we should be at 4000ft 6 miles from the fix”.  In a second 
mechanism the SME would extrapolate the current aircraft trends and 
establish if they were likely to intersect with the next major gate as planned. 
Discrepancies in profile were usually transformed into track mile error. Once 
more the expert pilots reported using a mental lookup table which they used 
to evaluate whether an error in profile could be recovered or not given the 
environmental conditions and aircraft configuration. Error tolerances usually 
reduced in magnitude with closing proximity to the airfield. Intolerable profiles 
errors were resolved by re-visiting the planning phase.  
 
“You’re always sort of flying in a tube...the diameter of this tube 
becomes smaller and smaller towards the runway” 
(Excerpt from SME interview) 
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2.4 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The cognitive mechanism outlined in this research should not be surprising to 
air transport pilots experienced in manual flight.  However, it has been elicited 
using objective techniques and emphasises the central role of a robust aircraft 
performance mental model in executing almost all of the critical planning and 
monitoring functions during raw data manual flight. Primarily the management 
of the vertical profile and aircraft energy is heavily dependent on mental 
computation and can demand significant working and long term memory 
capacity if an efficient model, simplified through heuristics, is not available.  
 
The formation of efficient mental models is a function of experience. Without 
manual flying exposure a pilot’s mental model of the performance of their 
aircraft is unlikely to become optimised and will remain cumbersome and 
inefficient to use. Correspondingly they will have little spare capacity with 
which to control the aircraft or perform secondary tasks. It may be that under 
certain conditions pilots are slower to acquire this knowledge structure, or 
perhaps learning simply fails to occur at all. Likewise, it is unclear whether 
once developed this structure can truly be forgotten, or whether it is actually a 
failure in retrieval which characterises ‘skill fade’. Nevertheless, when 
developing tasks to evaluate the manual handling proficiency of a pilot it is 
therefore vital to consider the cognitive aspects of this skill. The chosen 
scenario must challenge the pilot’s knowledge and ability to manipulate critical 
aircraft performance and environmental information. 
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Chapter 3 
3  
Study II: Evaluating and Selecting Manual Flying 
Performance Measures 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A performance measurement technique, whether it is used to select capable 
job candidates, gauge the efficacy of a training program, or monitor 
operational safety, must have integrity, assessing individuals consistently 
against a common interpretable scale.  This chapter evaluates the various 
means of assessing pilot manual flying expertise and selects those which are 
most suitable for researching the causes of manual flying skill variation.  
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General Discussion and 
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3.2 Performance Measurement in Flight Operations 
 
In commercial flight operations the assessment of a pilot’s manual handling 
performance is mostly entrusted to the judgement of expert human observers. 
Principally, line performance assessment occurs during the biannual Operator 
Proficiency Checks (OPC) and annual Licence Proficiency Checks (LPC) 
administered by a suitably trained Type Rating Examiner (TRE). This method 
of assessment has many advantages in the operational environment. 
Primarily it is practical since the required measurement resources, expert 
flight crew, already exists within the airline and can be relatively easily 
administered. Secondly it has a great deal of face validity, drawing upon the 
human’s innate ability to perceive often very subtle differences in 
performance. Thirdly it is an established practice which is well understood, 
documented and trusted within the airline environment.  
 
However, human judgement is naturally subjective and the discrimination of 
individual examiners may be coloured somewhat by factors other than the 
student’s manual handling performance i.e. by aspects of the student’s 
personality or appearance, their performance on a different aspect of the test 
or by the examiner’s mood or circumstance.  Whilst tools such as 
behaviourally anchored rating scales and structured grading criterion (e.g. the 
tolerances for manual handling performance listed in Standards Document 24 
(2005) reproduced at Appendix D) can focus human judgement, observational 
techniques remain insufficiently objective to form the sole means of 
performance assessment in a sensitive research study of manual flying ability. 
Truly consistent, sensitive and scientifically viable assessment can only be 
achieved through the numerical analysis of flight data records.  
 
Mathematical algorithms which evaluate performance are uninfluenced by 
human emotion and thus generate consistent and predictable results. In 
aviation the required performance data on which these techniques operate is 
relatively abundant, with time series records for hundreds of parameters 
generated by both the aircraft and simulator (primarily via data feeds to the 
Flight Data and Quick Access Recorders). Because numerical performance 
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evaluation may be applied post-event and without the presence of human 
observers it has allowed the process to migrate away from the OPC/LPC 
environment and into routine line operations, facilitating today’s Flight Data 
Monitoring/Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FDM/FOQA) programmes.  
 
3.2.1 Flight Data Monitoring & Discreet Event Measures 
 
The routine analysis of flight data (i.e. FDM/FOQA) has revolutionised the way 
in which airlines can assess their operational performance and has hugely 
benefitted flight safety.  It is now either a mandatory or recommended practice 
in most ICAO member states (for the UK see CAP 739) for aircraft exceeding 
27 tonnes in weight. However, because the demands placed on FDM/FOQA 
systems are significant, with very large volumes of data passing through them 
every hour of the day, the level of analysis undertaken on the data is relatively 
shallow and the performance measurement techniques applied are quite 
simplistic.  
 
A simple means of objectively assessing performance is to register when a 
flight parameter of interest deviates beyond a specified tolerance threshold for 
the phase of flight i.e. “altitude deviates more than 100ft from the assigned 
flight level during the cruise”. This form of measurement is often called ‘event 
analysis’ since it records the occurrence of a pertinent event in the flight and it 
forms the basis of most Flight Data Monitoring/Flight Operations Quality 
Assurance (FDM/FOQA) systems (Chidester, 2003; van Es., 2002). Often 
fairly complex triggering logic can be used to define the event so that specific 
flight safety issues are targeted, for example the logic “airspeed greater than 
170kts with a flap setting of between 25 and 30 degrees” may be used to 
detect a flap over-speed event and direct an engineering inspection of the 
subject aircraft. The limitation of this system is that in order to build the event 
set the analyst must have some preconception of where operational problems 
may lie and what tolerances define acceptable flight from unacceptable flight. 
Typically this is driven by company standard operating procedure (SOP) and 
engineering limitations.  
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Layers of events with progressively more conservative tolerances may be 
specified so that an event severity can be deduced, (i.e. minor deviation, 
moderate deviation, severe deviation) and the analysis focused. Event 
severity can be non linear and be dependent on secondary parameters, for 
example a glideslope deviation of one dot low may only be considered a 
minor event if it were to occur early on the approach and at high altitude, 
whilst the same deviation may be given a very high severity if it was detected 
late on the approach and at low altitude.  
 
The discreet event analysis technique is well suited for detecting occurrences 
of extremely abnormal performance where the barriers which defend against 
incidents and accidents have been significantly eroded.  Its strength lies in its 
ability to distil practical information rapidly from very large numbers of flights, 
as is the requirement of FDM/FOQA systems.  However, because event 
analysis is discreet (i.e. an event is either triggered or it is not) it offers a 
relatively shallow analysis of the each individual flight.  For example, Van Es 
(2002) reports a hard landing investigation conducted via an airlines flight 
data monitoring system.  From a sample of 8,000 flights only 25 were found to 
have touch down load factors beyond a specified value that constituted a hard 
landing. Whilst these eventful flights proved to contain very valuable 
information about hard landings within the operator, over 99 percent of the 
sampled flights were discarded. Deeper analysis of the discarded data may 
reveal more subtle abnormalities (‘near misses’) and provide trending 
information which would point to the causes of hard landings.  
 
Event type measures are also used to assist performance assessment during 
the OPC/LPC. CAA Standards Document 24 (2005) gives guidance to 
examiners assessing manual handling performance during these proficiency 
checks (Appendix D). Within the document are a set of tolerances which 
govern heading, track, airspeed, altitude, glideslope and localiser tracking 
deviation for various flight phases and aircraft conditions. It is suggested that 
sustained deviation beyond these tolerances by the performer signifies 
inadequate manual handling proficiency.  Although the system is intended to 
be implemented by human observation, and it is offered mainly to support the 
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examiner’s broader judgement, the guidelines are essentially event measures. 
However, these measures in isolation do not capture many of the aspects of 
manual handling ability which are considered to be important by the 
examiners, such as the smoothness, efficiency, co-ordination and anticipation 
of control (see chapter 2). If these measures were simply translated into an 
FDM event set they would offer a very limited and crude assessment of pilot 
handling performance which would likely be insensitive in a scientific study.  
 
This ‘loss of manual flying skills’ research will sample a much smaller number 
of pilots and flying hours than is typical of an airlines FDM system. 
Consequently it is not expected that a great number of serious manual flying 
deviations will be observed. It is more likely that the research will identify 
subtle differences in performance which show a general ‘creep’ towards the 
fringes of acceptability. However, it should be considered that serious 
performance errors may often be rooted in these subtle deviations due to the 
way that they impact the subsequent decision making process.   
 
FDM event sets and Standards Document 24 tolerances thus have limited 
application for the fine grained analysis of manual handling performance that 
is required of this research study. The following sections look to the research 
domain for more sensitive measures of performance which would be better 
suited to this study. 
 
3.3 Performance Measurement in Research 
 
A major challenge faced by performance analysts is to develop numerical 
metrics which successfully replicate the sensitivity and broadness of human 
perception.  The following sections evaluate the various types of numerical 
performance metrics which are in use in the applied research field. It is 
important to remember that typically (although with some exceptions) these 
metrics are designed to assess a single dimension of performance, such as 
altitude tracking accuracy or localiser tracking smoothness. To produce a 
broader assessment of manual flying ability it is necessary to somehow 
combine a battery of metrics which simultaneously assess the multitude of 
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performance dimensions. Developing weightings and strategies for combining 
individual metrics into a conglomerate is another significant challenge of 
numerical performance assessment and ultimately is the route to providing an 
automated performance assessment tool, the focus of much of the applied 
research (McDowell, 1978; Rantanen, Johnson and Talleur, 2004). 
 
3.3.1 General Properties of a Performance Metric 
 
From a review of performance assessment literature (e.g. Johnson and 
Rantanen, 2005; Rantanen, Talleur, Taylor, Bradshaw, Emanuel Jr., Lendrum 
and Hulin, 2001) it is apparent that certain qualities are associated with any 
capable performance metric. The attributes presented in table 1 are not 
domain specific but are certainly applicable to pilot performance 
measurement. 
 
Table 1 - Attributes of a performance metric 
 
Attribute Descriptive 
 
Reliable 
 
The metric should give a consistent measurement over time and not be 
heavily influenced by environmental noise. 
 
Valid The metric should actually be measuring what it purports to measure 
rather than a loosely associated surrogate. 
 
Interpretable The metric value should be meaningful to the analyst. There should be a 
strong theoretical construct linking the measured quantity to performance. 
 
Sensitive The metric should be able to differentiate between a useful number of 
performance levels.  At the very least it should discriminated adequate 
from inadequate performance. 
 
Applicable The metric should be capable of application to the operating environment. 
For example if the metric is to be used for real time simulator debriefing it 
must be able to be derived from the data in minimal time, probably 
autonomously.   
 
General The metric should be able applicable to different scenarios, fleets etc. 
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3.3.2 Scalar Measures of Tracking Performance 
 
Research studies generally favour the use of scalar measures of pilot 
performance over discreet measures (as in FDM/FOQA) since the inherent 
increase in processing time is generally not a constraint and the greater depth 
of analysis offered by the higher resolution of measurement is beneficial.  
Performance is generally assessed by periodically recording the difference 
between critical flight parameters and their datum during a phase of flight. For 
example the difference between the aircraft’s airspeed on the approach and 
the reference speed for its weight and configuration.  
 
These ‘time series’ of errors can then be reduced into performance statistics. 
For example, the Mean Error metric (ME) computes the arithmetic mean of 
these error data so as to describe the average deviation from the target, 
commonly referred to as tracking accuracy. The Standard Deviation of Error 
metric (SDE) assesses variability around the mean thus describing the 
variability, or smoothness, of parameter tracking. These measures are 
typically applied to the principle flight path and aircraft state parameters such 
as airspeed, altitude, course deviation and glideslope deviation which are 
clear indicators of performance on well prescribed tasks such as an ILS 
approach. 
 
Essentially these measures quantify the pilot’s success at closing the outer 
control loop (see figure 3). Some studies have developed more sophisticated 
measures which look at the aircraft’s  velocity of divergence and compute the 
expected time to exceed tolerance (essentially a measure recoverability) or 
the time spent outside tolerance (a slightly more sophisticated variant of event 
analysis using continuous data). However, these measures have not been 
widely adopted, perhaps because they are relatively complex to compute and 
have less face validity when compare to more conventional metrics. 
 
Another commonly applied metric in research is the Root Mean Square of 
Error (RMSE or RMS) which attempts to give a global assessment of tracking 
accuracy where smaller values generally indicate better performance. 
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However, RMSE has the disadvantage that it produces identical values for 
quite disparate performances.  For example, being consistently high, 
consistently low, or at the correct mean height but with great variations in 
height keeping can all result in the same RMSE value (see Hubbard, 1987). 
Taken in combination ME & SE completely define RMSE yet offer greater 
diagnostic ability individually, and so they are generally used in preference 
where brevity of feedback is not a key factor, such as in this research study.  
 
3.3.3 Advantages of  Measuring  Control Strategy 
 
The measurement of key aircraft state and position parameters is clearly 
relevant to the measurement of performance. However, it is suggested that 
this may not be sufficient to precisely characterise differences in manual flying 
performance in this research setting. The problem arises due to the nature of 
control systems in large transport aircraft.  
 
The mechanics of manual aircraft control was briefly touched upon in chapter 
two. Essentially all aircraft control systems are hierarchical in nature. 
Movements of the control inceptor cause a change in the aircraft flight control 
surface deflections which cause a change in the aircraft’s attitude which in 
turn cause a change in its translational rates which ultimately cause a change 
in its position, the desired effect. The relationship between each stage of the 
process is mediated by time constants, control powers and other factors 
which are a product of the control system design and which dictate its rate of 
response.  This differs depending on the aircrafts form and function. For 
example light fighter jets generally have responsive control systems so that 
changes in inceptor position produce an almost immediate high rate of 
change in the aircraft’s attitude and position making them agile and 
manoeuvrable. However, large jet transport aircraft are designed quite 
differently. Their control systems are generally much more docile with inceptor 
changes generating less immediate and lower rate changes in attitude and 
position. This is done primarily to preserve passenger comfort and avoid over 
stressing the airframe.  
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Since the response rate of a large transport aircraft is limited to a relatively 
low value it is possible for the control input rate of the pilot to surpass it. 
Consequently the pilot may be demanding changes through the inceptor 
which the aircraft is unable to achieve. This gives rise to a potential 
disassociation between the pilot’s control strategy and the behaviour of the 
aircraft.  
 
The previously described performance metrics are all targeted at aspects of 
the aircraft’s behaviour i.e. its speed or position in space. However, these 
metrics do not describe the demands which were made by the pilot and, 
owing to the nature of the control system, quite dissimilar input demands may 
result in very similar aircraft behaviours. For example, it is possible for a pilot 
to achieve the same flight path in a precision tracking task by making either 
low amplitude, well timed control inputs which precisely cancel out external 
disturbances, or by making more frequent, higher amplitude, ineffectively 
timed control inputs. The latter control strategy may have produced the same 
result but many of the input demands had no real effect on the aircraft and the 
total input energy expended by the pilot was far higher. Often this is reported 
by examiners as ‘over control’ of the aircraft. 
 
Performance research (Baron, 1988) suggests that the level of energy used to 
control a system is of equal importance to the result of that control. For 
example two pilots may follow the localiser datum precisely whilst flying an 
ILS approach and from this perspective both would be judged to have 
achieved the same level of flying performance. However, if analysis of their 
control inputs revealed that one pilot made relatively few, low amplitude inputs 
to achieve this standard of tracking whilst the other was extremely active on 
the controls, making frequent large amplitude control reversals, then they may 
be viewed quite differently. The pilot who used less energy to achieve the 
same tracking result employed a more physically efficient control strategy and 
is more skilled in controlling the aircraft. It could also be argued that the use of 
a more skilled control strategy is consistent with the pilot operating in the 
autonomous rather than conscious control mode (Hawkins, 1998) and thus 
reflects on the amount of mental capacity demanded by the manual flying 
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task. Whilst it is clearly desirable for the pilot to achieve key flight path and 
aircraft energy targets, it is also clearly undesirable that the pilot should 
expend the majority of their physical and cognitive capacity to accomplish this 
since secondary flight tasks will suffer. 
 
Previous studies in which pilot performance has been evaluated using the 
traditional ME, SDE, and RMSE metrics have tended to involve light, agile 
aircraft (e.g. Davenport and Harris, 1992; Rees and Harris, 1995). 
Consequently the pilots control strategy is highly associated with the changes 
in the aircraft state and the traditional means of measuring performance from 
the outer loop parameters is acceptable. However, it is argued that since this 
research study will focus on large transport aircraft it is imperative that 
measures which evaluate the pilot’s control strategy are used to augment 
these more traditional measures. By this means it will be possible to evaluate 
both the efficiency of the control process (i.e. how much effort was put in), and 
its success at closing the outer control loop (i.e. the product of that effort). 
 
3.3.4 Approaches to Measuring Control Strategy 
 
Despite the fact that many studies of pilot flying performance report collecting 
flight control input data, rarely has there been any analysis of pilot control 
strategy in such a setting (Veillette, 1995). It is not certain why this should be 
the case but it is suggested that a lack of a clear methodology for measuring 
and evaluating control input data may be a contributory factor. Primarily, 
unlike outer loop tracking performance, interpreting control input strategy is 
less intuitive and requires a greater degree of technical analysis to achieve. 
 
One very simplistic approach which is suggested in literature (Baron, 1988) is 
to apply the RMSE metric to time series records of control inceptor 
displacement (see figure 6). Used in this way the RMSE metric can give a 
reasonable quantification of control input energy. It has in fact been proposed 
as a measure of pilot physical workload in some FDM systems. However, the 
metric fails to capture any information about the frequency at which control 
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inputs were made and this property, along with control input amplitude, are 
typically cited as the critical aspects of the control strategy (see chapter 2). 
 
Figure 8 – Example time series of control inceptor displacement 
 
 
More sophisticated approaches to characterising control strategy are 
described in the literature. McDowell (1978) initiated the development of 
control strategy measures to evaluate pilot performance based upon 
frequency analysis techniques. He used a series of analogue electronic filters 
to estimate how control input energy was distributed amongst a series of 
frequency bands for novice, intermediate and experienced pilots flying a 
Cessna T-37 light military training aircraft.  It was found that the more 
experienced pilots generally concentrated most of their control input energy at 
the higher frequency end of the spectrum, particularly in the roll axis.  It was 
concluded that there were changes in pilot’s control movement power spectra 
(distribution of control input energy over frequency) as a function of skill level, 
and that measures of this property could be used effectively to discriminate 
pilot skill/experience level. Whilst McDowell (1978) utilised quite cumbersome 
analogue electronic filters to collect his data modern digital signal processing 
techniques make transforming time series records of control input 
displacement into the frequency domain a relatively straight forward task. 
Using these techniques it is possible to replicate McDowell’s approach to the 
measurement of control strategy, but it requires some prior knowledge of 
power spectral density and discreet Fourier transforms. 
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Figure 9 – An illustrative diagram showing the transposition of time series data into the 
frequency domain using a fast fourier transform algorithm  
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3.3.5 Power Spectral Analysis 
 
The power spectrum shows how the power of a signal (energy per unit time) 
is distributed over a frequency range and thus by examining it, it becomes 
possible to determine how much of the signals power falls into a given 
frequency bin. This is essentially the approach of McDowell. In digital signal 
analysis the typical means of computing the power spectrum is by performing 
a discreet Fourier transform. The discreet Fourier transform (DFT) identifies 
periodicities in a series of measured data and measures the relative strength 
of that periodicity (Press, Flannery, Teukolsky and Vetterling, 1989). 
Essentially such algorithms work on the assumption that any complex 
waveform can be expanded into a superposition of Sines and Cosines of 
varying amplitude, frequency and phase (see figure 7).  The discreet Fourier 
transform, Fn, of a series of data fk with N data points is given by; 
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With appropriate scaling the coefficients of the DFT give the power spectral 
density (PSD) of the time series data (see figure 8), expressing power per unit 
frequency (note that phase information is lost in the PSD distribution). Peaks 
in the distribution show strong periodicities in the signal and indicate where 
power is concentrated. Although scaling and interpretation of this process can 
be complex many maths processing packages such as MatlabTM incorporate 
streamlined DFT functions. By integrating the PSD data between two 
frequency limits it is possible to determine the amount of control input power 
within that frequency band (see figure 9). A simple Matlab script file which 
was developed for this purpose is reproduced in appendix E.   
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Figure 10 – Example Plot of Power Spectral Density distribution (periodogram) for a 
control input signal 
 
 
For analysis purposes frequency bands must be chosen which capture the 
typical regions of variability in the PSD distribution amongst pilots of differing 
skill. Whilst this is best established through inspection of data there are also 
research studies in which similar banding has been proposed and shown to 
discriminate performance (e.g. McDowell, 1978). It should be considered that 
these will be specific to the type of aircraft, the task and the environment in 
which it is conducted. It is possible that the presence of environmental noise 
may limit the use of these measures in the real world but they are quite 
suitable for comparing across pilots in a simulated study where environmental 
noise is highly constrained. 
 
It is worth noting at this juncture that there is a very well established practice 
of using frequency analysis for the design and evaluation of aircraft control 
systems. In laboratory environments the actions of the pilot in controlling a 
know disturbance function can be evaluated using frequency analysis and 
visualised as bode plots to determine how effective they were (McRuer and 
Jex, 1967). Furthermore the development of the ‘human transfer function’ 
aimed to produce a pilot response model which could be used to evaluate the 
stability of various control system designs. These research strands have been 
very productive in the design and engineering role, but the techniques 
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employed by them are not suitable for the assessment of pilot performance in 
a less well controlled and more open ‘real world’ environment.  Consequently 
they have not been detailed further within this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.6 An Alternative Characterisation of Control Strategy 
 
Recently Rantanen, Johnson and Talleur (2004) reviewed objective pilot 
performance measurement techniques in an attempt to develop an automated 
pilot proficiency scoring system. Their work concentrated heavily on the 
benefits of frequency analysis of time series data and they proposed several 
new metrics to quantify differences in PSD distributions which were 
associated with performance.  They did not adopt a band-pass technique as 
previously outlined. Instead their technique involved first subjecting the PSD 
data to a high pass filter, removing any spectral components which did not 
reach a critical magnitude and were therefore considered noise. Various 
dimensions of the distribution of the remaining components were then 
analysed, forming the performance metrics (see figure 10). The average 
amplitude of these significant components and their spread in amplitude were 
P
S
D
Frequency
Band -Pass 
Filters
Sum the Power in Each Band
Characterising the Power Spectrum through Frequency Banding
Figure 11 - Illustration of frequency banding of the power spectrum in order to 
measure differences in control input strategy 
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taken as two such measures (labelled the mean magnitude of spectral 
components (MSC) and the standard deviation of the magnitude of spectral 
components (DSC) respectively).  
 
The researchers hypothesised that more skilled pilots would distribute their 
control input power more evenly over the frequency range and generally use 
smaller inputs, thus their filtered PSD distributions would have more evenly 
less variable and smaller spectral powers. Also measures of the mean, 
median and spread in frequencies of the significant spectral components were 
computed (labelled FMGC, MEDF and FDGC respectively). The researchers 
theorised that more skilled pilots would have a greater spread in the 
frequency of their spectral components which would be shifted towards the 
higher end of the frequency spectrum (see Johnson et al., 2004; Johnson and 
Rantanen, 2005; Rantanen et al., 2001; Rantanen et al., 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Illustration of the Rantanen et al. approach to characterising 
control strategy from the power spectra 
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The researchers applied their proposed metrics in a series of flight trials, 
collecting data from a sample of pilots performing an instrument proficiency 
check (IPC) in a light aircraft.  The study demonstrated that the metrics were 
capable of discriminating between pilots who had passed or failed the IPC.  
However, due to limitations in the data collection system, control input data 
was unavailable and the metrics were applied only to outer loop parameters 
(see McRuer 1982 and Figure 3), such as course deviation and glideslope 
deviation indications.  Also, the individual elements of the test were isolated 
rather than integrated into a real time scenario and the overall cognitive 
demand (i.e. the requirement to anticipate future manoeuvres, energy 
changes etc.) was relatively low. Since it is expected that manual flying 
failures may result from the effects of limited cognitive capacity this particular 
lack of fidelity may have impacted the study significantly. 
 
Effectively the researchers measured aircraft performance rather than pilot 
performance, the former being mediated strongly by the stability 
characteristics of the machine, and have not measured differences in control 
strategy per se. Furthermore since the study was performed upon light aircraft 
which have significantly different stability characteristics to large transport 
aircraft it could not be assured that the metrics would perform well in the 
setting of this research.  
 
The metrics proposed by Rantanen et al (2004) are built upon a strong 
theoretical basis and show promise. However the properties which they 
measure are somewhat unintuitive and complex to derive from the PSD 
distribution (careful tuning of a low pass filter is required in order to properly 
separate the signal from noise without sacrificing information), violating some 
of the principles outlined in table 1. However the underlying theory of 
extracting control strategy information by characterising the PSD distribution 
seems to be valid and is in keeping with other research approaches.  
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3.4 Performance Measurement Literature Summary 
 
There is strong evidence from the literature that the ME and SDE metrics can 
provide good discrimination of pilot performance when applied to critical outer 
loop flight parameters (i.e. airspeed, localiser deviation, altitude etc) on a well 
prescribed task (i.e. where the parameters the pilot is trying to track are 
explicitly defined). Consequently such measures are certain to be included in 
the future stages of this research to measure pilot manual flying performance. 
However the literature also recommends that measures of control strategy are 
used to augment these more traditional measures in order to gauge the level 
of input effort exhibited by the pilot. Basic application of the RMSE metric to 
control input data fails to capture important aspects of the control strategy, 
namely the frequencies at which those inputs were made.   
 
However frequency analysis techniques may be used to classify different 
control strategies. There appears to be two primary techniques employed to 
quantify the power spectrum. The most commonly applied method is to simply 
‘band-pass’ the data and determine how much signal power falls into various 
frequency bins (e.g. McDowell etc). Alternatively Rantanen et al (2004) have 
recently developed a series of metrics which give a general description of the 
power spectral density distributions shape.  Whilst the former strategy has 
been reasonably well demonstrated in literature the latter has only found 
limited application.  Neither have been applied for the measurement of 
manual flying control strategy variation in large transport aircraft which have 
significantly different control systems with large amounts of lag. Consequently 
it is difficult, based on literature alone, to select a suitable control strategy 
measurement technique to take onto future parts of this research programme. 
It was also considered that there may be some advantage to conducting 
frequency analysis on the first or second order derivatives of control 
displacement data (thus analysing control input velocity or acceleration 
respectively) since signal noise may be reduced. However it was decided to 
reserve this exploration for future trials.  
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In order to validate that the described measurement techniques could 
adequately discriminate between subtle differences in pilots’ manual handling 
ability, and to gauge which measurement strategy was most effective, an 
empirical study was undertaken. The metrics were applied to data collected 
from students undertaking a Jet Orientation Course (JOC) in a fixed based 
simulator device. From instructor assessment data the evaluated students 
were known to have exhibited a positive manual handling performance 
increment as a result of the training course. The study aimed to evaluate how 
successfully the various measurement techniques could discriminate this 
performance difference. The most capable metrics for the subsequent phases 
of this research programme were selected on the basis of this analysis. 
 
 
3.5 Study Aims & Objectives 
 
The following empirical study aimed to demonstrate that frequency analysis 
based metrics could quantify a meaningful change in control strategy as 
student pilots undergoing jet transport flight skills training acquired manual 
handling expertise. Furthermore it tests the hypothesis that as this expertise 
develops control strategy changes will be characterised by an overall 
decrease in control input power and a shift in dominance from the low 
frequency bands to the higher frequency bands, i.e. a more efficient strategy, 
as proffered by previous research. If observed this would mean that the pilot’s 
control inputs were being made more frequently, signifying that the 
observeprocessrespond cognitive loop is being closed more rapidly and 
therefore possibly demanding less mental resource. The two methods of 
quantifying control strategy (frequency banding and Rantanen’s metrics) will 
be contrasted to determine which is more sensitive and capable of 
discriminating this performance change.  
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3.6 Method 
 
3.6.1 Participants 
 
The manual handling performance of 15 cadet pilots (all male, aged between 
18 and 25) was evaluated whilst they undertook a 40-hour Jet Orientation 
course on a Boeing 737NG. All students had similar levels of flying 
experience (approximately 180 hours in light singles and twins) at the 
commencement of the course.  None of the students had any flying 
experience of large jet transport types prior to undertaking the conversion 
course. All of the sampled students subsequently passed the Jet Orientation 
Training (JOT) course without the requirement for remedial training and were 
judged by the examiners to have significantly enhanced their manual flying 
ability. The research process was approved by the Cranfield School of 
Engineering Ethics Board which adheres to the guidance for ethical conduct 
promulgated by the British Psychological Association.  
 
3.6.2 Equipment 
 
The study was undertaken on a fixed-base JAA approved (Level 2) Flight 
Training Device (FTD) simulating a Boeing 737NG series aircraft. The FTD 
incorporated a 180 degree directly projected outside visual display, six screen 
Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) and flying controls with electrically 
generated control loading.  
 
A data logging computer running bespoke software was integrated into the 
system to collect flight data from the exercises. The logging system recorded 
92 flight parameters, including ILS tracking data, and position data from all the 
primary flight inceptors, at a sampling frequency of 4Hz.  Flight data were 
stored as comma delimited text files with time and date encoded filenames to 
allow for their identification whilst preserving participant anonymity.  
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3.6.3 Task 
 
The Jet Orientation Training syllabus required students to fly manual precision 
instrument approaches at a number of intervals throughout the course.  The 
orientation course immediately followed the student’s initial CPL(IR) training.  
Each student’s performance was sampled twice, once within the initial period 
of training and once during the final stages of the training programme, so that 
a longitudinal comparison could be made.   
 
The conditions of the approach were standardised for each student on each 
run so that weather, aircraft and traffic conditions would be consistent. The 
students were asked to fly a manual approach (i.e. without autopilot, flight 
director or autothrottle assistance) in instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC) to a minimum decision height of 200ft using the Instrument Landing 
System (ILS) for guidance.  In several previous studies this task proved to 
give the best discrimination of performance between pilots (see Rantanen et 
al, 2004).  
 
3.6.4 Performance Measures 
 
Flight data acquired from the trials was collated and imported into the Matlab 
data analysis suite. A bespoke M-file was produced to compute the ME (mean 
of Error) and SDE (Standard Deviation of Error) metrics for the outer loop 
parameters (localizer deviation, glideslope deviation and airspeed deviation) 
giving measures of accuracy and smoothness respectively. The M-file routine 
also performed a Discreet Fast Fourier Transform operation on the principle 
control movement data records (control wheel angle, control column angle, 
rudder pedal angle) from which the PSD was computed. Unfortunately 
records of thrust lever angle and commanded thrust were rendered unusable 
due to an error with the data acquisition computer.  
 
It is important to consider the effects of aliasing, windowing and end-effects 
when analysing the time series data. The maximum frequency of periodicity 
which may be detected in signal is half the sampling frequency of that signal 
 71 
as defined by the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem (Shannon, 1998).  
Effectively this occurs because any variability of higher frequency takes place 
between the periods of measurement and thus will be unobservable. The 
effect is known as aliasing. FDRs and QARs typically sample data at 4hz 
making the maximum analysable input frequency 2hz, or two control reversals 
per second. In the studies of Rantanen et al. (2004) control input activity was 
rarely seen to exceed 2hz. Furthermore, since these studies were performed 
in light, agile, aircraft it is expected that there will be even less activity beyond 
2hz in an aircraft with a much larger and heavier control inceptor, as will be 
used in this study. Consequently the effect of aliasing was not considered to 
present a significant threat to the study.  
 
Whilst aliasing threatens to mask the high frequency portion of the data, 
windowing effects threaten to discard the low frequency data. When a period 
of data is sampled a window is formed. If the periodicity of the signal exceeds 
the length of the sampling window valuable information will be lost. Whilst 
extending the window might change the proportional magnitude of any signal 
effect, small windows may mean that the signal is lost in noise. In this study 
the window size is mediated by the relatively short duration of the task. 
However, it was possible to permit a window length of 90 seconds which 
would allow relatively long period oscillations to be detected, but this may also 
mean some shorter period oscillations were masked. 
 
Finally, Discrete Fourier Transform algorithms generally assume that the 
signal upon which they operate is continuous. This means that a data sample 
should contain a perfect number of signal oscillations and its end point should 
match perfectly to its start point. In reality this is rarely the case and 
imperfections know as “signal end effects” exist which create nose in the 
spectral plot. Prior to performing a Fourier transform it is possible to apply 
various filters (a Hamming window is a well known example) which can 
reduce the impact of signal end effects. However, selecting an appropriate 
filter requires detailed knowledge of the signal and if done improperly can 
actually introduce further noise. Since there was little prior data for the 
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selection of a filter in this study a simple boxcar filter was applied (essentially 
minimal suppression of signal end effects). 
 
The spectral plots for each case were inspected visually in the first instance. It 
was noted that in all cases there was no significant spectral structure beyond 
0.25Hz. Two other research analysts familiar with the context of the research 
were asked to look through the spectral plots and independently suggest the 
frequency which generally represented the upper bound of significant spectral 
activity. In both cases the analysts concluded that 0.25Hz appeared to be the 
‘cut-off’ frequency. Therefore the frequency range 0Hz to 0.25Hz was divided 
into five equal frequency bands; very low frequency (0Hz to 0.05Hz), low 
frequency (0.05Hz to 0.10Hz), medium frequency (0.10Hz to 0.15Hz), high 
frequency (0.15Hz to 0.20Hz) and very high frequency (0.20Hz to 0.25Hz). 
Control input power within these bands was computed by integrating the PSD 
curve between the frequency limits using a Matlab routine. These values 
formed the frequency band metrics which were named VLFB, LFB, MFB, HFB 
and VHFB respectively. Additionally, the Rantanen measures of control 
strategy were computed from the PSD data (see section 3.3.6), again using a 
Matlab routine. The high pass filter in this case was set with reference to 
previous research on the subject by Johnson, Rantanen and Talleur (2004). 
All metric values were then imported into the SPSS package so that statistical 
comparisons of early and late training performance could be made using 
paired t-tests. 
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3.7 Results 
 
3.7.1 Flight path tracking accuracy and smoothness (outer loop parameters) 
 
Using a paired t-test (see table 2) no significant differences were observed in 
the mean tracking error (ME) of the ILS localiser early and late in the training 
course. Similarly there were no significant differences in the standard 
deviation (SDE) of Localiser tracking early or later in the training course. 
 
No significant differences were observed in students’ performance early and 
late in the training course for mean tracking error on the ILS glideslope. 
Furthermore there were no significant differences in the smoothness of 
glideslope tracking early or late on the training course (see table 2).  
 
Similarly, there were no significant differences between the mean airspeed 
error early and late on the training course. However, performance later on the 
course did demonstrate significantly lower standard deviations of airspeed 
error. This was indicative of greater stability in the control of the target 
approach speed (see table 2).  
 
Table 2 - Arithmetic Mean of Error (ME) and Standard Deviation of Error (SDE) for ILS 
outer control loop parameters broken down by early or late course assessment. 
Highlighted row indicates a statistically significant result.  
 
ILS Tracking Performance 
 Early in Course   Late in Course        
 M σ  M σ  t df Sig. 
Tracking Accuracy - ME            
   Localiser (dots) 0.064 1.359  -0.778 2.029  1.331 14 0.206 
   Glideslope (dots) -0.362 0.282  -0.266 0.357  -0.854 14 0.408 
   Airspeed (kts) 16.293 7.633  8.92 3.641  -2.142 14 0.050 
          
Tracking Smoothness - SDE          
   Localiser (dots) 0.041 0.037  0.013 0.031  2.007 14 0.064 
   Glideslope (dots) 0.006 0.006  0.006 0.007  -0.159 14 0.872 
   Airspeed (kts) 0.415 0.276   0.416 0.358   -0.005 14 0.996 
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Figure 13 - Averaged periodograms of Control Wheel Inputs for Students Early and 
Late in Training 
 
Figure 14 - Averaged periodograms of Control Column inputs for Students Early and 
Late in Training 
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3.7.2 Summary Frequency Measures of Control Strategy 
 
Visually there were distinct differences in the roll and pitch control strategies 
adopted by the students early and late in the training course, as demonstrated 
by the averaged Periodograms presented in figures 11 & 12. Control input 
power appeared to reduce across all frequencies as training progressed. In all 
cases control power appeared to be concentrated towards the low frequency 
end of the spectrum 
 
Applying the summary frequency metrics devised by Rantanen et al. it was 
observed that the magnitude of significant spectral components for roll input 
reduced later in training (see table 4). This result indicates that roll control 
inputs generally reduced in amplitude with the development of manual flying 
expertise. The analysis technique also indicated that the spread of 
frequencies of these components was significantly broader later in training.  
 
The summary frequency metrics indicated that the general amplitude of pitch 
control inputs was somewhat reduced later in training (see table 4). In general 
the Rantanen measures offered a similar description to the change in control 
strategy as the frequency band-pass technique 
 
3.7.3 Frequency Band-Pass Measures of Control Strategy 
 
Using the frequency band-pass analysis method roll control input power 
(lateral control wheel movements) was found to be significantly lower across 
all of the frequency bands for students late in their training. This indicates that 
as expertise developed the effort expended in controlling the aircraft in roll 
generally reduced (see table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Table 3 – Band-pass frequency analysis metrics for Primary Flight Control Inputs 
during the ILS tracking task broken down by early or late course assessment. 
Highlighted rows indicate statistically significant (p<0.05) results. 
 
Control Input Strategy - Frequency Band Metrics 
  Early in Course   Late in Course         
 M σ  M σ  t df Sig. 
Control Wheel Power (degs²)          
  Very Low Frequency Band 34183 36177  9134 26064  2.282 14 0.039 
  Low Frequency Band 31588 39603  2039 2278  2.855 14 0.013 
  Mid Frequency Band 21151 17070  1902 2461  4.744 14 0.000 
  High Frequency Band 14135 11889  1776 1701  4.334 14 0.001 
  Very High Frequency Band 5200 3796  873 1180  4.374 14 0.001 
          
Control Column Power (degs²)          
  Very Low Frequency Band 782 724  280 369  2.233 14 0.042 
  Low Frequency Band 92 48  42 54  2.681 14 0.018 
  Mid Frequency Band 64 41  30 47  2.148 14 0.050 
  High Frequency Band 41 36  21 23  1.735 14 0.105 
  Very High Frequency Band 22 15  9 8  2.936 14 0.011 
          
Rudder Power (degs²)          
  Very Low Frequency Band 3024 4515  2129 2592  0.593 14 0.282 
  Low Frequency Band 119 191  67 92  0.939 14 0.182 
  Mid Frequency Band 68 139  19 21  1.392 14 0.093 
  High Frequency Band 76 178  15 28  1.290 14 0.109 
  Very High Frequency Band 25 54   6 11   0.715 14 0.109 
 
 
The frequency band-pass analysis method also identified that pitch input 
power (fore-aft movements of the control column) was significantly reduced in 
the very low, low, mid and very high frequency bands for students late in their 
training. Again, this indicates that as expertise developed the pitch control 
strategy changed, with less power expended over most of the input 
frequencies (see table 3). 
 
The frequency band analysis method identified no significant differences 
between the yaw input power (rudder movements) at any frequency band for 
students at either stage of their training. This indicates that there were no 
identifiable changes to the yaw control strategy associated with manual flying 
expertise on this task. 
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Table 4 – Summery frequency metrics for Primary Flight Control Inputs during the ILS 
tracking task broken down by early or late course assessment. Highlighted rows 
indicate statistically significant (p<0.05) results. 
 
Control Input Strategy – Summary Frequency Metrics 
  Early in Course   Late in Course         
 M σ  M σ  t df Sig. 
 Control Wheel Input          
   MSC (degs²/hz) 448 361  71 126  4.121 14 0.001 
   DSC (degs²/hz) 1775 1582  416 1103  2.944 14 0.011 
   FMGC (hz) 0.122 0.029  0.175 0.100  -1.884 14 0.080 
   FDGC (hz) 0.078 0.016  0.122 0.016  -2.394 14 0.031 
   MEDF (hz) 0.087 0.033  0.120 0.071  -1.359 14 0.196 
          
 Control Column Input          
   MSC (degs²/hz) 4 3  2 2  2.595 14 0.021 
   DSC (degs²/hz) 28 27  11 14  2.071 14 0.057 
   FMGC (hz) 0.067 0.036  0.073 0.045  -0.326 14 0.749 
   FDGC (hz) 0.056 0.030  0.058 0.032  -0.124 14 0.903 
   MEDF (hz) 0.022 0.017  0.041 0.040  -1.556 14 0.142 
          
 Rudder Input          
   MSC (degs²/hz) 13 19  9 10  0.756 14 0.462 
   DSC (degs²/hz) 129 196  91 115  0.574 14 0.575 
   FMGC (hz) 0.024 0.058  0.014 0.016  0.652 14 0.525 
   FDGC (hz) 0.019 0.037  0.013 0.015  0.526 14 0.607 
   MEDF (hz) 0.011 0.038   0.004 0.009   0.708 14 0.491 
 
 
3.7.4 Descriptive Power of the Metrics 
 
For each performance metric the partial Eta Squared statistic was computed. 
This value represents the amount of between conditions variance in the 
dependent variable (metric score) explained by the levels of the independent 
variable (stage of training). Values range from zero to one, a value of one 
indicating that 100% of the variance is explained by the independent variable. 
A plot of partial Eta Squared values are presented in figure 13.  Whilst the 
values for the outer loop parameter tracking metrics are generally low, the 
frequency band measures of control input strategy are high and surpass the 
values achieved by the Rantanen et al. metrics (2004). 
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Figure 15 – Plot of partial Eta squared for each performance metric, illustrating how well they 
discriminated the two levels of student performance.  
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3.8 Discussion 
 
3.8.1 Measures of outer-loop parameter pursuit tracking 
 
When measuring performance from a traditional perspective (by examining 
error in outer loop parameters – see McRuer 1982) the results showed only a 
few small differences in performance over the period of the training course. 
There were no significant improvements in either the accuracy or smoothness 
of lateral or vertical flight path tracking on the ILS (see table 2). However, the 
results indicate that on both measurement occasions the student’s 
demonstrated relatively high levels of tracking smoothness and accuracy and 
there was only limited scope for improvement. 
 
The results indicate that the smoothness of airspeed tracking improved 
significantly over the period of the training course (table 2). Students who had 
gained more manual handling experience on the aircraft type held a more 
consistent airspeed rather than allowing it to drift and then correct. The results 
indicate that whilst students at either stage of their training were equally 
capable of maintaining the aircraft’s flight path on the ILS datum, the 
simultaneous management of the aircrafts energy proved more problematic 
and benefited considerably from gains in manual flying experience (see table 
2).   
 
Students undertaking the course were transitioning to flying a large jet 
transport aircraft having spent a considerable amount of time flying light twin 
propeller aircraft. One of the most significant differences between the two 
aircraft is in the management of their energy, as noted in the introduction. 
Large jet transport aircraft are generally very aerodynamically ‘clean’ with 
highly efficient, low drag wings. They can be reluctant to dissipate energy and 
slow down. Furthermore their high bypass turbofan engines lag in response to 
control demands and can generate considerable secondary pitching 
moments. Consequently the task of maintaining the larger aircraft’s energy is 
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far more complex and without adequate control significant airspeed errors can 
accumulate.  
 
This difference in the complexity of airspeed management appears to show 
through these results and indicates that ‘outer-loop’ measures did provide 
some useful information, supporting other studies which have used them to 
capture differences in manual handling performance (e.g. Rees and Harris, 
1995). However, the general sensitivity of such measures appears limited 
when applied to studies of large transport aircraft, supporting the view that 
further measures of control input strategy need to be included. 
 
3.8.2 Measures of control input strategy 
 
With regard to control strategy measurements both the frequency banding 
metrics and the Rantanen metrics successfully discriminated between the 
performance of the students early and late on the training course on a number 
of dimensions (see tables 3 and 4).   
 
The frequency band metrics revealed that both early and late in training the 
majority of the control input power was concentrated at the lower frequency 
end of the spectrum. This differs somewhat to the results obtained by 
McDowell (1978) who found control input power to be concentrated at the 
higher frequencies. However it is expected that the results should differ as this 
study involved light military jet aircraft which respond rapidly to control inputs. 
As noted in the introduction the pilots of large transport aircraft must generally 
adopt a lower frequency control input strategy due to the limitations of the 
aircrafts response rate. The large spikes in power at the extreme lower end of 
the spectrum are probably the result of periods of control inactivity i.e. when 
the inceptors remain static. This control strategy is plausible in a highly stable 
aircraft such as that used in this study, but would be relatively rare in a more 
‘twitchy’ light military jet. 
 
In support of McDowell’s findings the frequency band metrics recorded that 
over the period of training control input power significantly reduced in both the 
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pitch and roll control axes (see table 3). McDowell found that the low 
frequency components reduced in power so that the high frequency 
components of control became more dominant. The results presented in this 
thesis differ slightly in that the reduction in control power reduction was of the 
order 60% to 80% across all frequency bands and not specific to any 
particular one. Again, it is suggested that this is a result of the difference in 
control system between the aircraft used in these studies.  
 
In general though the results of the frequency band analysis show that there 
is much less control power input at the lower end of the frequency spectrum. 
This represents a significant change in the control strategy used to resolve the 
control problem. It is suggested that as pilots progressed in training they 
began to make a more varied range of control inputs which suited the errors 
they observed and needed to correct, rather than using occasional coarse and 
jerky higher amplitude inputs that would generate the high levels of low 
frequency power observed in the spectral distributions. In essence the pilots 
control strategy was refined to the task. These results correspond closely to 
the observations of Rantanen et al (2004) who found that pilots range of 
control input frequencies broadened with greater expertise.  
 
In contrast the summary frequency metrics proposed by Rantanen et al. give 
a coarser measure of the change in control strategy over the period of 
training. Whilst they similarly indicate a reduction in the total control input 
power they are less able to quantify how the distribution of this power over 
frequency was modified (see table 4). The results indicate that the power was 
more widely distributed over the frequency range but can be no more specific 
than this. Furthermore the comparison of partial Eta Squared values shows 
that the Rantanen metrics were generally less sensitive than the frequency 
band metrics and offered less explanatory power. The reason for this reduced 
discriminative ability is most likely because these metrics are based on simple 
averages and thus subtle patterns in the spectral distribution are largely 
discarded and overlooked.   
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Neither set of metrics measured any significant change in the yaw control 
strategy of the pilots over the period of training. This is perhaps a function of 
the task administered to the pilots since a symmetric thrust ILS generates few 
yaw control demands in a large swept wing airliner. Without a requirement to 
demonstrate their expertise it is therefore hard for pilots show that they have 
improved their performance and ‘stand out from the crowd’. Engine failure 
events are typically unexpected and challenge the diagnostic and decision 
making skills of the pilot. Pilots who handle such situations well typically have 
the capacity and foundation of experience to sense the initial, subtle, variation 
in the aircrafts response sooner and make appropriate corrective inputs 
before aircraft state deviations become large and more aggressive corrective 
action is required.  It may therefore be prudent to increase the yaw control 
demands of tasks used in future studies by including a crosswind component 
or an asymmetric thrust condition (i.e. engine failure). The latter may be 
particularly relevant since data from the introduction (CAP 776, 2008) shows 
many fatal manual flying related accidents to occur post engine failure, where 
either directional control is lost or the airspeed is allowed to decay 
excessively. 
 
3.8.3 Overview 
 
Whilst the outer loop tracking metrics indicated that there were only minor 
differences in a generally high standard of flight path tracking over the period 
of the training course, the control strategy metrics indicate that the effort 
required by the pilot to achieve this performance significantly reduced with 
training and that their control strategy became more refined.  
 
The results support the hypothesis (Baron, 1988) that when measuring 
manual flying performance in large jet transport aircraft measures of control 
strategy may be more sensitive to the change in expertise than measures of 
outer loop parameter tracking. Thus small differences in performance maybe 
detected using the former metrics before they are detected with the latter. 
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Clearly it is essential that measures of outer loop tracking performance are 
included in any study of manual flying since the successful outcome of 
performance is critical. However, measures of control strategy allow for a 
separate and complimentary analysis of performance. The results of this 
study suggest that the two types of performance metric are used in parallel in 
order to build a more sensitive and broader measurement system. 
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3.9 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The study suggests that coarse ’event’ type measurement metrics, as 
employed in FDM/FOQA, are of limited use within the scope of this research 
study. It also suggests that traditionally employed measures of outer-loop 
parameter tracking (ME & SDE) are valid in this research setting but may lack 
sensitivity when applied to large transport aircraft. 
 
Empirically derived data shows that frequency band metrics are able to 
sensitively measure difference in the control strategy of pilots with different 
manual flying ability. Pilots with more manual handling experience generally 
use less control input power to achieve equal levels of tracking performance. 
It is proposed that these measures are used as an adjunct to the more 
traditional tracking measures in order to improve overall sensitivity. Alternative 
measures of control strategy proposed by Rantanen et al are rejected in this 
instance as they demonstrate poorer sensitivity and explanatory power. 
 
A battery of performance metrics suitable for the fine grained assessment of 
pilot manual handling ability was chosen from the results of this empirical 
analysis and is presented in table 5.   
 
Table 5 - Selected battery of performance metrics 
 
Metric Description 
ME Gives the average accuracy of tracking (dots) 
SDE Gives the variability or smoothness in tracking (dots) 
VLF Control input power in the very low frequency band (0hz to 0.025hz) (deg2) 
LF Control input power in the low frequency band (0.025hz to 0.075hz) (deg2) 
MF Control input power in the medium frequency band (0.075hz to 0.125hz) (deg2) 
HF Control input power in the high frequency band (0.125hz to 0.175hz) (deg2) 
VHF Control input power in the very high frequency band (0.175hz to 0.225hz) (deg2) 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The initial phase of the research programme identified a safety concern which 
related the reduction in manual flying exposure in air transport operations to a 
perceived degradation in manual flying ability. Furthermore it was apparent 
from a review of previous research and publications that there was insufficient 
objective evidence to properly address this safety concern (see chapter 1). To 
provide objective evidence an empirical study of professional air transport 
pilot’s manual flying ability was undertaken and is reported in this chapter. 
 
The findings of the previous two studies were used to define the methodology 
that was adopted, ensuring that it was objective, sensitive and valid. The 
review of cognitive skills performed in Study I (see chapter 2) helped define 
the structure of the flying task which was used to elicit pilot’s manual flying 
ability and ensure it was valid from a cognitive perspective. The review and 
evaluation of numerical performance measures undertaken in Study II (see 
chapter 3) defined the means by which performance information was 
extracted from the flight data records collected during the exercises. 
 
 
4.2 Study Aims and Objectives 
 
• Measure the manual handling ability of a cross section of pilots of 
highly automated airliners on a representative task 
 
• Validate the chosen numerical performance measures by comparing 
them with TRE derived measures of performance 
 
• Evaluate the causal relationships between the sample’s long term and 
short term manual handling experience and their manual handling 
performance. 
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4.3 Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Research Setting 
 
The third and final research study addressed the practical issue of the loss of 
manual flying skills in the airline operating environment. Consequently it was 
vital to preserve ecological validity in the research design so that the results of 
the study could readily be applied to answering the real world problem 
presented. This requirement constrained the methodological approach that 
was adopted. Primarily it demanded that flight crew who were currently 
operational with an airline were sampled and evaluated in a high fidelity 
environment that reproduced the demands and context of commercial flight. 
To provide this environment whilst preserving scientific control and 
consistency it was decided to evaluate pilot performance in a full flight 
simulator device during a segment of a Line Orientated Flight Training (LOFT) 
style scenario. The research was presented primarily as a training opportunity 
to encourage pilot participation and to reduce the effects of testing induced 
stress on performance (peak performance). However, participants were fully 
briefed as to the purpose of the research in accordance with ethical guidelines 
(see appendix F). 
 
A collaborating airline (a UK based ‘low fares’ operator with a primarily 
domestic and European route network) agreed to offer the exercise to its 
Boeing 737 fleet pilots during a half hour simulator session which immediately 
followed the completion of the crews annual License Proficiency Check (LPC). 
This arrangement provided a sizable and diverse sample of pilots within a 
reasonably short period of time. However, it should be noted that since all 
sampled pilots had successfully demonstrated fundamental manual handling 
elements during the preceding proficiency check the range of their 
performance would likely be somewhat normalised.  
 
Consequently the study aims to discriminate the relatively narrow spread 
between desirable manual flying performance and merely tolerable manual 
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flying performance (i.e. performance which satisfies the absolute minimum 
safety criteria but should not serve as an example of good manual flying). 
However, a methodology that can successfully discriminate this small 
difference has promise for application to the population where performance 
spread is likely to be much wider since it demonstrates high sensitivity. It 
should also be noted that any performance observed during simulator testing 
is likely to exceed real world performance, especially during abnormal 
circumstances (Baker and Dismukes, 2002). There are of course obvious 
ethical considerations which surround assessing the performance of licensed 
air transport pilots.  These and other practicalities precluded an alternative 
research design in this instance but future studies may benefit by assessing 
performance just prior to the license proficiency check should this be possible.  
 
4.3.2 Participants 
 
Research participants were 66 professional pilots sampled over a period of 
four months. All pilots held an Air Transport Pilot License (ATPL) and a 
Boeing 737-300/400/500 type endorsement. The trial was run concurrently 
with the airline’s annual License Proficiency Check (LPC) programme and 
participants were recruited as they presented themselves for this simulator 
session. The airline’s Flight Crew Scheduling department allocated crew 
members in pairs to the various LPC sessions based on their requirement for 
revalidation which in turn was a function of their initial date of employment and 
roster availability. Research sessions were administered on those occasions 
where simulator availability allowed an additional half hour session to be 
added to the standard four hour LPC session (the simulator was highly utilised 
by several airlines and not all LPC sessions could be extended to facilitate the 
research). The criterion for participant selection was therefore convenience 
based but was not knowingly influenced by the individuals manual flying 
experience or performance (no participants were undergoing an LPC re-test).  
 
  
 
 
 89 
4.3.3 Ethical Considerations 
 
Prior to commencement of data collection all of the airlines pilot’s received an 
email explaining that the research was taking place and inviting them to 
participate if they wished to do so. It was made clear that participation was 
voluntary and that all data were made anonymous and would be held securely 
and in confidence at Cranfield University. They were provided with further 
details during a meeting in person the day prior to the research exercise. The 
research exercise was scheduled to run after the completion of the two day 
LPC items and once the candidate had received their result. Participants were 
informed that they could withdraw at any stage. All work was approved by the 
Cranfield University School of Engineering Ethics committee and conformed 
to the British Psychological Society’s guidelines for ethical treatment of 
participants (see Appendix F for a reproduction of the approved ethics 
proposal). The work was presented to and supported by several of the major 
pilots union groups.      
 
4.3.4 Expert Observation 
 
During the research simulator exercises a qualified Boeing 737 TRE occupied 
the instructor’s station. The TRE was responsible for administering the test 
scenario (including configuring the simulator and data collection equipment 
via the instructor’s operating station) and making observational assessments 
of the crew’s performance.  The TRE performance assessment data were 
collected in order to gauge the convergent validity of the flight data derived 
performance measures i.e. two different methods of measuring the same 
performance qualities are compared to check that they are in agreement. 
Additionally, contrasting the two data sets gave a practical scaling to the flight 
data derived measures i.e. TRE derived mean score values for tolerable & 
desirable performance. 
 
The TRE made a global assessment of the handling pilot’s manual flying 
ability by allocating a score on a behaviourally anchored Likert rating scale. 
The behavioural descriptions which anchored the scale were derived from 
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expert accounts of strong and poor manual handling practice gathered during 
the cognitive task analysis phase (see Chapter 2). The scoring scale was 
designed to parallel a rating scale already in use with the candidate airline so 
that the requirement to train TREs in its administration would be minimised 
and inter-rater reliability would be maximised. The scoring scale is reproduced 
at Appendix G. Essentially scores of one or two represented tolerable, but 
limited manual handling ability i.e. a standard which is not necessarily placing 
the aircraft in danger but should not serve as an example to others. Scores of 
three or above all represented varying degrees of desirable manual flying 
ability, i.e. a standard which the airline is aiming to achieve.  
 
An additional TRE (not associated with the candidate airline) occupied the 
second simulator observer seat during a random selection of the research 
exercises. The second TRE was trained in the administration of the 
observational scoring scale and gave parallel but independent ratings of the 
participant’s manual flying performance. These data were subsequently used 
to establish the level of inter-rater reliability achieved in administration of the 
rating scale. 
 
4.3.5 Equipment 
 
Research trials were conducted on a Hughes Rediffusion Simulation Ltd. 
Boeing 737-300 (see figure 14) full flight simulator equipped with six degrees 
of freedom hydraulic motion cueing system, hydraulic control loading, 150 
degree wide day/night/dusk capable visual display and Honeywell SP300 
Auto-flight and Flight Management System (see Appendix H for a 
reproduction of this aircrafts flight deck layout). The simulator was approved 
to JAR STD 1A Level D.  A customised lesson plan was incorporated into the 
instructor’s operating system (IOS) to manage the research scenario.  A 
simple IOS button selection reconfigured and positioned the simulator to the 
start of the exercise, initiated the flight data collection procedure and 
terminated it when the exercise was complete. The data collection procedure 
ran on a Gould computer integrated into the simulator system. Proprietary 
format data were recorded in real time and then converted off-line into ARINC 
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717 format raw bit-stream data. ARINC 717 is the standard data format for 
flight data and quick access recorders and hence is supported by most flight 
data analysis software making the collected data portable for analysis.  
 
4.3.6 Manual Handling Experience Measures (Independent Variables) 
 
A pro-forma was developed to gather demographic and flying experience data 
from the participating pilots (see Appendix I). These data served as the basis 
for the measures of pilot manual flying exposure (the independent variables of 
the study). The study aimed to determine the effects of recent and long term 
manual flying exposure on performance and so correspondingly the pro-forma 
gathered data relating to recent and long term manual flying experience. 
Proximal manual flying exposure was estimated from the number of extended 
manual approaches the pilot had conducted within the previous month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 - Front and Profile view of the Boeing 737-300 aircraft which 
formed the platform for the review of manual flying skills. Notably the 
aircrafts under-slung engines cause a considerable thrust-pitch 
coupling. (image adapted from Janes, 2000) 
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For this purpose an extended manual approach was defined as an approach 
whereby the autopilot was disconnected prior to or shortly after reaching the 
final approach point (FAP).  Distal manual flying exposure was evaluated from 
the pilot’s accounts of their career history. The list of aircraft types the pilot 
reported to have flown were divided into highly automated and manual groups 
(see assumed definition in Chapter 1). The number of hours spent flying 
manual types was used as a measure of manual flying exposure when set 
against their total number of commercial flying hours.  
 
In addition to these primary data the pro-forma also collected information 
about other individual differences which may impact manual flying experience 
so that their effects could be controlled for or explored in the subsequent 
analysis. These factors included the non-commercial flying activities of the 
participant (i.e. general or sport aviation), the training route of the participant 
and a self evaluation of their own manual flying ability, as well as the standard 
demographic information.    
 
4.3.7 Manual Flying Task 
 
Practicalities precluded the evaluation of a full descent, approach and landing 
profile and consequently many of the cognitive facets of performance 
uncovered in Chapter 2 could not be fully tested and evaluated. Instead the 
research focused on the ILS initial approach, ILS and missed approach 
procedures. However, information gathered during the CTA was used to 
incorporate appropriate cognitive complexity into these tasks and therefore 
challenge this aspect of manual flying expertise, enhancing the validity of the 
exercise. 
 
Participants were each required to perform a standardised terminal 
manoeuvring exercise in instrument meteorological conditions and with the 
aircraft in an asymmetric thrust condition. The simulated failure of an engine 
increased the yaw control demands of the task which was seen to be lacking 
in previous studies (see chapter 2). It also made the task more practically 
relevant since earlier data (see introduction) identified that a large proportion 
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of fatal manual handling related accidents occur following the loss of an 
engine. To force the participants to adopt manual control the autopilot, flight 
director and auto throttle systems were all made inoperative (the crew were 
briefed that these systems would not be available throughout the flight).  
 
The task began from a straight and level condition at platform altitude with the 
aircraft at relatively high speed in a clean configuration positioned to intercept 
the ILS localiser. From the information delivered via the standardised ATC 
brief (see figure 15) participants were required to recognise the need to shed 
energy relatively rapidly, transitioning to a suitable intercept speed and 
configuration over a fairly short track distance. Whilst performing the single 
engine ILS a significant backing crosswind further added to the cognitive 
demand of the manual flying exercise. Finally, weather conditions at decision 
height prevented visual acquisition of the runway, mandating a single engine 
missed approach and placing significant lateral and vertical control demands 
upon the pilot. Precise management of the aircraft’s performance during the 
single engine missed approach was necessary to achieve the required climb 
profile as the aircraft was at a relatively high landing weight.  
 
The exercise incorporated a variety of demanding but operationally relevant 
manual flight tasks in the short period of time available whilst preserving the 
continuity and line orientated nature of the simulator session. The ILS tracking 
task has previously been demonstrated to give good discrimination between 
weak and strong pilots and has a great deal of validity since it is a likely 
requirement for manual flight in the real world. Importantly the chosen 
exercise is well defined spatially and thus can be easily measured using the 
chosen measurement tools. The EFIS was configured to display only raw 
flight data, with the electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) set to 
expanded ILS mode, challenging the pilot’s instrument scanning discipline. 
The addition of a backing crosswind, asymmetric thrust condition and tight 
energy constraints were intended to challenge the cognitive processes that 
would be encountered during real world manual flight operations and are 
considered by experts to underpin manual flying performance (see chapter 2). 
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Figure 17 - diagrammatic representation of the task scenario 
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4.3.8 Experimental Procedure 
 
The TRE who had conducted the participating crew’s LPC prior to the 
research session also undertook the role of co-ordinator and observer for the 
research exercise. Following a refreshment break the TRE invited the 
participating crew into the simulator and delivered a joint research and flight 
briefing. Participants were asked to fly manually a terminal area exercise (see 
figure 15) which would commence from straight and level flight at platform 
altitude and include a raw data ILS approach in IMC. They were informed that 
the exercise would be undertaken with the starboard engine shut down and 
secured and without the availability of either the autopilot, flight director or the 
auto-throttle systems.  
 
Pilots were randomly assigned the duties of pilot flying (PF) and pilot 
monitoring (PM). The crew were asked to perform the exercise as they would 
during an operational flight with the PM making the standard company calls, 
operating the radios and calling the checklists. The TRE initiated the lesson 
plan through the IOS which configured the simulator into a ‘frozen’ state at the 
initial point of the research exercise. The crew were given the necessary 
approach plates, weather briefings and reference data and allowed time to 
brief and orientate themselves (the scenario assumed that all necessary QRH 
items had been performed to secure the non-operating engine).  With the 
agreement of the crew the simulation was unfrozen in time but held in 
geographical position to allow the PF to transition to flying the aircraft in its 
asymmetric thrust condition. When the PF indicated they were ready the TRE 
delivered a scripted ATC clearance;  
 
“Maintain 3000ft on this heading to intercept the localiser, 
reduce speed at your discretion, approximately 15 miles to run. 
Once established cleared to descend with the glideslope” 
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When the crews read back had been confirmed the simulation was released 
from its position freeze and the flight was allowed to progress. Reported 
weather conditions were marginally above the approach’s CAT1 minima 
allowing the crew to proceed legally with the approach but making the 
outcome at decision height unpredictable. As the aircraft passed 4nm DME 
inbound on the ILS the TRE delivered a landing clearance along with an 
update of the surface wind conditions (moderate with a crosswind component 
from the right). The simulated overcast cloud base was set slightly lower than 
the reported height and below decision height, requiring that the crew execute 
the missed approach procedure (straight ahead to 3,000ft) owing to a lack of 
visual contact with the runway. The lesson plan automatically froze the 
simulation and terminated data collection as the aircraft climbed through the 
acceleration altitude (1,500ft QNH). Following the experimental run the TRE 
completed the behaviourally anchored rating form, assessing the manual 
handling performance of the PF on the exercise (see Appendix G).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 – Exemplar animation of flight data using FlightScape Insight Animation 
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The simulation was then reconfigured back to the start of the exercise and the 
crew were asked to swap PF/PM roles and re-brief themselves for the same 
approach. The exercise was run again as before, although the crew were 
informed that the weather conditions may or may not require a go-around 
(although environmental conditions had in fact not been changed thus 
necessitating a missed approach). The order in which crew members were 
assigned the duty of PF was varied randomly over the trials. Following the 
simulator exercise participants were moved to a de-briefing room and asked 
to complete the demographic pro-forma which included information about their 
career history as well as recent and long term manual flying experience. 
Participants were then thanked for their contribution and given an 
experimental debrief which included time for feedback and discussion.  
 
 
Figure 19 – Exemplar Plots of flight data produce by FlightScape Insight Analysis 
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4.3.9 Flight Data Derived Performance Measures (Dependant Variables) 
 
Raw ARINC 717 format bit stream data were imported into the Flightscape 
Insight analysis suite. The data were animated and plotted (see figure 16 and 
17) to allow for an initial visual screening of the flights and the detection of any 
gross anomalies.  An event set was defined and run within the analysis 
software to segment each flight into the three distinct tasks, ‘straight & level’, 
‘ILS tracking’ and ‘Missed Approach’. Segmented data files were exported as 
comma delimited text files (.csv) and passed to the Matlab data analysis suite 
for further processing. A bespoke M-file (programme script file) was used to 
compute the battery of performance metrics (see table 5) for each flight 
segment. The performance metric values were then assembled in an SPSS 
data file alongside the participants corresponding biographical and career 
data and the TRE performance rating data for statistical analysis.  
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4.4 Analysis & Results 
 
 
4.4.1 Demographic Data 
 
The participating pilots reported widely varied flying experience (see table 6), 
ranging from young first officers operating on a frozen ATPL, having just 
completed their initial type rating training, to seasoned training captains 
holding close to 18,000 flying hours. Generally the samples total commercial 
flying experience was normally distributed around a mean of 5,887 hours with 
a standard deviation of 3,839 hours. 
 
The number of hours operating experience of highly automated aircraft (see 
definition chapter 1) ranged within the sample from 300 hours to 11,500 
hours, with a mean of 3,597 hours and a standard deviation of 2,803 hours. 
Importantly, the proportion of automation to total flying experience varied 
considerably amongst the sample, being largely dependent upon the career 
path of the individual prior to taking up their appointment at the host airline. 
There was thus ample variability in automation exposure with which to 
contrast against any observed variance in manual flying performance. 
 
Table 6 - Sample Demographic & Career Background 
 
N=66, 32 First Officers (49%), 27 Captains (41%), 7 Training Captains (11%) 
  Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
      
Age (yrs) 25 56 40 9 
Total Commercial Experience (Hrs) 500 17900 5887 3839 
Automated Aircraft Experience (Hrs) 300 11500 3597 2803 
Boeing 737-3/4/5 Experience (Hrs) 300 8500 2269 1722 
Private Flying Experience (Hrs) 0 5000 555 1190 
Sectors Flown in Past Month 0 60 25 15 
Manual Approaches Flown in past month 0 10 3 3 
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The amount of non-airline flying conducted by the sampled pilots was also 
highly variable. The majority of the sample (72%) reported that they had 
undertaken no significant flying activity outside of their occupational duties. 
However, amongst the remaining crew there was considerable variation in 
recreational flying experience up to a maximum of 5,000 hours (mean 555 
hours, standard deviation 1,190 hours). This non-airline flying activity included 
touring and instructing in light aircraft and helicopters, as well as performing 
sports aerobatics in light powered aircraft and gliders.  
 
When completing the demographic pro-forma pilots were asked to consider if 
they felt their manual flying ability had been influenced by the experience of 
operating a highly automated aircraft. In response 77% of the sample 
indicated that their skills had deteriorated. However 16% of participants felt 
their skills had not been affected, whilst 7% believed their skills had actually 
improved, although many of the latter were young pilots who noted that the 
improvement was probably due to a large proportional increase in their flying 
experience on large transport types. 
 
4.4.2 Flight Data Performance Measures 
 
The tables in appendix J show the distribution of flight data derived 
performance measurements for the whole sample, separated by the three 
flight phases of the research exercise (straight & level, ILS tracking, and 
missed approach).  
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4.4.3 TRE Performance Assessment 
  
The TRE observational scoring of general manual handling ability was 
normally distributed with a slight negative skew (-0.17) resulting in a mean 
score of 3.41 and standard deviation of 1.03 (see Appendix G for a full 
description of the scoring scale). However the skew was modest and did not 
threaten the assumed normality of these data (see figure 18).  
 
 
 
Figure 20 - TRE scoring distribution 
 
 
Seventy eight percent of the sampled pilots demonstrated desirable manual 
handling skills whilst 22% demonstrated tolerable but notably weaker manual 
flying ability. It should be emphasised that during the preceding LPC no 
participant was awarded an overall fail grade, thus bounding the minimal level 
of performance observed as tolerable.  
 
Desirable 
Performance 
Tolerable 
Performance 
Distribution of TRE Manual Handling Scores 
 102 
Parallel TRE rating was conducted for 24% of the simulated flights (16 cases) 
to assess the level of inter-rater reliability in scale administration. Cohen’s 
Kappa was computed as a statistic of inter-rater reliability. A value of 0.818 
resulted, indicating that the TREs had achieved ‘almost perfect agreement’ 
(Landis & Koch, 1977) in discriminating between tolerable and desirable 
manual flying performance amongst the sample of pilots (see table 7).  
 
 
 
Table 7 - Inter-Rater Reliability Assessment of TRE grading using Cohen's Kappa 
 
TRE Inter-Rater Reliability 
              
     
      Principle TRE   
      Low High Total   
   Low 19% 0% 19%   
  Secondary TRE  High 6% 75% 81%   
    Total 25% 75% 100%   
 
low = performance approaching lower limits of tolerance (TRE defined) 
 
 
high = Desirable erformance (TRE defined) 
 
   
         
   Cohen's К = 0.818    
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Table 8 - Correlations between performance metric score and TRE score on the 
straight and level segment of the exercise (those shaded are statistically significant to 
p<0.05) 
 
TRE-Performance Metric Correlations (Straight & Level) 
 r N p 
    
Spatial Tracking Error    
  Altitude ME (ft.) 0.181 50 0.107 
  Altitude SDE (ft.) -0.267 50 0.032 
  Heading ME (deg.) 0.010 50 0.472 
  Heading SDE (deg.) -0.183 50 0.104 
    
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -0.173 50 0.117 
  Low Frequency Band -0.113 50 0.220 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.269 50 0.031 
  High Frequency Band -0.147 50 0.157 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.163 50 0.132 
    
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -0.076 50 0.302 
  Low Frequency Band -0.149 50 0.153 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.222 50 0.063 
  High Frequency Band -0.043 50 0.384 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.201 50 0.084 
    
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band 0.162 50 0.133 
  Low Frequency Band 0.022 50 0.441 
  Mid Frequency Band 0.044 50 0.381 
  High Frequency Band -0.022 50 0.440 
  Very High Frequency Band 0.118 50 0.210 
    
Throttle Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band 0.173 50 0.117 
  Low Frequency Band 0.107 50 0.232 
  Mid Frequency Band 0.112 50 0.223 
  High Frequency Band 0.103 50 0.240 
  Very High Frequency Band 0.142 50 0.166 
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Table 9 - Correlations between performance metric score and TRE score on the ILS 
tracking segment of the exercise (those shaded are statistically significant to p<0.05) 
 
TRE-Performance Metric Correlations (ILS) 
 r N p 
    
Spatial Tracking Error    
  Localiser ME (dots) -0.297 50 0.025 
  Localiser SDE (dots) -0.625 50 0.000 
  Glideslope ME (dots) 0.284 50 0.023 
  Glideslope SDE (dots) -0.413 50 0.001 
  Airspeed ME (kts) -0.279 50 0.025 
  Airspeed SDE (kts) -0.350 50 0.006 
    
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -0.315 50 0.013 
  Low Frequency Band -0.265 50 0.031 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.331 50 0.010 
  High Frequency Band -0.432 50 0.001 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.080 50 0.290 
    
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -0.088 50 0.272 
  Low Frequency Band -0.408 50 0.002 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.389 50 0.003 
  High Frequency Band -0.212 50 0.070 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.072 50 0.310 
    
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band 0.092 50 0.263 
  Low Frequency Band -0.068 50 0.319 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.112 50 0.220 
  High Frequency Band -0.199 50 0.083 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.035 50 0.404 
    
Throttle Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -0.008 50 0.479 
  Low Frequency Band -0.170 50 0.119 
  Mid Frequency Band 0.041 50 0.389 
  High Frequency Band -0.010 50 0.472 
  Very High Frequency Band 0.016 50 0.457 
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Table 10 - Correlations between performance metric score and TRE score on the 
missed approach segment of the exercise (those shaded are statistically significant to 
p<0.05) 
 
TRE-Performance Metric Correlations (Missed Approach) 
 r N p 
    
Spatial Tracking Error    
  Track ME (deg.) -0.092 50 0.265 
  Track SDE (deg.) -0.221 50 0.063 
  Airspeed ME (kts) -0.038 50 0.397 
  Airspeed SDE (kts) -0.118 50 0.209 
    
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -0.054 50 0.356 
  Low Frequency Band -0.215 50 0.069 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.163 50 0.132 
  High Frequency Band -0.140 50 0.169 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.062 50 0.337 
    
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band 0.350 50 0.007 
  Low Frequency Band -0.098 50 0.252 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.262 50 0.035 
  High Frequency Band -0.168 50 0.124 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.187 50 0.100 
    
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band 0.042 50 0.387 
  Low Frequency Band -0.290 50 0.022 
  Mid Frequency Band -0.028 50 0.423 
  High Frequency Band -0.134 50 0.179 
  Very High Frequency Band -0.210 50 0.074 
    
Throttle Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band 0.140 50 0.169 
  Low Frequency Band 0.041 50 0.390 
  Mid Frequency Band 0.194 50 0.091 
  High Frequency Band 0.258 50 0.037 
  Very High Frequency Band 0.271 50 0.030 
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4.4.4 Validating the Objective Performance Measures against TRE Scores 
 
Measurement Convergent Validity 
 
Bivariate correlations were performed for each performance metric against the 
TRE derived manual handling score (see tables 8, 9 and 10). This analysis 
tested the convergent validity of the measures since theoretically the TRE and 
numerical assessments of manual handling performance should be 
convergent. 
 
In general the performance measures computed from the ILS tracking 
segment of the exercise were highly correlated to the TRE derived manual 
handling scores (see table 9). All measures of outer-loop performance 
(localiser, glideslope and airspeed tracking accuracy and smoothness) were 
negatively correlated with TRE measures of manual handling ability for this 
flight phase. Thus greater accuracy and smoothness (smaller numerical 
scores) of tracking was convergent with higher TRE scores. 
 
Performance measures of control strategy were also well correlated to TRE 
score on the ILS tracking segment of the task (see table 9). Measures of 
control wheel input power in the very low, mid and high frequency bands were 
all significantly negatively correlated with the TRE manual handling score. 
Therefore, lower control input power values converged with higher TRE 
scores. Furthermore measures of control column input power in the low and 
mid frequency bands were also negatively correlated with TRE manual 
handling score. However no measure of rudder or throttle control strategy 
appeared to be significantly related to the TRE score for manual handling 
ability. 
 
Performance measures derived from the straight and level segment of the 
exercise generally did not correlate strongly with the TRE derived measure of 
manual handling ability (see table 8). However, altitude tracking smoothness 
and control wheel input power in the mid frequency band were significantly 
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negatively correlated with TRE manual handling score. No further metrics 
demonstrated significant correlation for this segment.  
 
 
Similarly, few performance measures computed from the missed approach 
segment of the task showed significant correlation to the TRE derived manual 
handling score (see table 10).  Those which did show significance were all 
measures of control input strategy. Rudder input power in the low frequency 
band and control column input power in the mid frequency bands were both 
significantly negatively correlated to the TRE manual handling score.  
 
Measurement Sensitivity 
 
The sensitivity of the objective performance measures was assessed by 
performing independent t-tests between the TRE derived ‘tolerable’ and 
‘desirable’ manual handling performance groups (see table 11). Essentially 
this analysis tests the metrics ability to separate the two different performance 
groups.  Many of the metrics computed for the ILS tracking task were 
sufficiently sensitive to separate the two groups with a high degree of 
confidence. Localiser error, Glideslope error and Airspeed error variability 
(outer-loop performance measures) values were all significantly smaller for 
the ‘desirable’ group indicating a higher standard of tracking smoothness. 
However it should be noted that all measures of outer-loop tracking accuracy 
(Localiser, Glideslope and Airspeed ME) failed to be separated with statistical 
confidence. 
 
Also on the ILS tracking segment, measures of control wheel input power in 
the high, mid and low frequency bands, as well as control column input power 
in the low frequency band, were sufficiently sensitive to  successfully separate 
the TRE assigned performance groups. The only remaining measure which 
showed such sensitivity was rudder input power in the low frequency band 
which was computed during the missed approach segment. In this case 
values of rudder input power were significantly lower for the ‘desirable’ 
performance group. 
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Table 11 - Statistically significant (p<0.05) t-test results for each performance metric 
between TRE assigned performance groups. 
 
Significant t-test between acceptable and desirable performance 
          
 Tolerable   Desirable         
 M SD  M SD  t df Sig. 
 
Straight & Level          
  No Metrics n/a n/a  n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a 
 
ILS Segment          
  Localiser SDE 0.055 0.030  0.023 0.013  5.209 48 0.000 
  Glideslope SDE 0.015 0.015  0.010 0.010  2.906 48 0.006 
  Airspeed SDE 0.347 0.176  0.241 0.115  2.431 48 0.019 
  Control Wheel Low Freq 11951 8022  4775 5085  3.680 48 0.001 
  Control Wheel Medium Freq 9739 12872  3556 2256  2.885 48 0.006 
  Control Wheel High Freq 13580 9965  6128 4040  3.786 48 0.000 
  Control Column Low Freq 18 11  10 6  2.901 48 0.006 
 
Missed Approach          
  Rudder Low Freq 104 38  75 36  2.378 48 0.022 
 
 
 
Table 11 gives the mean group scores for each performance metric which 
attained a statistically significant t-test value and thus demonstrated strong 
sensitivity. These scores can assist in setting an appropriate ‘cut score’ which 
divides ‘tolerable’ from ‘desirable’ manual handling performance on each of 
the measured dimensions. It is notable that significance was generally limited 
to those measures derived from the ILS tracking segment. As noted 
previously (see section 2.1) this flight segment is highly dynamic, with 
transitions into different states, and of greater cognitive complexity than the 
other flight phases and as such more demanding of the pilot’s skill.  
 
Multivariate Measurement Sensitivity 
 
 
The previous analysis demonstrated the sensitivity of each performance 
metric individually i.e. a univariate analysis. By combining the metrics their 
sensitivity as a whole may improve. The following analysis aims to build a 
weighted linear combination of the metrics and assesses whether this has 
sufficient sensitivity to categorise the pilots into the same performance groups 
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assigned by the TREs.  The unique variance explained by each metric will 
thus be critiqued. The strength and fit of the resulting model will provide a 
further and more robust validation of the performance metrics convergent 
validity and sensitivity. Also, such a model may prove an effective way of 
combining the metrics to provide a useful global measure of manual flying 
ability, rather than many measures of individual performance dimensions. If 
the strength and reliability of the resulting model is high then it has potential 
for application as a multivariate manual handling performance measurement 
tool for FDM and similar programmes or in future research.   
 
A Binary Logistic Regression (LR) procedure was performed using the SPSS 
software package. A forward LR stepwise entry method was selected so that 
performance metrics would be either added to or removed from the model 
based upon their individual predictive ability. The conventional outer-loop 
tracking metrics and the control strategy metrics were entered in two separate 
blocks. The resulting model contained four predictors and a constant. The 
predictor variables were Localiser SDE (tracking smoothness), Airspeed SDE 
(tracking smoothness), Control Wheel Input Power in the Low Frequency 
Band during the ILS, Rudder Input Power in the Low Frequency Band during 
the missed approach procedure, and a constant (see table 12). The sample to 
variable ratio was therefore approximately 16:1.  
 
The non-significance of the Hosmer & Lemeshow test indicates that the model 
is well fitted to the data. The reasonably high Nagelkerke pseudo R2 value of 
0.712 indicates that approximately 70% of the variability in the TRE 
discrimination is explained by this model and its four predictor variables (see 
table 12). Therefore the multivariate model agrees highly with the TRE 
discrimination. 
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Table 12 - Logistic Regression Model Parameters 
 
 
Predictor β SE β 
Wald's 
Χ2 df p 
odds 
ratio 
  Localiser tracking SDE  -82.121 30.067 7.460 1.000 0.006 0.000 
  Airspeed tracking SDE  -8.178 5.390 2.303 1.000 0.129 0.000 
  ILS Control Wheel Low Freq Power 0.000 0.000 4.269 1.000 0.039 1.000 
  Missed Approach Rudder Low Freq Power -0.041 0.018 5.009 1.000 0.025 0.960 
  Constant 11.209 3.765 8.866 1.000 0.003 n/a 
 
Goodness-of-fit test   X2 df p  
  Hosmer & Lemeshow   13.002 8 0.112  
       
Pseudo R2   R2    
  Cox and Snell   0.478    
  Nagelkerke   0.712    
              
 
 
Table 13 - Logistic Regression Model Classification Rate 
 
Logistic regression model classification rate 
              
      Predicted    
     Tolerable Desirable    
   Observed Tolerable 75.00% 25.00%    
   Desirable 6.00% 94.60%    
     
Total Model Classification Rate = 89.9% 
 
 
The total sample size precluded the formation of a hold out sample on which 
to validate the model. Consequently validation was performed using the 
general sample. A cut value of 0.6 was set to reduce the number of type 2 
errors since these were less tolerable than type 1 errors in the practical 
setting of the study (this also helped to remove any biasing which the 
imbalanced group sizes may have generated). The resulting classification rate 
of 0.898 (see table 13) indicates that overall approximately 90% of the models 
predicted scores (desirable or tolerable performance) were in agreement with 
that given by the TRE. In more detail, allocation to the tolerable performance 
group was 75% accurate whilst allocation to the desirable performance group 
was 94.6% accurate. The overall classification rate and goodness of fit data 
indicates that the model is highly reliable and useful as a predictive tool. 
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4.4.5 Examining the relationships between Manual Handling Experience and 
Performance 
 
Bivariate correlations were performed to measure the extent of the 
relationship between a pilot’s general flying experience and their performance 
on the manual flying task. There was found to be no statistically significant 
correlation between the total number of flying hours the pilot had accumulated 
and any dimension of their performance on the assessment (see appendix K)  
 
The previous analysis showed that the total amount of general flying activity 
did not appear to be a significant influence on the manual flying performance 
of the pilots. A more detailed analysis was required to investigate whether the 
composition of that experience did shape their manual flying performance i.e. 
if that experience was gained predominantly on highly automated types were 
they likely to perform differently to a pilot who had gained a similar number of 
hours on manual types? 
 
Although general flying experience did not appear to be a dominant factor in 
determining manual flying performance, any influence it did have needed to 
be systematically controlled for when looking in finer detail at the makeup of 
the pilots flying experience i.e. number of hours on highly automated aircraft, 
number of recent manual approaches etc. In short, it was necessary to assess 
the affects of automation exposure fairly across all pilots, regardless of their 
total operating experience. 
 
Partial correlation analyses were performed, controlling for total flying hours, 
in order to identify the extent of the relationship that existed purely between 
manual flying exposure factors and manual flying performance. Partial 
correlation procedures were performed between the proximal and distal 
manual flying exposure measures (see section 4.3.6) and the flight data 
derived manual flying performance measurements.  
 
 
 112 
Table 14 - Statistically significant correlations between number of manual flying hours 
and performance metrics (controlling for total fixed wing hours) 
 
Measure = Number of Manual Flying Hours 
Long Term Manual Flying 
Exposure 
Controlling for Total Number of Fixed Wing Hours 
    
Metric R N p 
Straight & Level    
  Control Column Input Power in Very Low Freq Band -0.342 46 0.022 
ILS Tracking    
  No Significant Correlations n/a n/a n/a 
Missed Approach    
  Control Wheel Input Power in Mid Freq Band -0.380 46 0.010 
  Control Column Input Power in Very Low Freq Band -0.318 46 0.033 
  Control Column Input Power in Mid Freq Band -0.302 46 0.044 
  Rudder Input Power in Mid Frequency Band -0.510 46 0.000 
  Throttle Input Power in Low Freq Band -0.318 46 0.034 
    
 
 
The pilots manual flying performance was somewhat influenced by their long 
term exposure to automation (see table 14). Those who had spent 
proportionally more time flying manual types, and thus had lower exposure to 
automation, generally demonstrated a somewhat different control strategy 
during the straight and level and missed approach segments of the exercise.   
 
During the straight and level segment long term manual flying exposure was 
negatively correlated with control column input power in the very low 
frequency band. During the missed approach segment long term manual 
flying exposure was negatively correlated with control wheel input power in 
the mid frequency band, control column input power in the  very low and mid 
frequency bands, rudder input frequency in the mid frequency band and 
throttle input power in the very low frequency band. However long term 
manual flying exposure was not significantly correlated with any measures 
derived from the ILS tracking segment nor any measures of aircraft tracking 
performance (see table 14). 
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Table 15 - Statistically significant correlations between recent manual flying exposure 
and performance metrics (controlling for total fixed wing hours). 
 
 Recent Manual Flying Exposure 
Measure = Number of Manual Approaches in the Past 
Month, Controlling for Total Number of Fixed Wing Hours    
    
Metric R N p 
Straight & Level    
  Altitude ME -0.286 46 0.028 
  Control Wheel Input Power in Mid Freq Band -0.264 46 0.040 
  Control Column Input Power in Very Low Frequency 
Band -0.263 46 0.040 
  Control Column Input Power in Mid Frequency Band -0.381 46 0.005 
ILS Tracking    
  Airspeed SDE -0.436 46 0.001 
  Control Wheel Input Power in Very High Freq Band -0.249 46 0.047 
  Control Column Input Power in Mid Freq Band -0.325 46 0.014 
  Control Column Input Power in High Freq Band -0.288 46 0.026 
  Rudder Input Power in Very Low Frequency Band -0.275 46 0.032 
Missed Approach    
  Control Wheel Input Power in Very Low Freq Band -0.249 46 0.049 
  Control Wheel Input Power in High Freq Band -0.381 46 0.005 
  Control Column Input Power in High Freq Band -0.344 46 0.010 
        
 
The number of manual approaches flown in the preceding month was used as 
an estimate of the pilot’s recent manual flying activity. Correlations between 
this measure and aspects of the pilot’s manual flying performance were 
generally more abundant and stronger than those previously noted, 
particularly during the ILS tracking segment of the task (see table 15). 
 
During the straight and level segment recent manual flying exposure was 
significantly negatively correlated with altitude tracking mean error, control 
wheel input power in the mid frequency band and control column input power 
in the very low and mid frequency bands. During the ILS tracking segment 
recent manual flying exposure was significantly negatively correlated with 
airspeed tracking variability, control wheel input power in the very high 
frequency band, control column input power in the mid and high frequency 
bands, and rudder input power in the very low frequency band. During the 
missed approach segment recent manual flying exposure was significantly 
negatively correlated with control wheel input power in the very low and high 
frequency bands, and control column input power in the high frequency band 
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(see table 15). Again it is notable that the more correlated measures occur 
during the more demanding flight segments, where a greater number of 
performance elements are subject to change. This point is developed further 
in the subsequent discussion.  
 
In chapter 3 a table of desirable performance metric attributes was proposed. 
Table 16 revisits these attributes and identifies how each has been 
demonstrated, or not, by the selected performance metrics. 
 
Table 16 – Performance metric attributes summarised 
 
Attribute Descriptive 
 
Reliable 
 
Although every effort has been made to ensure the method by which the 
metrics are generated is reliable it was not possible to explicitly test their 
reliability since only one iteration of the experiment was performed. 
 
Valid The various statistical tests cited show that the measures have 
demonstrated both uni-variate and multi-variate convergent validity and 
that the properties that they are measuring are closely aligned with the 
concept of manual flying performance held by type rating examiners. 
 
Interpretable The selected metrics each describe an element of performance which is 
relatively easy to conceptualise, such as control input energy, flight path 
deviation and as such have high interoperability which facilitated a clear 
understanding of the observed performance differences. 
 
Sensitive The performance metrics were able to differentiate between two 
fundamental levels of performance as judged by type rating examiners 
and thus was shown to have a useful level of sensitivity. 
 
Applicable The metrics were computed from data collected during real time simulator 
evaluations and therefore should be capable of replication in similar 
simulated environments. However it remains to be seen if such 
techniques could be adequately applied to data collected from real aircraft 
and this subject should form significant future research. 
 
General The metrics have so far been applied to only one aircraft type and 
operator. Future work is required to evaluate their generalisability. 
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4.5 Discussion 
 
The results show that within a typical cross section of pilots operating modern 
highly automated airliners, manual flying ability will vary considerably. Within 
the sample manual flying ability ranged from that which was only just 
considered tolerable to that which was considered exceptional. This range of 
performance was reflected in both the TRE scoring and the numerical 
performance metrics. This supports the findings of Viellette (1995) who found 
a similarly broad range of performance in a sample of pilots operating a highly 
automated type. 
 
It is also apparent from the results that the manual handling exposure of pilots 
operating these aircraft varies significantly and is not simply a function of 
overall flying experience as may be expected. Clearly, many of the extremely 
experienced pilots within the sample had spent a substantial proportion of 
their career operating ‘manual’ airliners (typically types such as the BAC 1-11, 
HS Trident and Boeing 707) since they began their flying career prior to the 
introduction of highly automated types. However, there were also many 
examples of senior pilots who had spent almost their entire career operating 
highly automated types. Conversely, there were also many examples of 
younger pilots who had spent less than 200 hours on highly automated types 
having spent their initial career operating older manual equipment for smaller 
airlines or freight carriers. Career paths which lead into the modern automated 
airliner therefore still vary widely and subsequently generate differences in 
manual flying experience.  
 
Furthermore the relatively recent manual flying exposure of pilots varies 
widely (estimated from the number of manual approaches conducted within 
the past month – see table 6). However, this study cannot directly attribute the 
causes of this variance. Whilst each pilots recent exposure to manual flight 
prior to testing would have been influenced by external factors such as their 
route allocation, seniority, absenteeism or weather conditions, it may also be 
somewhat shaped by the pilots own attitude towards manual flight. For 
example, during the cognitive task analysis (see Chapter 2) many pilots 
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reported they felt that manual flying was a ‘catch 22’ situation, implying that if 
they removed the automatics they were in danger of allowing the aircraft to 
stray outside of operational tolerances and significantly increase their 
workload, whilst if they don’t remove the automatics they are in danger of 
having their manual flying skills decay.  
 
The level of recent exposure to manual flight may be dependent upon the 
pilot’s attitude to risk, how they perceive the benefits of manual flight and 
whether they take or seek opportunities to disengage the automatics (see 
chapter 1). Of course, as highlighted in the introductory review of literature, 
there are occasions when removing the automatics is perhaps not the most 
prudent approach, but the circumstances which define when this is 
appropriate are not rigid. It is thus not surprising that the results show 
considerable variation between pilots’ exposure to manual flight. It may be 
prudent to discuss these issues formally in training in order to encourage a 
measured and consistent practice regarding the deliberate disengagement of 
the automatics and building of manual handling experience.  
 
4.5.1 Validation and Assessment of Sensitivity of Performance Measures 
 
The correlation analysis aimed to demonstrate that the objective measures 
were convergent with the TRE measures of manual handling performance 
and thus that the measures were meaningfully related to the intended 
theoretical property (manual handling skill).   
 
The correlation analysis showed that the chosen battery of performance 
metrics was generally very well related to the TRE derived performance 
scores on the ILS segment (see table 9). This shows that both the outer-loop 
and the control strategy metrics had high levels of convergent validity. 
However, as an exception, measures of rudder and throttle control strategy 
were not significantly correlated to the TRE score.  
 
With the relatively complex demands of the yaw control task (owing to the 
aircraft’s asymmetric condition) differences in rudder input strategy should 
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have been apparent and it is surprising that this factor did not correlate highly 
with the TREs’ scoring of performance. A possible explanation lies in the 
simulator’s relatively low fidelity reproduction of yawing movements. This may 
have lessened the TREs’ impression of the yaw control strategy during the 
ILS approach, especially since from the observer’s station the view of rudder 
pedal movements was significantly restricted. Perhaps these elements of the 
control problem are less critically viewed by the TRE, and may be allowed to 
deviate with a reasonable degree of freedom.  
 
However, on the missed approach segment measures of rudder control 
strategy did correlate significantly with the TREs’ performance score (see 
table 10). The application of high levels of asymmetric thrust associated with 
the missed approach manoeuvre make the adequacy of yaw control strategy 
more apparent than it is on the ILS segment (see table 9, since poor control 
results in large amount of swing which is readily observed by the TRE. 
 
The demonstration of convergent validity in this setting supports the findings 
of the previous metric selection study (see chapter 3) and gives added 
confidence in the use of the metrics for measuring manual flying skill. It could 
also be argued that these results demonstrate the validity of the TREs’ 
performance assessment and give more strength to the observations of 
manual flying variation obtained by Young, Fanjoy and Suckow (2006) which 
were previously criticised for lacking objectivity. 
 
The sensitivity of the measures was evaluated through their ability to separate 
pilots into the same performance groups that were defined by the TREs. 
Independently, on the ILS segment, the control strategy metrics for roll and 
pitch axes proved to be very sensitive. Roll and pitch metrics discriminated 
the performance groups with a high degree of confidence (see table 11). 
However, as before, measures of rudder pedal and throttle movement proved 
less sensitive on this segment. In contrast, rudder pedal control strategy 
proved to be a highly sensitive measure on the missed approach segment 
(see table 11) and again this is attributed the increased lateral control 
demands of this task.  
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Whilst measures of outer-loop tracking smoothness were also very sensitive 
on the ILS segment, measures of tracking accuracy were relatively 
insensitive. The raw data (see appendix J) shows large variance in SDE 
scores whilst relatively small variance in ME scores, which indicate that 
average ILS tracking error was close to zero on most occasions. Effectively, 
whilst the degree to which pilots deviated from the ILS datums varied 
considerably, these deviations would generally always be centred around the 
datum, generating low ME values. The use of separate measures for 
smoothness and accuracy, rather than a combined RMSE measure, allows for 
this deeper investigation of performance. This result supports the arguments 
of Hubbard (1987) in the adoption of SDE and ME over just RMSE.  
 
The sensitivity of the localiser SDE, airspeed SDE, control wheel LF and 
rudder pedal LF measures in combination was high, indicated by the 
multivariate models ability to successfully categorise the pilots into the 
performance groups. (see table 13) The model explains a considerable 
amount of the total variance (see table 12) and demonstrates that many of the 
metrics have a high degree of unique variance. Specifically it demonstrates 
that measures of outer-loop tracking and control strategy can produce a highly 
sensitive and reliable measure of pilot manual flying skill when used in 
combination.  
 
In general the sensitivity of the control strategy frequency analysis derived 
metrics surpassed that of the more traditional outer-loop performance 
measures. This further supports the hypothesis put forward in chapter 3 and 
again gives credit to the argument that measures of outer-loop tracking 
performance should be augmented by measures of control strategy (see 
Ebbatson, Huddlestone, Harris and Sears, 2006). 
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4.5.2 Relationships between Manual Handling Experience and Performance 
 
The results indicate that the amount of general flying hours accumulated by a 
pilot is not a good indication of their ability to manual fly a large transport 
aircraft in challenging circumstances (see table 14). Similarly the general 
experience of the pilot on the specific type of aircraft flown and the training 
route they undertook to obtain their Air Transport Pilots Licence were poor 
predictors of manual flying performance.  
 
The results show that the long-term accumulation of manual handling 
experience throughout a pilot’s career had only a moderate effect on their 
manual flying performance on the task (see table 14). There was no impact 
upon outer-loop tracking performance but moderate effect upon the control 
strategy applied (see table 14). These differences tended to become apparent 
during the missed approach manoeuvre where control input power in the 
pitch, roll and yaw axes were reduced. With significant pitch and yaw effects 
coupled to the application of asymmetric thrust during the go-around, it is 
critical that the pilot makes timely and appropriate inputs to the flying controls. 
The results suggests that pilots with a greater foundation of manual flying 
experience were able to anticipate these control requirements as they 
commenced the missed approach and thus could make more refined, lower 
power control inputs (see table 14). Those with less manual flying experience 
failed to ‘get on top’ of the error and needed to make more inputs to control 
the aircraft, thus demonstrating higher control input powers. This is 
comparable with the findings of McDowell (1978) and Rantanen et al (2004). 
 
The missed approach segment appeared to be the only portion of the task 
with sufficient control demand to draw out the differences in manual flying skill 
attributable to long-term differences in manual flying experience. However, the 
result confirm Baron’s (1988) hypothesis, and the findings from earlier 
sections of this research program, that control strategy measures are a 
sensitive indicator of performance.    
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The effects of recent exposure to manual flying upon manual handling 
performance were more pronounced (see table 15). Differences in the amount 
of manual flying the pilot had accumulated within the preceding two months 
influenced control strategy over all the task segments (see table 14). In all 
cases the level of control input power reduced with increased experience 
demonstrating a more refined control strategy. Again, these results compare 
favourably with those of McDowell (1978). Furthermore the effect on 
performance was sufficiently strong to cause notable differences in altitude 
and airspeed tracking performance (see table 14).  
 
The correlation with airspeed tracking smoothness was strongest, showing 
that pilots who had accumulated more manual handling time within the past 
two months had better control over the speed of the aircraft on the approach. 
The result suggests that airspeed control is perhaps more vulnerable to decay 
than other aspects of manual flying skill. This reflects results obtained in 
chapter three of this research programme. It also supports evidence from 
accident data analyses (see Chapter 1, CAP 776 ) that many fatal accidents 
and less severe incidents which are attributed to manual handling deficiencies 
result from a lack of adequate airspeed control. The results help to explain the 
broad range of performance amongst pilots of highly automated aircraft that 
Villette (1995) measured but was unable to account for. It is notable that the 
distribution of performance issues is in line with the distribution of task 
complexity and demand over the flight phases. As outlined in chapters 1 and 
2 the final approach phase is considerably more complex than other phases 
with many transient control aspects, requiring a more sophisticated mental 
model structure to resolve. Thus control issues during this phase appear in all 
axes, rather than just the yaw axis as with the missed approach phase. It 
highlights the possibility of cognitive capacity failures as a probable 
explanation for manual flying issues, with poor quality mental models 
demanding excessive bandwidth to process the complex approach control 
problem and resulting in aspects being attended to with insufficient frequency. 
 
Manual handling performance appears to be influenced more by the amount 
of manual flying the pilot has undertaken in the few weeks preceding the test 
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than it is by the amount of manual handling experience the pilot has 
accumulated throughout their career. In essence, the ‘recency’ of the pilot’s 
manual flying experience is a critical influence upon their manual flying 
proficiency. It perhaps indicates that manual flying skills decay quite rapidly 
towards the fringes of ‘tolerable’ performance without relatively frequent 
practice. Significantly this means that quite a broad range of pilots are 
susceptible to manual flying skills fade. Previous sections of this work (see 
chapter 2) have highlighted the importance of anticipatory control over the 
aircraft, through use of well developed mental models, in order to reduce 
control input and mental capacity demands during highly transient 
manoeuvres, such as the ILS and missed approach. The results appear to 
indicate that increasing the frequency of practice of these highly transient 
manoeuvres, either in flight or through simulation, could significantly enhance 
performance, but again a proper training framework needs to be developed to 
avoid unsafe and inappropriate practice occurring on the line. 
 
The results indicate that for many pilots, even having spent a considerable 
proportion of their flying career on manual types is not an adequate defence 
against skills fade if they haven’t managed to practice those skills recently. 
These results may possibly explain why Viellette (1995) observed such widely 
varied performance in his sample of pilots of highly automated aircraft. 
 
The results of this study support anecdotal and subjective evidence of the loss 
of manual flying skills put forward in the introduction to this thesis (e.g. Curry, 
1985, Weiner, 1989). It is prudent to recall that those studies, conducted from 
the late 1970s through the early 1990s, showed pilots to be concerned over 
potential skill fade but confident enough to still practice manual flight relatively 
frequently. The results of this thesis indicate that such practice was likely 
sufficient to prevent any significant skill decrement. In contrast, Wood (2004) 
notes that the modern air transport environment often limits the opportunity for 
pilots to disengage the automatics and exercise their manual flying skill (see 
also the introductory chapter to this thesis) drawing added emphasis to the 
findings of this work.  
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5.1 General Discussion 
 
Subjective data and anecdotal evidence suggested that pilots of highly 
automated airliners may be vulnerable to the loss of their manual flying skills. 
However, there was insufficient objective data to support this safety concern 
and guide any remedial action. This thesis forms part of a response to that 
safety concern and provides more substantive evidence of the extent and 
causes of the degradation of manual flying skills. The following discussion 
summarises the findings of the research.    
 
The cognitive task analysis study (see chapter 2) revealed the dominant role 
of cognition in manual flying skill. Expert pilots reported using highly refined 
mental model structures and heuristics in order to predict the performance of 
their aircraft in its dynamic environment. The study found that the level of 
refinement of these models is closely linked to the performance achieved in 
manual flight. Pilots reported using advanced meta-cognitive skills to isolate 
elements of the control problem, reducing its complexity, and narrow their 
information gathering scan and reducing cognitive workload. The results 
support the work of Moray (1999) and Sarter et al (2003) who found that 
expertise was closely linked to mental model structure. The development of 
effective cognitive mechanisms which place little demand on the pilots mental 
capacity may therefore be as important as the development of robust motor-
schema in achieving manual control of the aircraft. The study suggests that 
when measuring manual flying performance careful consideration should be 
given to designing a task which challenges the cognitive aspects of 
performance as well as the physical aspects.    
 
The second study evaluated performance measurement techniques and 
selected a battery of metrics suitable for analysing manual flying skill. The 
relatively coarse ‘event’ type measures used within the flight data monitoring 
environment were considered to be insufficiently sensitive for this purpose. 
The study recognised that owing to lags and slow response rates in the 
control systems of large transport aircraft the pilot’s control input strategy may 
not be well reflected in the resultant behaviour of the aircraft. Importantly, prior 
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research (Baron, 1988) suggested that the level of input energy employed to 
manoeuvre the aircraft is an important indicator of skill. Thus, whilst 
conventional ‘outer-loop’ tracking metrics could measure the ‘product’ of 
performance (the aircraft’s behaviour), further measures needed to be applied 
to measure the refinement of the pilots control input strategy. The study 
evaluated two frequency analysis based methods of quantifying control 
strategy. Whilst one method (McDowell, 1978) used frequency banding to 
give a raw interpretation of the pilot’s control input power spectra the other 
performed a more complex analysis to produce summary measures of the 
same power spectra  (Rantanen et al., 2004). The results of an empirical 
evaluation of the sensitivity of the two techniques justified selecting the 
frequency banding technique as a measure of the pilot’s control input strategy 
and confirmed the hypothesis that more skilled performance was shown by 
reductions in control input power across all frequency bands. 
 
The third study used the measures from chapter 3 to evaluate the manual 
flying performance of a sample of air transport pilots. The results of this study 
indicated that the manual flying performance of a significant proportion of that 
sample (see 18) was very low and approaching the limits of acceptability 
defined by type rating examiners. Furthermore, by comparing the 
performance measures with demographic data and the amount of manual 
flying undertaken in the weeks preceding the study, it was identified that a 
lack of recent manual flying skills practise was likely to cause a substantial 
degradation of manual flying ability, particularly with respect to airspeed 
management on the approach which was identified as a factor in manual 
handling related accidents (CAP 776, 2008). The ‘recency’ of the pilots 
manual handling experience appeared to outweigh any benefit of long term 
manual flying experience. Generic skills research (see chapter 2) has 
identified that cognitive skills are more vulnerable to decay than psychomotor 
skills. Although the study cannot directly provide evidence to show that the 
pilot’s cognitive abilities have faded, this could perhaps be inferred given that 
the results indicate that manual flying skills overall are relatively vulnerable to 
decay. The findings of this study support earlier anecdotal and subjective 
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concern relating to the loss of manual flying skills (e.g. Curry, 1985; Wiener, 
1989; Tenney, Rogers and Pew, 1998).  
 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
 
The research identifies that manual flying skills are vulnerable to decay 
through a lack of experience, supporting earlier anecdotal and subjective 
evidence (e.g. Tenney, Rogers and Pew, 1998). The research also furthers 
other empirical work (Viellette (2005); Young, Fanjoy and Suckow (2006)) by 
finding that subtle differences in the operational experience of pilots may have 
pronounced effects on their manual flying ability.  
 
The results suggest that a strong foundation of manual handling experience 
may be insufficient to guard against manual flying skills decay. In contrast, 
pilot’s with relatively high levels of recent manual flying experience performed 
better than other pilots on a manual handling exercise regardless of their 
longer-term manual flying background. The benefits of manual handling 
‘recency’ thus appear to be considerable, drawing emphasis to observations 
(Wood, 2004) that such practise is becoming increasingly difficult to 
accommodate in the modern air transport environment.  
 
More specifically, the results of this work demonstrate that airspeed control on 
the approach is significantly improved in pilots who have gained more recent 
manual flying experience. Given the dominant role of poor airspeed control in 
manual handling related accidents (CAP 776, 2005) this research advocates 
frequency of manual handling practise as an effective measure against such 
events. However, as in all such cases a holistic view must be taken. It is the 
task of regulators and operators to consider the balance of risk and consider 
whether other areas of safety may be jeopardised by advocating increased 
manual flying practise.   
 
The research also shows that a sensitive and reliable measurement technique 
is required to properly evaluate manual flying performance. The results 
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demonstrate that frequency based metrics can provide a sensitive measure of 
pilot performance in air transport aircraft when applied directly to control input 
data, supporting the views of Baron (1988). Such metrics enable a broader 
analysis of pilot performance, reporting on the ‘process’ by which the pilot 
achieved control of the aircraft, and complimenting more traditional metrics 
which report the ‘product’ of performance. Furthermore, the results of this 
research show that measures of control strategy can be more sensitive to 
changes in manual handling performance than the more traditional ‘outer-
loop’ tracking measures, and when acting in combination the result is more 
sensitive still. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that although this research has primarily focussed on 
the plight of manual flying skills, there is reason to be encouraged. At the time 
of writing an unusual incident had caught the attention of the aviation 
community and the wider media. A highly automated Airbus A330 airliner 
experienced a flight control computer anomaly during cruising flight which 
caused it to adopt a highly unusual nose down attitude. The crew’s timely 
response was to disconnect the auto-pilot and manually recover the aircrafts 
attitude and trajectory, minimising the altitude excursion. An interim 
investigator briefing (ATSB, 2008) praised the crew’s exemplary manual 
handling ability. This event demonstrates that it is possible for pilots to 
operate a highly automated airliner and preserve their manual flying ability. 
Furthermore, it highlights that such skills are still important in a modern air 
transport environment. 
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5.3 Suggested Future Research 
 
This thesis has identified a relationship between the manual flying experience 
and performance of pilot’s operating a highly automated aircraft. More 
specifically, those pilots were employed by an airline that operated a 
predominantly short-haul route network. These pilots typically flew upwards of 
four sectors a day, often to airfields which demanded a manual approach due 
to a lack of ground based navigational aids. Contrastingly, pilots of long-haul 
aircraft typically fly considerably fewer sectors, often only six or eight a month 
(the pilot acting as ‘pilot flying’ for only a fraction of those approaches). 
Consequently, pilots of long haul aircraft are likely to experience considerably 
less manual flying exposure than the pilots sampled within this research. 
Given the observation of a sizeable effect within the current study it may 
therefore be prudent to replicate the work with a sample of long-haul pilots 
since the effects may be even more pronounced. 
 
The current study is effectively a cross-sectional analysis of pilot manual flying 
skill i.e. the analysis was conducted at a fixed point in time. It may be 
worthwhile adopting the sensitive measurement methodology developed 
within this study to perform a longitudinal analysis of pilot manual flying skill. 
Periodic samples of manual handling proficiency could be made so as to 
capture a pilot transitioning from manual aircraft to highly automated aircraft. 
This profile of performance data could be used to study in more detail how 
advanced flight deck technology impacts manual handling skill. Clearly this 
research would be resource intensive and would require adequate protection 
against the effects of sample attrition over the extended data collection period. 
 
A further development may be to integrate the research with a Flight Data 
Monitoring programme and look for evidence of manual skills attrition in real 
world derived flight data. The analysis techniques adopted within this thesis 
may also be of benefit to the Flight Data Monitoring community and it would 
be beneficial to research how these techniques could be shared. 
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Appendix A 
Cognitive Interview Protocol 
 
 
ACTA Interview Schedule 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. What do you think are the individual skills that we refer to when we talk about manual 
flying skills? 
 
2. In your experience do you think the level of manual flying skill is changing?  
 
3. What do you think are the reasons for this change? 
 
 
Task Diagram 
 
1. I’d like to think now about a specific element of your job that requires cognitive skill to 
perform.  
 
2. Introduce the task and identify the segment to be analysed. 
 
3. What do you do to manage the approach? How do you ensure that you will arrive at 
the appropriate points at the appropriate time, speed and configuration? 
 
4. I’d like you to think about what you do when you perform this task without the 
automation (elaborate if necessary). Can you describe it in a number of linked steps; 
let’s say no more than six? 
 
5. Which of these steps involve complex cognitive skills, and by cognitive skills I mean 
decisions, judgements - thinking skills? 
 
6. Would this diagram be different if you had the automation available? How? 
 
Knowledge Audit 
 
List of cognitive probes to investigate each task step 
 
1. What is the goal of this task? 
What are you trying to achieve by carrying out this task? 
 
2. What set of conditions prompts you to start performing this task? 
 
3. What set of conditions tells you to stop performing this task? 
What are you looking for to stop doing this task? 
 
4. Can you give examples of the decisions you have to make when performing this 
task? 
 
5. How do you know that at this point? 
 
6. What is the important information you need to know to carry out this task? Where 
would you find this information? 
 
7. How would you calculate that information? 
What strategy would you use to work that out? 
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8. Do you have to make any assumptions to perform this task? 
 
9. Are there any rules of thumb/tricks of the trade that you use to make this task easier? 
Can you think of an example to explain how you would use this rule of thumb? 
 
10. Can you think of an example of how you would work smart at this task i.e. not cut 
corners but work efficiently and achieve more with less? 
 
11. How does the FMS assist you with this task? 
Would the absence of the FMS affect how you perform this task? 
 
12. How does the auto throttle assist you with this task? 
Would the absence of the auto throttle affect how you perform this task? 
 
13. How does the flight director assist you with this task? 
Would the absence of the flight director affect how you perform this task? 
 
14. What would you have to do if ATC suddenly changed the plan? 
i.e. gave you a different crossing altitude or changed the route/runway 
 
15. How do you know where you are at this point? 
 
16. What is your next goal at this point? 
 
17. How do you know where you are in relation to your goal? 
 
18. How do you decide if you will achieve your goal? 
How would you judge if you weren’t going to make your goal? 
 
19. What would you do if you decided you couldn’t achieve your goal? 
What corrective action would you take at this point? 
How would you decide what corrective action to take? 
 
20. Can you give me an example of when you realised that the way you were doing this 
wasn’t going to work and you would have to do it differently? 
 
21. Can you think of a time when you were performing this task that you suddenly noticed 
something that appeared obvious, but the other pilot did not? 
 
22. How may a less experienced person struggle with this task? 
What specifically causes them to struggle? 
 
 
Simulation Scenario 
 
Please read through this scenario as if you were the pilot flying. Take time to read through 
and imagine the scene, and please use the supporting information. Think about what actions, 
decisions, judgements or general thoughts you may have at each step as you read through. 
When you have finished I will ask you to list what you thought were the major events in the 
scenario, these can be actions, decision points, judgements or any points in the timeline you 
feel were important. 
 
Please list the major events in the sequence they occurred. At this stage I don’t want to go 
into too much detail, just list what the event was and I’ll write them down the side of this table. 
After we shall come back to each in turn and explore them in more detail. 
 
When the major events have been listed use selective probes from above list to elicit details 
of the cognitive demands of that event and strategies employed etc. 
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Appendix B 
Cognitive Demand Tables 
 
Planning Demands 
 
ID Cognitive Demand Why Difficult Cues/Factors Strategies/Actions Novice Errors Automation
2.05
How is the plan likely to 
change and how should I 
respond?
Requires the evaluation of multiple 
options from uncertain information. 
resource intensive and ill defined.
Traffic intensity, weather trends 
and forecast, location 
idiosyncrasy
Plan for most likely changes, 
i.e. runway change, minima 
change
Don't know likely changes 
and therefore can't 
anticipate or plan for them.
HUMAN
9.02
Select speed for initial 
descent
7.05
Select strategic points to 
assess approach
ATC restrictions, approach 
plate, weather
Use ATC waypoints as check 
points, also assign 
intermediate points to 
evaluate performance. Use 3 
in 1 to determine their 
position and altitude.
Insufficient checks between 
major waypoints - allow 
errors to accumulate, fail to 
meet waypoint crossing 
restrictions
FMS provides a 
continuous data of 
profile error against the 
planned profile
4.08
How could the plan change 
and when?
Requires knowledge of local 
operations, awareness of the 
influence of many factors.
Traffic, weather, ATC
Anticipate if typical route 
alterations may occur and 
how you would respond
Novices don't consider the 
influence of enough factors. 
Don't have fall back plans if 
things change. 
Consequently they are likely 
to stick with the current plan 
if things do change.
HUMAN
6.01 Anticipate approach routing
Many unknown variables, using 
historical data for prediction
Weather reports, weather radar
Mentally simulate what you 
expect the approach to look 
like and consider factors that 
may change
Don't take the time to do 
this, get flustered if things do 
change
HUMAN
9.01
Mentally simulate the 
approach to commit to 
memory
Requires considerable time and 
cognitive resources
Approach plates, knowledge of 
aircraft performance, crossing 
restrictions
Fail to review approach and 
commit salient features to 
memory. Frequently need to 
review printed approach 
information
FMS stores waypoints 
and displays for instant 
review - provides 
pictorial representation 
of the approach (in plan 
only)
2.02
Which navigation aids should 
I use?
Select nav aids and standbys 
so that minimal effort is 
required to interpret your 
position
Don't have strategic standby 
nav aids in case of re-route. 
Stick with inappropriate 
beacons and spend more 
effort computing their 
position. 
FMS computes a 
position automatically 
from several aids. No 
need to select individual 
aids.
8.08 What is my fuel duration
No single source of information, 
must be integrated and predicted 
from multple information sources.
Fuel flow rate, anticipated 
average fuel flow, fuel 
remaining, time to destination
Compute time to destination 
based upon track and 
average airspeed, multiply by 
average fuel flow and subtract 
fuel usage from that 
remaining
HUMAN
5.01
Where are the critical 
obstacles that effect me?
Must be incorporated into the 
mental image from a number of 
sources and held.
Approach charts, terrain, radar, 
traffic, TCAS, ATC restrictions
3.02
What will be my likely 
routing?
May be influenced by many 
factors, large degree of uncertainty
Knowledge of local 
idiosyncrasy, weather, traffic, 
time of day
Draw on knowledge of 
previous operations to that 
airfield, expect full procedure 
if traffic is heavy, expect 
possible short cuts when 
quiet
Do not consider changes to 
the standard plan, get 
caught out if plan is then 
changed
HUMAN
2.01
What will be my landing 
weight?
Need to calculate landing weight. 
requires interpretation and 
extrapolation of disparate 
information sources
Current aircraft load, expected 
avaerage fuel flow, remaining 
track to target
Estimate fuel usage for 
remaining track and subtract 
from current aircraft load
FMC generates 
predicted fuel loads and 
estimated landing 
weight
9.07
Which approach will I be 
required to use?
Many influencing factors, some 
may be peculiar to the airfield
Lack of knowledge of the 
airfield
HUMAN
10.01
Calculate when to start initial 
descent
Need to know aircrafts typical idle 
profile
Speed, altitude, aircraft 
performance, track to target, 
winds, temperature
Idle descent at fixed airspeed, 
work out total track miles for 
descent using 1 in 3 rule
FMS determines 
optimal TOD point
5.03
Where should I begin my 
descent
Idle descent profile, use 3 in 1 
rule to determine track miles 
for altitude.
FMS calculates optimal 
descent point
10.03
How should we transition to 
the landing configuration
Must reduce speed + rate of 
descent. Aircraft descent 
characteristics change with config 
change. External demands change 
- more ATC requirements close to 
airfield
Distance to FAP, altitude, 
speed, configuration, descent 
rate
Aim to be in landing 
configuration a couple of 
miles before FAP. Use rules 
for changing aircraft speed 
and consider aircraft 
limitations.
Concentrate on flying the 
profile but forget to configure 
the aircraft - configure late, 
rushed flap scheduling, 
braking with flaps
FMS provides flap 
scheduling information 
on ASI and VNAV 
achieves path to lose 
airspeed  
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Planning Demands Continued 
2.03
What landing configuration 
should I use?
Requires consideration of a 
number of factors. Balance 
between expediancy and 
efficiency.
Runway length, aircraft weight, 
wind, other weather, aircraft 
status, traffic, airfield 
idiosyncrasy
Aim for lower landing speed if 
turnaround time short due to 
lower brake cooling times. 
Higher speed if gate at the 
end of the runway. Assess 
situation and consult 
reference card for config and 
speeds.  
Always use the same 
landing configuration which 
may be safe but not 
necessarily the most 
efficient
HUMAN
3.06
Store targets and constraints 
for recall
Requires information to be 
comitted to memory, resource 
intensive.
Charts, altitudes, speeds, track
Mentally simulate approach 
which aids memorisation of 
salient features. Make written 
notes of important points.
Novices often do not have 
the capacity to undertake 
this task and instead revert 
to information gathering 
during the approach
FMS stores route 
information and 
presents it for rapid 
recall.
2.08
Retain a reference picture of 
the planned approach and 
targets
The integrated approach plan and 
aspects not printed on the 
individual approach charts must be 
held in memory.
Make written notes of critical 
flight information. Mentally 
simulate planned approach to 
commit to memory
Will have insufficient 
capacity to make notes or 
commit approach to 
memory. Will have to 
regenerate and search for 
information frequently during 
the approach.
FMS records waypoint 
information and 
presents plan pictorially 
on navigation display for 
reference.
2.04
What targets should I aim to 
achieve on the approach?
Between major waypoints there 
may be no stipulated targets
ATC restrictions, approach 
charts
Aim to achieve ATC 
stipulated waypoints but also 
insert targets to divide those 
segments into smaller sub-
segments. Insert targets 
where route changes may be 
considered. Memorise the 
targets position (track) and 
altitude.
Use only the basic 
waypoints as their target 
structure and therefore are 
more vulnerable to 
estimation errors when 
computing position. Allow 
larger deviations to build up 
before correcting.
FMS can generate a 
continuous target, 
extrapolating between 
waypoints, and give 
constant feedback of 
relative error
6.02
How many miles does the 
approach demand?
Information gathered from 
disparate sources, not easy if not 
a published approach
Chart distances, ATC 
information
Add up sector distances, 
estimate complex turns based 
on knowledge
Add too many or too few 
miles for unknown distances 
i.e. turns.
FMS generates precise 
information about route 
length
3.04
What will the weather 
situation be?
Large degree of uncertaintly in 
information, often requires 
extrapolation of historical data or 
estimation between two data 
points.
Weather forecasts, current 
reports, knowledge of weather 
behaviour, local variations
Novices may not anticipate 
unusual weather behaviour 
at certain destinations as 
they have no experience of it
HUMAN
2.07
Plan how to lose energy on 
profile
Aircraft energy is a function of 
multiple variables and their 
interaction must be understood. 
There may be many options of 
how to loose energy and the most 
appropriate means must be 
selected.
Aircraft performance, profile 
restrictions, altitude, speed, 
commercial pressure
Have a standard model. Plan 
for a basic 3 degree approach 
at idle and allow suffcient 
track with config changes at 
standard points. Mentally 
simulate and identify 
constraints that may require a 
change to the standard 
model. Modify config 
changes, speeds or profile to 
meet differences.
Insufficient knowledge of 
aircraft performance and 
therefore do not recognise 
that energy management 
plan is inappropriate.
FMS will plan a suitably 
managed approach 
profile. Manually edited 
approaches however 
may not have 
achievable energy 
profiles.
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Execution Demands 
ID Cognitive Demand Why Difficult Cues/Factors Strategies/Actions Novice Errors Automation
9.06
When do I need to start 
this turn?
Difficult geometry for 
mental calculation, no 
source of information 
provided
Airspeed, turn rate
For 90 degree turn at 250kts and 
standard rate, lead distance is 
groundspeed over 100 
Have not got a similar rule of 
thumb
FMS displays predicted turn 
radius and lead in distance on 
ND
5.02
How long will it take to 
reach a target?
No direct indication, needs 
interpretation
Airspeed, track, wind
Track miles divided by 
groundspeed
Don’t calculate time, tasks 
managament suffers, become 
rushed
FMS offers ETA for waypoints
2.06
What is the state of the 
wind?
Requires capacity for 
mental arithmetic. May be 
working with historical data 
and therefore need to 
estimate or compensate
Actual wind report, wind 
forecasts, groundspeed data
Compute headwind by looking at 
difference between groundspeed 
indication (from dme) and 
airspeed. Compute headwind and 
crosswind components from 
actual wind reports. Compute 
average wind over altitude change 
by looking at forecasts/reports. 
Extrapolate wind at flight level 
forcasts to determine wind at 
current level.  
Base computations on forecast 
wind information and fail to seek 
current wind report. 
INS gives constant indication of 
current wind conditions. The 
need to assess deminishes to 
some extent as wind 
compensation is built into the 
auto-flight system.
10.02
Choose a descent rate to 
reduce speed for next 
gate
Must slow but also remain 
on profile. Speed and 
altitude are tightly coupled 
via energy. Must meet 
gate but inefficient to slow 
too early.
Speed, descent rate, gate 
altitude, current altitude
In idle descent, reduce rate of 
descent to slow. Predict track 
miles for descent to target altitude 
at that rate (rate = time, time = 
distance) adjust rate depending 
on track error
FMS alerts if drag is required to 
achieve gate, VNAV manages 
profile and chooses appropriate 
descent rate 
3.03
How much altitude do I 
need to lose?
Mental arithmetic which 
demands capacity
Approach charts, target 
altitude, current altitude, 
pressure adjustment
HUMAN
10.04
How many miles do I 
have to go?
Can rarely be determined 
precisely as charts contain 
limited information - 
changes if you're not 
exactly flying the published 
procedure
DME, rules of thumb
Select navigation aid at strategic 
location to provide distance 
information easily. Minimal 
interpretation. Add sector lengths 
and estimate unknowns.
will stick with FMS value of track 
following an ATC change for 
longer than expert. Will not 
recompute track value or seek 
that information
FMS porvides very accurate 
value for track miles to run, 
although this is also invalid if 
route is changed.
7.04
What are the headwind 
and crosswind 
components?
Needs to be determined 
from historical information. 
Airspeed, groundspeed, 
time, wind reports
Derive from wind reports or use 
DME and timing against airspeed 
to determine headwind factor. 
Allow error margin.
Use historical information without 
checking if it is accurate. 
FMS provides current wind 
vector information based on INS
3.01 How far have I got to go?
Needs to be interpretend 
from numerous sources. 
Difficult to calculate 
precise track of complex 
paths due to geometry
DME, approach charts
Knowledge of approximate radius 
of turns at various speeds. Add 
up approach segments on charts
FMS performs complex 
geometry and gives precise 
indication of track on planned 
flightpath
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Monitoring Demands 
ID Cognitive Demand Why Difficult Cues/Factors Strategies/Actions Novice Errors Automation
9.06
When do I need to start 
this turn?
Difficult geometry for 
mental calculation, no 
source of information 
provided
Airspeed, turn rate
For 90 degree turn at 250kts and 
standard rate, lead distance is 
groundspeed over 100 
Have not got a similar rule of 
thumb
FMS displays predicted turn 
radius and lead in distance on 
ND
5.02
How long will it take to 
reach a target?
No direct indication, needs 
interpretation
Airspeed, track, wind
Track miles divided by 
groundspeed
Don’t calculate time, tasks 
managament suffers, become 
rushed
FMS offers ETA for waypoints
2.06
What is the state of the 
wind?
Requires capacity for 
mental arithmetic. May be 
working with historical data 
and therefore need to 
estimate or compensate
Actual wind report, wind 
forecasts, groundspeed data
Compute headwind by looking at 
difference between groundspeed 
indication (from dme) and 
airspeed. Compute headwind and 
crosswind components from 
actual wind reports. Compute 
average wind over altitude change 
by looking at forecasts/reports. 
Extrapolate wind at flight level 
forcasts to determine wind at 
current level.  
Base computations on forecast 
wind information and fail to seek 
current wind report. 
INS gives constant indication of 
current wind conditions. The 
need to assess deminishes to 
some extent as wind 
compensation is built into the 
auto-flight system.
10.02
Choose a descent rate to 
reduce speed for next 
gate
Must slow but also remain 
on profile. Speed and 
altitude are tightly coupled 
via energy. Must meet 
gate but inefficient to slow 
too early.
Speed, descent rate, gate 
altitude, current altitude
In idle descent, reduce rate of 
descent to slow. Predict track 
miles for descent to target altitude 
at that rate (rate = time, time = 
distance) adjust rate depending 
on track error
FMS alerts if drag is required to 
achieve gate, VNAV manages 
profile and chooses appropriate 
descent rate 
3.03
How much altitude do I 
need to lose?
Mental arithmetic which 
demands capacity
Approach charts, target 
altitude, current altitude, 
pressure adjustment
HUMAN
10.04
How many miles do I 
have to go?
Can rarely be determined 
precisely as charts contain 
limited information - 
changes if you're not 
exactly flying the published 
procedure
DME, rules of thumb
Select navigation aid at strategic 
location to provide distance 
information easily. Minimal 
interpretation. Add sector lengths 
and estimate unknowns.
will stick with FMS value of track 
following an ATC change for 
longer than expert. Will not 
recompute track value or seek 
that information
FMS porvides very accurate 
value for track miles to run, 
although this is also invalid if 
route is changed.
7.04
What are the headwind 
and crosswind 
components?
Needs to be determined 
from historical information. 
Airspeed, groundspeed, 
time, wind reports
Derive from wind reports or use 
DME and timing against airspeed 
to determine headwind factor. 
Allow error margin.
Use historical information without 
checking if it is accurate. 
FMS provides current wind 
vector information based on INS
3.01 How far have I got to go?
Needs to be interpretend 
from numerous sources. 
Difficult to calculate 
precise track of complex 
paths due to geometry
DME, approach charts
Knowledge of approximate radius 
of turns at various speeds. Add 
up approach segments on charts
FMS performs complex 
geometry and gives precise 
indication of track on planned 
flightpath  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
Modify Plan Demands 
ID Cognitive Demand Why Difficult Cues/Factors Strategies/Actions Novice Errors Automation
7.06
Is that a recoverable 
error?
No firm yes or no answer, 
needs experience to understand 
what is and is not recoverable.
Track miles to next gate, 
distance from threshold
Error tolerance reduces as you get 
closer to your stabilised approach 
point
Autoflight will attempt 
recovery but may not 
succeed
7.07
Can I accept this plan 
change?
Requires rapid assesment of 
many variables
Terrain, type of ATC service, 
radar coverage, sufficient track 
to lose altitude
3 to 1 rule to determine track required 
for altitude change. As rule of thumb 
during early stages of the approach 
reject if the change leaves you more 
than 2-3000ft above profile.
Accept plan changes without 
proper asesment. Reluctance 
to 'say no' to atc.
The FMS will advise if 
approach exceeds capability
3.07
How should we respond 
to this error in profile?
Requires option generation and 
evaluation in time pressured 
environment, knowledge of 
aircraft performance abilities.
Magnitude of altitude error or 
track error, aircraft config
Have reference rules of thumb for 
acceptable error "thresholds" - first 
level is just adjust rate or descent - 
second level needs config change - 
third level is more track or go around
Do not have rough guidelines 
and have to revert to first 
principles to determine what 
is acceptable or 
unacceptable. Requires lots 
of capacity so often causes 
bottleneck
Autoflight automatically 
adjusts profile to achieve 
next gate. 
6.04
How should I correct this 
profile error?
Multiple alternate options Weight, speed, height
Sacrifice energy with speedbrake or 
accept an increase in speed and dive 
off altitude - this depends on 
constraints. Convert profile into track 
error. Use rules of thumb for 
acceptable track errors i.e. 5 miles is 
recoverable, 10 will require 
speedbrake. always use all of the 
speedbrake for this
Don't recognise the need to 
manage speed. Don't make a 
positive correction and allow 
aircraft to 'drift' back onto 
profile, rushed speed 
correction close to target. 
Reluctant to request track 
miles from ATC. Reliance on 
controller to prompt altitude.
Auto-flight automatically 
adjusts profile to achieve 
next gate. 
8.07
Should I execute go-
around or continue to 
land?
Time pressured decision
Visual scene, aircraft status, 
weather, altitude, stability, 
speed, configuration
HUMAN
2.12
Can we correct the 
profile error?
Depends on many varaiables, 
with complex interaction. 
Requires knowledge of aircraft 
performance, often outside of 
typical operating range.
Track miles, airpseed, aircraft 
weight, altitude error, speed 
error, configuration
Have good knowledge of the aircrafts 
performance, i.e. how long it takes to 
slow down at different descent rates 
and configurations. Estimate track 
required to correct and compare to 
what is available.
Become overloaded, show 
good control of aircraft's 
position but fail to consider 
energy and the extended 
implications of their actions. 
May dive to recover profile but 
fail to anticipate speed 
increase for next gate.
The FMS will advise if 
approach exceeds capability
4.07
Can I accept this track 
change?
Track change likely to occur at 
high workload time and requires 
significant re-planning. Need to 
rapidly assess situation
Determine how many track miles will 
be added/subtracted and have rules 
for what is or isn't achievable
Must go back to first 
principles to determine if track 
change can be accepted or 
rejected, consumes capacity. 
Other parameters suffer. 
Communication suffers. 
Novice may allow himslef very 
large margins due to 
uncertainty.
The FMS will advise if 
approach exceeds capability
 
 
General Demands 
ID Cognitive Demand Why Difficult Cues/Factors Strategies/Actions Novice Errors Automation
9.03
How can I my minimise 
workload?
Time pressures reduce that 
available for planning. Lots of 
information needs to be 
interpreted and memorised
segment task into sub-segments, 
consider only the parameters 
applicable to that phase
Fail to segment task and carry 
out tasks concurrently
HUMAN
2.09
What flight information do I 
need to attend to and where 
can I find it?
There are a multitude of 
information sources which 
must be attended to and 
integrated, demanding capacity
Flight phase, task goal
Develop and use effective scan 
patterns. Identify which scan 
pattern should be used for each 
phase of flight to attend only to 
relavent information. Be 
disciplined in frequently executing 
the scan.
Use the same scan for all 
phases of flight, inefficiently 
attending to irrelavent 
information or missing 
important information. Scan 
infrequently or in a random 
fashion, looking at the wrong 
things at the wrong times.
Auto-flight reads flight 
parameters at very high 
frequency and process 
information to generate actions. 
8.09
What flight information do I 
need?
Need to simultaneously attend 
to many variables - assign 
priority to information - 
changes depening upon flight 
phase
Develop a disciplined and frequent 
scan pattern. Develop and use 
different scan patterns depending 
on phase of flight, attending only 
to pertinent information.
Tend to include irrelavent 
information in scan and fail to 
scan frequently
Auto-flight system samples 
flight parameters very 
frequently
9.04
Am I on top of the 
situation? - metacognition
Requires skill to assess your 
own cognitive performance
Stress levels, number and 
frequency of errors
Do not consider their own 
performance
HUMAN
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Appendix C 
ACTA Paper Simulation 
 
Manchester Approach Scenario 
 
 
You are PF operating a medium sized commercial twin jet transport aircraft on a scheduled 
passenger service from Shannon to Manchester. Weather at Manchester is reported as 
above company minimums, with cloud overcast at 2,800ft, wind 320/11kt and 
temperature/dew point 05/03. 
 
The aircraft is not equipped with a Flight Management Computer and has been dispatched 
with no significant malfunctions.   
 
You are tracking inbound to the Wallasey VOR, R278, on the L975 Airway. At D52 from the 
VOR, Manchester clear you for the MIRSI 1B STAR, crossing WAL above FL130, to be 
6000ft by MIRSI, and expect vectors for the ILS DME approach runway 24R.  
 
At D3 from the WAL VOR Manchester advise that the landing runway has switched to 06R. 
Manchester offers you a vectored approach onto the ILS for a 9 mile final, and questions if 
you can accept. Surface wind is reported as 340/13kt. The MCT VOR is tuned on the second 
box and DME currently indicates 33nm.  
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Appendix D 
CAA Standards Document 24 Flight Parameter Tolerances 
 
Tolerance  
 
Altitude or Height  
 
Normal Flight ± 100 ft  
With simulated engine failure ± 100 ft  
Starting go-around at decision alt/ht + 50 ft/-0 ft  
Minimum descent alt/ht + 50 ft/-0 ft  
 
Tracking  
 
All except precision approach ± 5°  
Precision approach half scale deflection azimuth and glidepath  
 
Heading  
 
All engines operating ± 5°  
With simulated engine failure ± 10°  
 
Speed  
 
All engines ± 5kts  
Asymmetric +10 /-5kts and never below V2  
 
Further Guidance  
 
1 Height Accuracy  
The candidate need not be failed if an error of more than 100ft occurs 2/3 times. However, the 
examiner should seriously consider awarding an individual fail if:-  
a) Height error of more than 200ft occurs.  
b) An error of 100ft or more is uncorrected for an unreasonable period of time.  
2 Approach Minima  
a) On a non-precision approach when constant descent profile is flown care must be taken 
not to descend below MDH/A when a missed approach is being conducted.  
b) RVR must be checked against airfield minima prior to commencing an approach to land.  
3 Tracking Accuracy  
a) A failure should be awarded at any time during the test/check if there is an inability to settle 
within +/- 5° of the specified track or correcting track the wrong way and maintaining the error 
for an unreasonable period.  
4 Speed Accuracy  
The 5 kts limit in climb, cruise and approach should be extended to 10 kts in the case of jet 
aircraft and an airspeed error of 15 kts at any time.  
 
NOTE: When making an assessment, handling qualities and aircraft performance should be 
taken into account.  
If the test/check is conducted in an aircraft, the examiner should make allowance for turbulent 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 143 
Appendix E 
 
Matlab M-File for the Computation of Frequency Band Metrics 
(adapted from Johnson, Rantanen & Talleur (2004)) 
 
function spectral=frequency(parameter) 
 
 
 
% Purpose:  
 
% 
 
% estimates the power spectral density function of the time series data 
for 
 
% the parameter specified and compute the power in each frequency 
band. 
 
% 
 
% 
 
% Record of revisions: 
 
% 
 
%   Date        Programmer      Description of change 
 
%   ====        ==========      ===================== 
 
%  5 Dec 06     Ebbatson        Function adapted 
 
%   
 
% 
 
% Define variables: 
 
% 
 
% SOURCEDATA  --  Array containing all the raw flight data 
 
% FLIGHT   --  Index of rawdata file in focus (ex file) 
 
% FS --  Parameter sampling rate 
 
% BASERATE --  Highest sampling rate in rawdata file (ex fs) 
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global FS 
 
global BASERATE 
 
global FLIGHT 
 
global METRICINDEX 
 
global OUTPUT 
 
global SEGMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
% Calculate the power spectral density function upto the Nyquist 
frequency using the fft 
 
 
 
data=getsample(parameter); 
 
BASERATE=FS/2; 
 
NPO2=2.^(ceil(log(length(data))/log(2)));  
 
NumUniquePts=ceil((NPO2+1)/2);   
 
spectrum=fft(data,NPO2); 
 
spectrum=spectrum(1:NumUniquePts);  
 
MX=abs(spectrum).^2;  
 
MX(1)=MX(1)/2;  
 
if ~rem(NPO2,2)  
 
    MX(length(MX))=MX(length(MX))/2; 
 
end 
 
MX=MX*2; MX=MX/length(data);     
 
f=(0:NumUniquePts-1)*2*BASERATE/NPO2;  
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PSD=MX; 
 
Freq=f'; 
 
 
 
 
 
%Calculate cumulative sum of power spectral density  
 
 
 
y=cumsum(MX);   
 
PSD_total=sum(MX);    
 
norm_y=y/PSD_total; 
 
 
 
% create a matrix containing the freqency band limits 
 
 
 
bands=5; 
 
bpf1=0.05; 
 
bpf2=0.10; 
 
bpf3=0.15; 
 
bpf4=0.20; 
 
bpf5=0.25; 
 
bp_freq=[bpf1, bpf2, bpf3, bpf4, bpf5];  
 
 
 
%find matrix index which corresponds to the frequency band limit 
 
 
 
for k=1:bands 
 
    d=find(f>=bp_freq(k)); 
 
    bp_index(k)=d(1); 
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end 
 
 
 
%determine power in the signal up to frequency band limit 
 
 
 
bp1=y(bp_index(1)); 
 
bp2=y(bp_index(2)); 
 
bp3=y(bp_index(3)); 
 
bp4=y(bp_index(4)); 
 
bp5=y(bp_index(5)); 
 
 
 
%determine power just in the frequency band 
 
 
 
VLF=bp1; 
 
LF=bp2-bp1; 
 
MF=bp3-bp2; 
 
HF=bp4-bp3; 
 
VHF=bp5-bp4; 
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Appendix F 
Ethics Proposal for Airline Study 
 
 
Loss of Manual Flight Skills in Air Transport Pilots 
Ethics Proposal for an Experimental Study 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Modern jet transport aircraft typically employ automated systems to perform the basic flying 
duties. The pilots, rather than manipulating the primary flying controls, command the aircraft 
by entering targets into the auto-flight system and then monitoring its performance. In this 
manner many of the psycho-motor and cognitive skills required for traditional manual flight are 
redundant. There is therefore a credible concern within the aviation industry that the 
infrequently exercised manual flight skills may be decaying, perhaps towards the limit of 
acceptable standards.  
 
This research study aims to measure the manual flying performance of a broad sample of 
current, UK licensed, jet transport pilots, exploring the general level of proficiency and any 
sources of variation within that sample. 
 
Methodology 
 
Both technical and non-technical aspects of pilot performance will be investigated using flight 
data records and observer assessments. The data is to be collected whilst pilots perform part 
of their bi-annual simulator based proficiency check. This check is a standard licensing 
requirement for all UK air transport pilots and incorporates a number of manual flight 
elements. Flight data will be recovered from the simulator device and the participating license 
examiners will be asked to provide the observational assessments. Participating pilots will 
also be asked to provide demographic and career background information via an anonymous 
pro-forma following the simulator session.  
 
Informed Consent 
 
All air transport pilots are required to complete a proficiency check within six months of their 
previous validation. Consent to approach individual pilots to request their participation will be 
sought from both the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) and from the appropriate 
managers of the participating airlines.  
 
As the individual pilots report for their training session, and at a convenient time which does 
not interfere with their preparation activities, the examiner in charge (an airline staff member 
who also acts as an appropriately trained member of the research team) will introduce the 
research and provide a written explanation for the crew to consult, requesting their 
participation. At the end of this document crews will be asked to provide written consent if 
they wish to participate in the research. It will be emphasised that non-participation will not be 
viewed negatively.   
Deception 
 
There is no requirement or intention to deceive the participants. Prior to the trial the 
participants will be informed that the general purpose of the research is to investigate the 
pilots handling performance. The researcher will not detail the specific phases of flight to be 
assessed in order to avoid influencing the participant’s response. These details will be given 
during the debrief session. 
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Debriefing 
 
At the close of the study the participants will be fully debriefed as to the exact purpose of the 
research. They will be provided with a written explanation of the research, including the 
contact details of the research team should they later have any questions. Participants will 
also be asked to avoid discussing the research with other potential participants to avoid 
biasing their performance.  
 
Right to Withdraw 
 
As part of the pre-study briefing it will be stressed that all participants have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time and that any data contributed up to that point will 
subsequently be destroyed. However, it will also be explained that it will be impossible to 
remove their data following the days exercise as it will have been de-identified and 
aggregated with other data.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
All data will be collected anonymously. Data sets will be identified and collated according to 
the time and date when they were recorded. The researcher will hold the raw data securely 
and confidentially. It will be explained that any published data will also be anonymous and as 
part of an aggregated set. No individual data record will ever be presented.  
 
Risk to Participants 
 
The study will not involve any risk of physical or psychological harm and duress. The research 
study uses the existing license proficiency check process and therefore does not alter the 
standard by which participating pilots are measured.   
 
Protection of Participants 
 
The participants will be assured of confidentiality, and briefed that any data downloaded from 
the simulator will be de-identified and stored securely at Cranfield University. They will also be 
encouraged to contact the researcher if they wished to discuss any other concerns. 
 
Observational Work 
 
Observational work will be carried out with participants during their proficiency check 
programme. Consequently, the participant will be aware they are being observed and why. 
However, the observations will take place during normal assessment sessions when the 
participants expect to be observed by the examiner. 
 
Professional Conduct 
 
The research will be carried out in such a manner as to uphold the continued reputation of the 
university. The researcher will also ensure that the research will be conducted in a 
professional manner to ensure the continued support of the public for similar work. Final 
approval for the research will be obtained from the Cranfield University Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix G 
TRE Scoring Scale 
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Appendix H 
Boeing 737 Classic Series - Main Panel 
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Appendix I 
Demographic Pro-Forma 
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Appendix J 
General Performance Metric Results 
 
 
Straight & Level Segment Performance Metrics – description of distribution 
 
Straight and Level Tracking Performance 
 Min Max Mean SD 
     
Spatial Tracking Error     
  Altitude ME (ft.) 
-
328.066 171.787 4.178 79.678 
  Altitude SDE (ft.) 0.724 18.441 5.277 3.501 
  Heading ME (deg.) -12.822 8.103 -4.497 3.764 
  Heading SDE (deg.) 0.055 0.586 0.239 0.132 
     
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 1254 74627 15478 14551 
  Low Frequency Band 162 14437 4345 2849 
  Mid Frequency Band 335 12288 2900 2375 
  High Frequency Band 413 11617 3355 2398 
  Very High Frequency Band 200 4471 1524 1081 
     
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 4 590 120 128 
  Low Frequency Band 1 59 13 14 
  Mid Frequency Band 1 42 7 7 
  High Frequency Band 0 10 4 2 
  Very High Frequency Band 0 9 2 2 
     
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 242 1786 597 291 
  Low Frequency Band 4 51 16 9 
  Mid Frequency Band 2 18 6 4 
  High Frequency Band 1 9 3 2 
  Very High Frequency Band 0 4 1 1 
     
Throttle Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 67924 210268 101144 27887 
  Low Frequency Band 1104 6058 2513 871 
  Mid Frequency Band 366 1671 741 270 
  High Frequency Band 195 883 404 143 
  Very High Frequency Band 113 362 201 55 
 
 
 154 
 
 
 
ILS Segment Performance Metrics – description of distribution 
 
ILS Tracking Performance 
 Min Max Mean SD 
     
Spatial Tracking Error     
  Localiser ME (dots) -0.542 2.179 0.146 0.354 
  Localiser SDE (dots) 0.006 0.103 0.030 0.022 
  Glideslope ME (dots) -1.098 0.203 -0.024 0.177 
  Glideslope SDE (dots) 0.003 0.032 0.011 0.006 
  Airspeed ME (kts) -10.502 14.115 0.458 5.529 
  Airspeed SDE (kts) 0.083 0.666 0.268 0.140 
     
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 1253 67281 13020 11138 
  Low Frequency Band 339 30891 6341 6451 
  Mid Frequency Band 775 48763 5018 6760 
  High Frequency Band 1381 32733 8371 7065 
  Very High Frequency Band 656 23725 4599 4096 
     
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 3 260 62 58 
  Low Frequency Band 2 47 12 9 
  Mid Frequency Band 1 25 8 6 
  High Frequency Band 1 16 5 3 
  Very High Frequency Band 1 17 4 3 
     
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 476 1834 1042 321 
  Low Frequency Band 10 81 28 12 
  Mid Frequency Band 1 63 7 10 
  High Frequency Band 1 25 5 6 
  Very High Frequency Band 1 11 3 2 
     
Throttle Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 61730 112806 82965 10523 
  Low Frequency Band 1209 4129 2170 553 
  Mid Frequency Band 179 1554 418 331 
  High Frequency Band 123 1076 285 219 
  Very High Frequency Band 95 804 235 162 
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Missed Approach Performance Metrics – description of distribution 
 
Missed Approach Tracking Performance 
 Min Max Mean SD 
     
Spatial Tracking Error     
  Track ME (deg.) -16.169 16.158 -2.897 4.559 
  Track SDE (deg.) 0.137 3.005 0.635 0.486 
  Airspeed ME (kts) -4.516 21.766 5.479 6.859 
  Airspeed SDE (kts) 0.152 1.492 0.758 0.352 
     
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 900 110807 17219 20156 
  Low Frequency Band 1597 60983 10843 10651 
  Mid Frequency Band 889 22272 6648 5433 
  High Frequency Band 525 32395 6124 5821 
  Very High Frequency Band 117 10201 1967 2079 
     
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 3 459 73 88 
  Low Frequency Band 2 84 17 16 
  Mid Frequency Band 1 20 7 5 
  High Frequency Band 1 24 7 6 
  Very High Frequency Band 0 21 4 4 
     
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 1370 6357 3303 1013 
  Low Frequency Band 32 194 83 41 
  Mid Frequency Band 8 157 45 35 
  High Frequency Band 8 140 33 27 
  Very High Frequency Band 1 27 9 6 
     
Throttle Power (degs²/hz)     
  Very Low Frequency Band 126383 247849 169576 26460 
  Low Frequency Band 1821 5215 3350 768 
  Mid Frequency Band 678 2205 1258 342 
  High Frequency Band 474 1685 994 306 
  Very High Frequency Band 170 545 309 94 
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Appendix K 
Correlation of General Flying Experience with Performance 
 
 
Correlations between performance metric score and number of fixed wing 
hours on the straight and level segment of the exercise. 
 
TRE-Performance Metric Correlations (Straight & Level) 
 r N p 
    
Spatial Tracking Error    
  Altitude ME (ft.) -.010 49 .949 
  Altitude SDE (ft.) -.103 49 .489 
  Heading ME (deg.) -.029 49 .844 
  Heading SDE (deg.) -.026 49 .861 
    
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -.046 49 .760 
  Low Frequency Band -.141 49 .923 
  Mid Frequency Band -.053 49 .388 
  High Frequency Band .143 49 .534 
  Very High Frequency Band -.126 49 .978 
    
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -.090 49 .545 
  Low Frequency Band .070 49 .641 
  Mid Frequency Band .163 49 .272 
  High Frequency Band .214 49 .149 
  Very High Frequency Band .101 49 .500 
    
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band .275 49 .062 
  Low Frequency Band .162 49 .277 
  Mid Frequency Band .075 49 .615 
  High Frequency Band .161 49 .278 
  Very High Frequency Band -.02 49 .892 
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Correlations between performance metric score and total fixed wing hours on the ILS 
tracking segment of the exercise. 
 
TRE-Performance Metric Correlations (ILS) 
 r N p 
    
Spatial Tracking Error    
  Localiser ME (dots) -.187 49 .199 
  Localiser SDE (dots) -.072 49 .623 
  Glideslope ME (dots) -.017 49 .910 
  Glideslope SDE (dots) -.005 49 .970 
  Airspeed ME (kts) .053 49 .715 
  Airspeed SDE (kts) .080 49 .582 
    
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -.226 49 .119 
  Low Frequency Band -.183 49 .207 
  Mid Frequency Band -.062 49 .672 
  High Frequency Band .275 49 .056 
  Very High Frequency Band -.054 49 .715 
    
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band .195 49 .179 
  Low Frequency Band -.133 49 .362 
  Mid Frequency Band -.058 49 .694 
  High Frequency Band -.219 49 .131 
  Very High Frequency Band -.062 49 .674 
    
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -.164 49 .261 
  Low Frequency Band -.237 49 .101 
  Mid Frequency Band -.207 49 .154 
  High Frequency Band -.106 49 .467 
  Very High Frequency Band -.192 49 .187 
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Correlations between performance metric score and total fixed wing hours on the 
missed approach segment of the exercise. 
 
TRE-Performance Metric Correlations (Missed Approach) 
 r N p 
    
Spatial Tracking Error    
  Track ME (deg.) .010 49 .947 
  Track SDE (deg.) .086 49 .564 
  Airspeed ME (kts) -.281 49 .055 
  Airspeed SDE (kts) -.109 49 .465 
    
Control Wheel Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -.252 49 .088 
  Low Frequency Band -.208 49 .161 
  Mid Frequency Band -.080 49 .591 
  High Frequency Band .249 49 .092 
  Very High Frequency Band -.077 49 .608 
    
Control Column Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band .216 49 .144 
  Low Frequency Band -.124 49 .408 
  Mid Frequency Band -.099 49 .510 
  High Frequency Band -.274 49 .063 
  Very High Frequency Band -.127 49 .394 
    
Rudder Power (degs²/hz)    
  Very Low Frequency Band -.224 49 .131 
  Low Frequency Band -.259 49 .079 
  Mid Frequency Band -.202 49 .173 
  High Frequency Band -.102 49 .496 
  Very High Frequency Band -.158 49 .288 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
